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Chapter I
Environmental Investment and Export Dynamics
Introduction
This paper develops a dynamic model of environmental abatement and exports with heterogeneous firms.
Specifically, the paper addresses the impact of firm-level actions taken to reduce deforestation in Indonesia
on domestic and export performance. The model emphasizes the role of firm-level environmental invest-
ment and export decisions on the evolution of the distribution of abatement and exports in Indonesian
timber industries. The model is estimated using firm-level data from Indonesian timber manufacturers.
Counterfactual policy experiments are used to assess the policy implications of trade and environmental
regulation.
Today, consumers are often encouraged to “think globally and act locally” when purchasing a wide
range of goods. What is less clear is whether such actions have discernable impacts on global environ-
mental choices or outcomes. That is, can increasing demand for more environmentally conscious goods
change the nature of production and products on a global level? This issue is particularly difficult since
many goods of environmental concern are produced in developing countries which are often characterized
by weak environmental regulation. Moreover, given the sparcity of data linking environmental actions in
one country with outcomes in others it is nearly impossible to quantify or evaluate the potential role of
evolving environmental preferences or regulation on production, abatement and export decisions across
countries. We study one of the few cases (if not the only case) where there exists producer-specific in-
formation regarding both the actions taken by producers in a developing country and outcomes of these
actions in export markets. We exploit the unique structure of trade and international timber product certi-
fication during the early 1990s along with unique data on environmental decisions from the same period
to document and quantify the impact of actions taken to reduce deforestation on export market demand in
the Indonesian wood furniture and saw mills industries.
This is not to suggest that there is little existing literature linking trade and environmental outcomes.
Rather the opposite is true, particularly in developing countries. For example, Copeland and Taylor (1994,
1995) argue that international trade may be particularly likely to increase pollution in countries that have
a comparative advantage in pollution-intensive industries. Similarly, Ederington et al. (2005) and Levin-
son and Taylor (2008) argue that when we examine trade between developed and developing countries
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we often observe substantial reallocation of environmentally harmful production. In contrast, numerous
authors cast doubt on the hypothesis that free trade will create pollution havens or reduce environmental
quality.1 We contribute to this literature by examining firm-level abatement and exporting activities and
characterizing their behavior for a critical, resource-intensive industry in a developing country.
Recent research on export dynamics has emphasized the complementarity between investment and ex-
porting activities. Costantini and Melitz (2008), Ederington and McCalman (2008), Atkeson and Burstein
(2010), Lileeva and Trefler (2010) and Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011) highlight this link across firm-level
decisions and emphasize the impact it may have on the evolution of firm-level outcomes over time. We
follow this literature by examining the relationship between exporting and the investment in mitigating
negative outcomes on the natural environment.
While the preceding literature has stressed the link between investment and exporting through the
impact of investment on the evolution of firm-level productivity, our paper, in contrast, emphasizes the
impact of environmental investment on the evolution of export demand at the firm-level. In this sense,
our paper is also related to the literature on firm-level decisions, productivity and demand as in Foster et
al (2008) or Eaton et al (2009). Using standard variation in domestic and export revenues we develop
a methodology to estimate dynamic, stochastic, market-specific returns to firm-level investments even
when those returns are only partially observed (since relatively few firms export in any given year). We
examine a situation where firms may choose to make environmental investments which have differential
future returns in both export and domestic markets. While exporting firms are able to directly capture
the return from such actions in export markets, we also consider the possibility that non-exporting firms
internalize the benefit that current environmental investments have on potential export sales in the future.
A large number of papers have studied whether environmental investment improves firm-level perfor-
mance, with mixed results. Gollop and Roberts (1983), Smith and Sims (1983) and Brannlund (1995)
all report large productivity declines, while Berman and Bui (2001) find significant improvements and
Gray (1987) finds no significant change at all.2 Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue that any measured
productivity gain from environmental investment may actually reflect an increase in the demand for goods
from “environmentally clean” sources. This interpretation is consistent with the evidence in Teisl et al.
(2002) and Bjorner et al. (2004) which document that environmental labeling can have large impacts on
1See Grossman and Krueger (1995), Antweiler et al. (2001), or Frankel and Rose (2005) for examples.
2These papers study regulation in the US fossil-fueled electric power generator, Canadian brewing, Swedish pulp and paper,
US oil refinery and US manufacturing industries, respectively. Further studies of environmental management on firm performance
include Jaffe and Palmer (1997), Konar and Cohen (2001) and Brunnermeier and Cohen (2003). Theoretical arguments for the
impact of regulation on firm-level efficiency and environmental performance can be found in Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999),
Ambec and Barla (2002), Campbell (2003), Bajona et al. (2010) and references therein.
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consumer demand in US and European markets, respectively.
Although some of the above mentioned papers examine the impact of environmental investment on
firm performance, none of them capture the impact of trade decisions on firm behavior. Kaiser and Schulze
(2003) and Girma et al. (2008) explicitly examine the interaction of firm-level abatement with the deci-
sion to export abroad. While they confirm that exporting firms from Indonesia and the UK are more
likely to abate, they do not study the impact of environmental expenditures or exporting on the evolution
of productivity, export demand and export/abatement decisions over time. Similarly, Holladay (2010)
demonstrates that exporting U.S. firms tend to emit 5.3 percent less than non-exporting firms on average.
He is not, however, able to directly observe whether exporting firms have actively pursued environmental
abatement. Pargal and Wheeler (1996) report that larger, more efficient firms tend to produce less local
pollution on average in Indonesia. Our paper, in contrast, emphasizes the internal incentive firms may have
to reduce local environmental degradation: an increase in profits. Moreover, conditional on the domestic
market response to abatement behavior we are able to separately distinguish whether there are further
gains in export markets. In fact, our results will suggest that exporting and environmental investment are
closely linked within firms.
We build a dynamic structural model of exporting and abatement. As in the preceding exporting and
abatement research we allow abatement and export decisions to influence the evolution of future produc-
tivity. However, our model adds another layer of firm-level heterogeneity, export demand, whose evolution
is an endogenous function of firm decisions. The model links exporting and abatement through four mech-
anisms. First, the return to either activity is increasing in the firm’s productivity, so that high-productivity
firms self-select into both activities. Second, each activity potentially influences future productivity re-
inforcing the first effect. Third, we allow future export demand to depend directly on investment in
abatement, encouraging future entry into export markets. Last, entry into either activity influences the
return from undertaking the other activity. The decision to export directly influences the probability of
abatement and vice-versa.
The data employed in this paper contain unique information detailing firm-level expenditures on en-
vironmental abatement, export decisions, and domestic and export revenues for all firms with more than
20 employees in the Indonesian manufacturing sector. While several papers have examined firm-level
emissions we are not aware of any other data set that captures variation in abatement behavior across
trade-oriented manufacturing firms. Fowlie (2010) examines firm-level abatement in the US electricity
industry, but does not investigate the interaction of abatement with firm-level trade decisions given the
3
domestic-orientation of this industry.
Our approach has a number of advantages. First, we are able to be specific regarding the environ-
mental concern in the wood furniture and saw mills industries and tailor our model to suit these particular
manufacturing industries. Second, deforestation is a leading environmental concern in Indonesia and has
generated substantial interest both within Indonesia and abroad. Deforestation is a key environmental is-
sue in Latin America, Eastern Europe, West and Central Africa and South East Asia. In almost every case
deforestation and illegal timber practices are closely tied to international trade (WWF, 2008). Despite its
importance, deforestation has received almost no attention in the economics literature. Third, the nature
of the sustainable resource issue studied here is typical of the type of trade-off between resource depletion
and development common in many developing countries. Sachs and Warner (1995) document that the
economic development in Latin America has relied heavily on natural resources and the degree to which
resource booms influence trade have important implications for economic growth.3
The model is estimated in two steps. First, the parameters governing the evolution of productivity are
estimated using control function techniques as in Olley and Pakes (1996) and Doraszelski and Jaumandreu
(2008). We find that abatement has little effect on firm productivity or on the evolution of domestic sales in
the timber industry. The remaining dynamic parameters are estimated by Bayesian Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) methods. Our results suggest that deciding to abate has a significant positive effect on
the evolution of export demand. We observe that firms which choose to start using wood in a sustainable,
environmentally conscious manner observe export demand grow 1.4 to 6 percent faster than non-abating
firms. Consistent with evidence from the US, we further find that industries whose main product is closer
to a finished product tend to enjoy larger increases in demand from such activity (Arora and Cason, 1996).
We perform a number of counterfactual experiments in order to quantitatively assess the impact of
policy on firms’ decisions in a developing country. The experiments highlight that small changes in the
regulatory environment can have large impacts on exporting and abatement over time. Moreover, similar
to the evidence found in Ryan (2010), we demonstrate that the entry costs associated with these activities
play a key role in determining aggregate outcomes over time.
The experiments suggest that trade liberalization and abatement subsidies encourage exporting and
environmental investment. In the wood furniture industry increasing the size of the export market by 20
percent increases export participation rates by 22 percentage points over ten years while also increasing
abatement rates by 33 percentage points. Reducing the cost of abatement by 20 percent similarly increases
3Similarly, McNeely (1993) indicates that increased trade in Africa has lead to substantial resource depletion across many
African countries.
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exports and abatement by 1 and 7 percent, respectively, in the same industry and time period. Last, we
study the impact of shutting out firms which do not abate from export markets. We find that restricting
export markets from environmentally non-compliant exporting firms encourages abatement, but causes
export participation to fall. In the wood furniture industry the proportion of abating firms grows by 43
percentage points over ten years, but the proportion of exporting firms falls by 20 percentage points outlin-
ing a clear trade-off between these objectives. The experiments confirm that ignoring differential returns
to the same activity on different markets can potentially lead to misleading policy conclusions.
The next section describes the importance of the Indonesian timber industry, both at home and abroad.
Sections 2 and 3 present the model and describe the estimation methodology. The fourth section describes
the data while sections 5 and 6 present the empirical results and policy experiments. The last section
concludes.
Deforestation, Abatement and Trade in Indonesia
Deforestation and Domestic Policy
Indonesia is home to a rich endowment of natural resources, including the worlds second largest expanse
of tropical forest. The timber industry accounts for almost 20 percent of total output, 33 percent of
total manufactured exports and played leading role in sustaining GDP growth rates near eight percent per
annum before the 1997-1998 Asian crisis (FWI/GFW, 2002). The most common timber exports include
plywood, profiled wood, wood furniture and other finished wood products (WWF, 2008). The success
of manufactured Indonesian wood products on foreign markets is often tied to numerous policies which
restrict the export of whole logs in order to encourage the development of the timber manufacturing
industry in export markets (Resosudarmo and Yusuf, 2006).
In 1950 forests covered over 162 million hectares of the Indonesian archipelago. By 2000 forest
coverage had fallen to 98 million hectares, a 40 percent loss. During the 1980s it is estimated that 1
million hectares of forest were cleared per year, with that rate accelerating to 1.7 million hectares per
year by 1990 and 2 million hectares per year by 1996. By 2000, tropical forests had been nearly cleared
from the region of Sulawesi and were shrinking rapidly in both the Sumatra and Kalimantan regions of
Indonesia.4 Due to the lack of domestic enforcement, Indonesian wood manufacturers routinely ignore
harvest licenses and log trees illegally in order to export timber products abroad. It is estimated that of all
of the wood products manufactured in Indonesia as much as three-quarters may be from illegally logged
4These figures are taken from the FWI/GFW report (2002).
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timber.5
We are most interested in the policy environment between 1994 to 1997 during which we have access
to data describing firm-level abatement decisions. Indonesian manufacturers faced few domestic environ-
mental regulations during our period of study. There were notable environmental programs in place by
1986 which encompassed a number of recommendations for air, water quality, hazardous waste control
and deforestation (Afsah et al., 2000 and WWF, 2008), although compliance was extremely low since en-
forcement was essentially non-existent (Afsah and Vincent, 1997). Finally, in 1994 Indonesia was prepar-
ing to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). While trade barriers fell across timber manufacturing
industries, tariffs in major export markets were already relatively low before trade liberalization.6
Saw Mills, Wood Furniture and Deforestation
Environmental impacts do vary somewhat across distinct timber industries. We focus on the two largest
industries classified at the 4-digit ISIC code level, the saw mill and wood furniture industries.7 In most
timber industries, operations include the handling and transportation of logs, the drying of timber, sorting
and classification, although these activities plays a larger role in the saw mills industry (McCarthy, 2002).
In contrast, several rare woods, some of which are particularly close to extinction, are used intensively in
the production of wood furniture.8
Although deforestation is by-far the primary concern in these industries, it is not the exclusive en-
vironmental concern in this sector (Resosudarmo and Yusuf, 2006 and Synnott, 2005). Other saw mills
activities include the transformation (sawing) of logs into dimension lumber, boards, and beams. Aside
from design, typical operations in the wood furniture manufacturing industry include finishing, gluing,
cleaning, and wash-off (EPA, 1995). Timber certification schemes, as we detail below, require firms to
reduce the environmental impact on these dimensions as well so that consumers can be confident that
they are purchasing a product that was produced in an environmentally conscious manner over its entire
life-cycle.
5McCarthy (2002) reports that 60 percent of saw mills in the province of South Aceh were operating without necessary
licenses during the mid-1990s. Similarly, Indonesia is reportedly the largest South-Asian exporter of illegally logged wood
products to Europe and the second-largest European source of illegal wood products in the world (WWF, 2008).
6Although the EU added environmental clauses to its generalized scheme of tariff preferences (GSP) in 1998, Brack et al.
(2002) report that no country has applied for these tariff reductions due to the low rate of duties already applied to timber products
in importing countries.
7A joint report by the World Resources Institute and Forest Watch Indonesia provide exhaustive details of environmental
impacts in the Indonesian timber industries: http://pdf.wri.org/indoforest full.pdf.
8For example, Merbau (or Kwila), a highly-prized tropical hardwood typically used to manufacture high-end luxury timber
products, may be extinct world wide by 2042. By 2007, 83 percent of Indonesia’s stock of Merbau had already been logged or
was allocated for logging (Greenpeace, 2007).
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Nonetheless, to check that abatement expenditures were primarily directed towards deforestation in
these industries we investigated whether firm-level abatement activities have any impact on the rate at
which firms use energy, intermediate materials or capital since these activities have been established as
a good proxy for emissions (Cole and Elliott, 2003). Consistent with the results in Pargal and Wheeler
(1996) we find no evidence that abatement has any effect on these firm-level attributes in the timber
industry.9
Foreign Responses to Deforestation
In the mid 1980s and early 1990s, deforestation of tropical forests, began to receive greater international
attention. During the 1980s international organizations such as the World Bank and Food and Agricul-
ture Organization of the United Nations, in conjunction with numerous bilateral agencies, begin funding
numerous projects to improve timber management, particularly in tropics (Synnott, 2005).10
The global institutional framework during the early 1990s played a key role in determining mech-
anism through which abatement operates in the timber products industry. In particular, Article 20 of
the GATT (and later WTO agreements) obliges member countries to treat imports and domestic goods
equally, regardless of the nature of production. Despite international concern over tropical deforestation
there were few government actions taken to distinguish sustainably produced products. The 1992 United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development resolved to encourage sustainable harvesting prac-
tices across countries, but did not bind signatories (Tarasofsky, 1994). While Indonesia signed and ratified
numerous similar agreements, essentially none of these agreements were binding. While it was initially
expected that these agreements would eventually become binding, no such agreements were adopted dur-
ing this period.11
9Details and full results can be found in the Supplemental Appendix. Although these processes generate environmental
concerns due to air toxins contained in solvents and glue adhesives, a number of inexpensive, less toxic substitutes are widely
available (Pollution Prevention Resource Exchange, 2011).
10For example, the Tropical Forest Action Plan or the International Tropical Timber Organization.
11Austria and the Netherlands attempted to create national timber industry trade policies. In 1992, Austria introduced a
special import duty of 70 per cent and a compulsory labeling system for tropical timber. The Netherlands sought to only allow
imports of tropical timber only from regions where sustainable forestry management is practiced by 1995. The governments
of Indonesia and Malaysia, primary suppliers to the Netherlands, brought these measures to the attention of the GATT. While
these disagreements led to the cancelation of policies shortly after they were enacted it was expected these laws were broadly
considered precursors to binding European agreements (Lee, 1997 and Patterson, 1997). However, the European Union reports
that a Voluntary Partnership Agreement with Indonesia has only been signed very recently (European Union, 2011).
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Corporate Responses to Deforestation
In the late 1980s many timber retailers came under increased pressure to provide sustainably harvested
alternatives, as numerous NGOs called for outright boycotts of tropical timber products (Synnott, 2005).
By 1992 a number of the world’s largest timber retailers had developed and instituted wood purchasing
policies emphasizing environmental consciousness and tropical forest sustainability. Examples include
the largest Do-It-Yourself (DIY) retailers in the US and UK, HomeDepot and B&Q, respectively, and the
world’s largest furniture retailer, IKEA.12 These policies were influential in determining the nature of
timber certification which followed shortly thereafter (Synnott, 2005).
Concurrently, across Europe and North America corporations in timber-related industries joined to-
gether to form buying groups committed to purchasing sustainably harvested wood. The first such group
was formed in 1991 among 18 UK timber-purchasing firms from a variety of end-product industries. By
1996 similar groups had formed in Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Ireland, Switzerland, Austria, Ger-
many, Spain, Sweden and North America.13 As an increasing number of firms became committed to
purchasing sustainably harvested timber it became clear that there was a distinct need for an independent,
global certification. In particular, purchasing firms needed a credible mechanism to evaluate a product’s
environmental impact over the entire course of production from harvesting to final use (Synnott, 2005).
The lack of such a mechanism provided the necessary motivation for the creation of the initial forest
certification bodies.
Smartwood, the FSC and LEI
In contrast to inter-governmental agreements, progress on voluntary timber certification came quickly.
This provided a mechanism through which producers could voluntarily opt to distinguish their product on
the basis of how it was produced in export markets. Moreover, because these certification schemes were
operated by global, independent, non-governmental organizations, they did not run the risk of contraven-
ing GATT regulations since they were not administered by national governments (Okubo, 1998). Retailers
in major export markets were quick to adopt these independent labels which allowed them to distinguish
environmentally negligent and conscious suppliers on their store shelves. We document that this practice
12In the Supplemental Appendix we have compiled a list of more than 40 industry-leading, timber-purchasing corporations
who made similar commitments during our period of study for our products of interest. Note that this list is not intended to
be exhaustive. We only wish to illustrate the degree of corporate commitments to the issue of deforestation in tropical forests.
Hundreds of other commitments in these industries can be readily found online with international organizations such as the Global
Forest Trade Network (http://gftn.panda.org/), the TFT (formerly Tropical Forest Trust, www.tft-forests.org/) or the Rainforest
Alliance (http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/).
13See the Supplemental Appendix for further details and various citations.
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was common, particularly among the largest retailers in many of Indonesia’s largest export markets for
timber products.14
Consumer guides and timber certification began to appear as early as 1987 (Synnott, 2005). In 1989
the Rainforest Alliance had established its global “SmartWood” forest certification program and began
certification in Indonesia in 1990. The “Smartwood” certification grew in Indonesia throughout 1991-
1993 and has been shown to have had an important impact on producers: initial adopters of certification
benefitted from a substantial rise demand traced to a export boom sustainably harvested Indonesian teak
furniture (Muhtaman and Prasetyo, 2006).
By 1990 numerous international meetings were organized to explore the idea of an global, independent
timber monitoring agency. In particular, in 1990 the Certification Working Group was born from meetings
of numerous timber users, traders and environmental organizations in California. This group paved the
way for the eventual establishment of Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) certification in 1993 (Perera and
Vlosky, 2006). A key accomplishment of this group was the establishment of a criterion for evaluating
sustainably produced timber products worldwide (Synnott, 2005).
There are three keys features of FSC certification that are important for our study. First, the FSC
certification is required at each stage of production. That is, when consumers inquire about FSC certi-
fication they can assured that the product was produced in an environmentally conscious manner from
harvesting to retailing. Second, although deforestation was the primary motivation for the creation of FSC
certification, the FSC requires that timber producers take action to broadly reduce their impact on the
environment. For instance, furniture producers are not just asked to use better sources of wood but also
to adopt more environmentally conscious adhesives, finishes, etc. As such, any action taken by firms to
reduce the environmental impact can contribute to FSC certification. Third, FSC was the most prominent
global certification available to Indonesian producers during our sample period (Synnott, 2005).15
In 1993 the Indonesian government established the Lembaga Ekolabel Indonesia Working Group
(LEI) to study the potential for a national certification scheme which would enable Indonesian producers
to establish that their products were meeting international sustainability expectations. Based on the FSC
guidelines, the LEI created a framework for timber certification tailored to the Indonesian context. In
1998 the group severed ties with the government and began certifying producers. While the LEI did not
directly certify products between 1994 and 1997 they were working closely with Indonesian firms to help
14See the Supplemental Appendix for a timeline of standards adoption for firms such as B&Q, Carre f our, Homebase,
HomeDepot, IKEA and Walmart among others.
15Numerous alternatives appeared shortly after 1996-1997 such as the PEFC and ISO 14001.
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them meet international sustainability standards (Muhtaman and Prasetyo, 2006).
While certification was voluntary, numerous studies have found that voluntary certifications can have
substantial impact on demand. Chen, Otsuki and Wilson (2008) find meeting foreign standards does
have a significant impact on export performance among manufacturing firms in developing countries.
Moreover, Arora and Cason (1996) demonstrate that these effects may be particularly important for firms
which produce relatively finished products. Market studies suggest that over the 1992-1996 period tropical
timber consumption fell by 36 percent in Germany, the UK and the Netherlands (Greenpeace, 1999) and
that by 2000 certified wood products accounted for at least 5 percent of all timber sales in Western Europe
(Brack et al., 2002).
Certification, however, can be quite costly. These expenditures often include changes in forest man-
agement, creating separate inventories of certified and non-certified products, tracking certified products
through all previous stages of production and the costs directly associated with the actual certification pro-
cess (Perera and Vlosky, 2006). Studies focussing on Indonesia emphasize costs associated with securing
lands from illegal logging activities, redesigning the working area and allocating some land to protected
area (Muhtaman and Prasetyo, 2006).16 The actual certification process includes preparing the firm for a
certification audit, paying the auditors’ costs (travel, field visits, reports, annual follow-ups, certificates),
and compliance costs associated with changes in management and employee training (Fischer et al, 2005).
Some studies suggest that certification can increase costs by 5-25 percent (Gan (2005)), but others note
these costs generally display large economies of scale (Fischer et al, 2005).
A Structural Model of Abatement and Exporting
We contribute to a rich literature that examines firm entry into exports markets such as Roberts and
Tybout (1997), Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998), Melitz (2003) and models of exporting and investment
as in Costantini and Melitz (2008), Atkeson and Burstein (2010), Lileeva and Trefler (2010). Our structural
model is closest to the structural models of firm entry into export markets presented in Das, Roberts and
Tybout (2007) and Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011). While we will also allow abatement to influence the
evolution of productivity, we do not need (or necessarily expect) that this is the primary mechanism
through which abatement influences export decisions.
16Examples reported by Indonesian timber producers include expenditures incurred to patrol their licensed timber holdings
with military or police officers and the making of guard posts. The government does not fund these operations in Indonesia. Other
timber producer have noted that they needed to restructure their production area to allocate some timber sources to conversation
forests and recover higher percentage from the trees that were cut Muhtaman and Prasetyo, 2006).
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We prefer to emphasize the positive impact that abatement has on export demand. Our model allows
us to separately identify productivity effects from demand effects in export markets, allowing us to test
one version of the “Porter Hypothesis”: that abatement may increase firm-specific demand (Porter and
van der Linde, 1995).17 To the extent that abatement may encourage growth in domestic demand (rather
than improving firm productivity), our estimates in export markets identify the differential growth rate in
demand across domestic and export markets.
Static Decisions
We first consider the total costs for each firm. Firm i’s short-run marginal cost function is modeled as:
lncit = lnc(kit ,ωit) = β0+βk lnkit +βwwt −ωit (1)
where kit is the firm’s stock of productive capital, wt is the set of relevant variable input prices and ωit is
firm-level productivity. Data limitations require a number of assumptions. First, we assume that each firm
is a separate organizational entity and that each firm produces a single output which can be sold at home or
abroad.18 Second, there are two sources of short-run cost heterogeneity: differences in firm-level capital
stocks and productivity. Abatement can only affect short-run costs through its impact on productivity.
Last, we assume that marginal costs do not vary with firm-level output. As such, demand shocks in one
market do not affect the static output decision in the other market.
Both domestic and export markets are assumed to be monopolistically competitive in the Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) sense. However, we allow each firm to face a different demand curve and charge different
markups in each market j where j =D denotes the domestic market and j = X denotes the export market.
Specifically, firm i faces the following demand curve q jit in market j:
q jit = Q
j
t (p
j
it/P
j
t )
η j ez
j
it(dit−1) =
I jt
P jt
(
p jit
P jt
)η j
ez
j
it(dit−1) =Φ jt (p
j
it)
η j ez
j
it(dit−1) (2)
where Q jt and P
j
t are the industry aggregate output and price index, I
j
t is total market size and η j is the
elasticity of demand, which is constant. The individual firm’s demand in each market depends on industry
aggregatesΦ jt , the elasticity of demand, its own price p
j
it and a firm-specific demand shifter z
j
it(dit−1). The
firm-specific demand shifter z jit(dit−1) in turn depends on the firm’s history of environmental abatement
17See Innes (2010) for other interpretations of the Porter hypothesis we do not consider here.
18The first part of this assumption is not too restrictive. Blalock, Gertler and Levine (2008) report that 95% of the firms in the
Indonesian manufacturing census are separate organizational entities.
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decisions dit−1.
Both firm-specific productivity and the export demand shock capture various sources of heterogeneity,
and as such, it is important to interpret their effect cautiously. Our data will not allow us to separately
identify productivity from demand effects on the domestic market. As such, we follow Das, Roberts
and Tybout (2007) and Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011) and assume z jit = 0 for all i and t if j = D. In this
case, the term ωit captures any source of firm-level heterogeneity that affects the firm’s revenue in both
markets; this may be product quality, for example, but we will refer to it as productivity. If abatement
affects domestic demand then it will show up as a productivity effect in domestic revenues. Moreover, if
environmental investment affects both costs (productivity) and revenues (demand) our estimates will only
reveal the net/total effect on the domestic market.
In this case z jit captures all sources of export revenue heterogeneity, arising from differences in either
cost or demand, that are unique to the export market. We are particularly interested in identifying the
component the export demand shifter that depends on environmental abatement. In the same sense as
above if firm-level environmental investment improves product appeal or the efficiency with which the
firm produces the “version” of the product for export, we cannot separately identify these effects. We will
be more specific regarding the functional form of z jit in the following section.
Each period firm i decides whether or not to export, whether or not to abate and sets the price for its
output in each market to maximize the discounted sum of profits. The firm’s optimal price p jit implies that
the log of revenue r jit in market j is:
lnr jit = (η j +1) ln
(
η j
η j +1
)
+ lnΦ jt +(η j +1)(β0+βk lnkit +βw lnwt −ωit)+ z jit(dit−1) (3)
so that the firm’s domestic revenue is a function of aggregate market conditions, the firm’s capital stock,
firm-specific productivity and demand. Export revenues will depend on abatement decisions through both
firm-specific productivity and the export demand shock whereas abatement can only influence domestic
revenues through productivity.
The structure of the model allows us to calculate operating profits in each market, pi jit =−η−1j r jit(Φ jt ,kit ,ωit),
and, as such, the short-run profits are observable with data on domestic and export revenues. These will
be important for determining the export and environmental investment decisions over time developed in
the dynamic model below.
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Transition of the State Variables
We describe here the evolution of productivity, export demand shocks and the state variables ΦDt , ΦXt ,
and kit . We assume that productivity evolves over time as a Markov process that depends on the firm’s
abatement decisions, its participation in the export market, and a random shock:
ωit = g(ωit−1,dit−1,eit−1)+ξit (4)
= α0+α1ωit−1+α2dit−1+α3eit−1+α4dit−1eit−1+ξit
where dit−1 is the firm’s abatement decision, and eit−1 is the firm’s participation in export market in the
previous period. We treat dit (eit) as a binary variable which takes a value of 1 if firm i abates (exports)
in year t and zero otherwise. As described above, it is not unrealistic to assume that the costs associated
with certification and abatement in this industry are fixed in nature. We assume that any effect abatement
has on productivity occurs in the year subsequent to when the expense was incurred due to the time
necessary to install new technology, for certification to be verified and processed and for upgraded product
characteristics to be noticed in the market.
The inclusion of eit−1 allows for the possibility of learning-by-exporting and, in this case, we expect
that α3 > 0. The term dit−1 captures the impact of abatement on the evolution of productivity. If envi-
ronmental technology is more costly to operate (e.g. maintenance costs, emission control costs, fewer
resources allocated to production) we would expect that abatement would reduce firm productivity and
α2 < 0. However, if environmental technology is more advanced such that firms which abate also experi-
ence productivity improvements, we would expect α2 > 0. We further argue that there may be important
interactions between exporting and abatement. For instance, if foreign contacts allow firms to make better
use of new technology we would expect that α4 > 0. The stochastic element of productivity evolution is
captured by ξit . We assume that ξit is an iid draw from a distribution with zero mean and variance σ2ξ.
Note that the stochastic element of productivity is carried forward into future periods.
We also assume that the export demand shock evolves according to the following first-order Markov-
process:
zit = h(zit−1,dit−1,eit−1)+µit (5)
= γ0+ γ1zit−1+ γ2dit−1+µit
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where µit ∼N(0,σ2µ). Unlike previous studies our model allows firm-level export demand to endogenously
evolve separately from firm-level productivity.19 The persistence in z captures factors such as the nature
of the firm’s product or destination markets that lead to persistence in export demand over time. The
coefficient γ2 captures any effect that environmental investment has on export sales over and above any
effect it had on productivity. If there is an export specific boost from abatement we expect that γ2 > 0.20
As in Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011) we will assume that capital is fixed over time for each firm i. Due to
the short time series in our data, there is little variation over time in firm-level capital stock (particularly
relative to the cross-sectional variation). We will, however, allow for cross-sectional variation in capital
stock across firms. Last, we treat the aggregate state variables lnΦDt and lnΦXt as exogenous first-order
Markov processes.
Abatement and Export Decisions Over Time
We next consider the firm’s dynamic decisions to abate and export. We assume that the firm first observes
the fixed and sunk costs of exporting, γFit and γSit , and decides whether or not to export in the current year.
After making its export decision, the firm observes the fixed and sunk costs of abatement, γAit and γDit , and
makes the discrete decision to abate in the current year. All four costs are assumed to be iid draws from
the joint distribution Gγ.21
Denote the value of firm i in year t before it observes fixed or sunk costs by Vit :
Vit(sit) =
∫
(piDit +maxeit
{(piXit − eit−1γFit − (1− eit−1)γSit)+V Eit (sit),V Dit (sit)})dGγ (6)
where sit = (ωit ,zit ,ki,Φt ,eit−1,dit−1) is a vector of state variables, V Eit is the value of an exporting firm
after it makes its optimal abatement decision and V Dit is the value of a non-exporting firm after it makes its
optimal abatement decision. The value of abating is determined by V Dit and V
E
it :
V Eit (sit) =
∫
max
dit∈(0,1)
{δEtVit+1(sit |eit = 1,dit = 1)−dit−1γAit − (1−dit−1)γDit , (7)
δEtVit+1(sit |eit = 1,dit = 0)dGγ
19The Supplemental Appendix provides methodological details on how to simulate the endogenous z process when it is only
partially observed.
20We experimented with versions of (4) and (5) that included higher powers of ωit−1 or zit−1, e.g. ω2it−1, ω
3
it−1, etc. In either
case, the coefficients on those variables were always very close to zero and statistically insignificant.
21An alternative assumption is that the export and environmental abatement decisions are made simultaneously. While this
leads to a similar model, the computational difficulty associated with calculating the probability of each decision is substantially
greater.
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V Dit (sit) =
∫
max
dit∈(0,1)
{δEtVit+1(sit |eit = 0,dit = 1)−dit−1γAit − (1−dit−1)γDit , (8)
δEtVit+1(sit |eit = 0,dit = 0)dGγ
The net benefit (or loss) to abating and exporting, conditional on previous decisions, is embedded in the
value functions. The tradeoffs facing the firms are captured in the expected future value of any possible
choice:
EtVit+1(sit |eit ,dit) =
∫
Φ′
∫
z′
∫
ω′
Vit+1(s′)dF(ω′|ωit ,eit ,dit)dF(z′|z)dG(Φ′|Φ) (9)
Notably, we allow for the possibility abatement may reduce productivity and increase the cost of produc-
tion. We do expect, however, that the return to exporting and abatement are both increasing with respect
to export demand. In industries where this second effect is dominant we expect a typical selection effect:
only highly productive firms that expect large export sales will choose to export and abate.
The model explicitly recognizes that current choices affect the evolution of export demand and pro-
ductivity, and potentially influence future export and abatement decisions. It is important to emphasize
that the structure of the model further implies that the return to either decision may depend very much
on the other. For example, the return to abatement depends on export decisions both through the evolu-
tion of productivity and the sunk cost associated with export behavior. Similarly, the return to exporting
intuitively depends on the past abatement decisions which influence the path of export demand and the
productivity directly through equations (4) and (5), but also influences the export decision through the
sunk cost of abatement. The marginal benefit of abating from equations (7) and (8) can then be defined as
the difference in expected future returns between investing or not investing in abatement for any vector of
state variables, sit :
MBAit(sit |eit) = EtVit+1(sit+1|eit ,dit = 1)−EtVit+1(sit+1|eit ,dit = 0) (10)
As alluded to earlier, the marginal benefit of abatement will not only depend on the effect that abatement
has on future productivity but also on the decision to export. The difference in the marginal benefit of
abatement between both groups can be defined as:
∆MBAit(sit) = MBAit(sit |eit = 1)−MBAit(sit |eit = 0). (11)
This difference will be positive if abatement is more worthwhile to exporters relative to non-exporters
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in which case we might expect that α4 in equation (4) and/or γ2 in equation (5) are positive, suggesting
complementarity between the decision to export and abate. Likewise, for any given state vector, the
marginal benefit of exporting can be defined as:
MBEit(sit |dit−1) = piXit (sit)+V Eit (sit |dit−1)−V Dit (sit |dit−1) (12)
This reflects current export profits plus the expected gain in future export profit from being an exporter as
opposed to serving only the domestic market. Analogous to the marginal benefit of abatement discussion,
in general the marginal benefit of exporting will depend on past abatement decisions when there is a sunk
cost to abating where ∆MBEit(sit) = MBEit(sit |dit = 1)−MBEit(sit |dit = 0) indicates the marginal effect
of abating on the return to exporting. In the next section we examine how we can empirically estimate the
interdependence between these decisions.
Estimation
Next we develop the empirical counterpart to the model presented in the previous section and describe
the estimation procedure. We estimate the model in two steps; in the first step we employ control function
techniques similar to Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Doraszelski and Jauman-
drau (2008) to recover the parameters of the revenue function and the evolution of productivity. In the
second stage, we describe a Bayesian MCMC method to estimate the dynamic parameters and capture the
impact of abatement on export decisions over time.22
Mark-ups and Productivity
As a first step, we recover an estimate of the mark-ups at home and abroad. We exploit the fact that
each firm’s marginal cost, cit is constant with respect to total output and equal across domestic and export
output. Setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost in each market we can write total variable cost,
tvcit , as a combination of domestic and export revenue weighted by their respective elasticities:
tvcit = qDit cit +q
X
it cit
= rDit
(
1+
1
ηD
)
+ rXit
(
1+
1
ηX
)
+ εit (13)
22Our method is similar to Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007). We extend their method to allow us to estimate an endogenous,
dynamic process which is only partially observed in the data. Given the generalized type II Tobit likelihood function in our
model, classical estimation techniques such as Maximum Likelihood Estimation often do not perform well. Hence we choose
to use Bayesian MCMC methods to estimate the dynamic parameters of the model. Methodological details can be found in the
Supplemental Appendix.
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where the error term εit captures measurement error in total variable cost. Estimating equation (13) by
OLS we retrieve the estimates of ηD, and ηX and turn next to estimating the parameters of the productivity
process.
Recall that the domestic revenue function is
lnrDit = (ηD+1) ln
(
ηD
ηD+1
)
+ lnΦDt +(ηD+1)(β0+βk lnkit +βw lnwt −ωit)+uit (14)
where we have added an iid error term to equation (3). The composite error includes both an iid component
and firm-specific, time varying productivity: −(ηD+1)ωit +uit . As in Olley and Pakes (1996) we rewrite
unobserved productivity as a non-parametric function of observables that are correlated with it. Note
that the relative demand for mit and nit are not a function of output (or zit), given our assumption of
constant marginal costs. If technology differences are not Hick’s neutral then productivity differences
cause input demand to vary across firms and time.23 As such, input demand will contain information on
firm productivity levels, ωit =ω(kit ,mit ,nit ,dit−1), and we can write the domestic revenue function in (14)
as
lnrDit = ρ0+
T
∑
t=1
ρtDt +(ηD+1)(βk lnkit −ωit)+uit
= ρ0+
T
∑
t=1
ρtDt + f (kit ,mit ,nit ,dit−1)+ vit (15)
where ρ0 is a constant, Dt is a set of year dummies and we approximate f (·) by a fourth order polynomial
of its arguments. The essence of the above method is that the function f (·) captures the combined effects
of exporting, abatement, capital and productivity on domestic revenue. We denote the fitted value of the
f (·) function as ϕˆit . According to our model the estimate of ϕˆit captures (ηD+1)(βk lnkit −ωit) which is
a function of capital and productivity. We first estimate (15) by OLS, recover an estimate of the composite
term, ϕˆit and construct a productivity series for each firm. Specifically, inserting ϕit into (4) we write the
estimating equation
ϕˆit = β∗k lnkit −α∗0+α1(ϕˆit−1−β∗k lnkit−1)−α∗2dit−1−α∗3eit−1−α∗4dit−1eit−1+ξ∗it (16)
where the asterisk indicates that the coefficients are scaled by (ηD + 1). Equation (16) is estimated by
23Numerous studies find that technical change is not Hick’s neutral. See Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987) for an
example.
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non-linear least squares and the parameters are retrieved given ηD.24
Dynamic Parameters
The remaining parameters of the model can be estimated using the discrete decisions for exporting and
abatement. Given the first-stage parameter estimates we construct a firm-level productivity series, ωi ≡
(ωi1, ...,ωiT ) and in combination with the observed firm-level series of exporting ei ≡ (ei1, ...,eiT ), ex-
port revenues rXi ≡ (rXi1, ...,rXiT ), and firm-level abatement di ≡ (di1, ...,diT ) we can write the ith firm’s
contribution to the likelihood function as
P(ei,di,rXi |ωi,ki,Φ) = P(ei,di|ωi,ki,Φ,z+i )h(z+i |d−i ) (17)
where z+i is the time series of export market shocks for firm i in years in which it exports and d
−
i ≡
(di0, ...,diT−1) is the sequence of lagged abatement decisions. Equation (17) expresses the joint proba-
bility of discrete export and abatement decisions, conditional on export market shocks and the marginal
distribution of z. Note that in this case the marginal distribution of z varies across firms with different
abatement histories. Given the estimated parameters of the export shock process we can simulate exports
shocks, construct the density h(z+i |d−i ), and evaluate the likelihood function.25
The model allows us to express the probabilities of exporting or abatement as functions of the value
functions and sunk and fixed cost parameters. Specifically, assuming that the sunk and fixed costs are
iid draws from a known distribution, the joint probabilities of exporting and abatement can be written as
the product of the choice probabilities for dit and eit in each year, conditional on sit . The probability of
exporting can be written as:
P(eit = 1|sit) = P(eit−1γFit +(1− eit−1)γSit ≤ piXit +V Eit −V Dit ) (18)
Intuitively, the sunk and fixed costs are identified from differential entry and exit behavior across similar
firms with different export histories.
24Standard errors are computed by bootstrapping over equations (13),(15), and (16).
25The Supplemental Appendix describes how we simulate the density of endogenous export shocks conditional on a firm’s
observable abatement history.
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Similarly, the probability of abatement can be calculated as:
P(dit = 1|sit) = P(dit−1γAit +(1−dit−1)γSit ≤
δEtVit+1(sit |eit ,dit = 1)−δEtVit+1(sit |eit ,dit = 0)) (19)
The probability of abatement depends on the current export decision due to the model’s timing assumption
requiring export decisions to be made ahead of abatement decisions.26
The probabilities depend on sunk and fixed cost parameters, export and abatement histories, and the
expected value functions, EtVit+1, V Dit and V
E
it . For a given set of parameters we employ a Bayesian Monte
Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) estimator to characterize the posterior distribution of the sunk and fixed
cost parameters. We assume that all fixed and sunk costs are drawn from separate, independent exponential
distributions. The estimated sunk and fixed costs we estimate should then be interpreted as the the means
of those distributions.27
Data
We estimate the model using firm-level data from Indonesia between 1994-1997, collected annually
by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Budan Pusat Statistik (BPS). The survey covers the population of
manufacturing firms in Indonesia with at least 20 employees. The data capture the formal manufacturing
sector and record detailed firm-level information on domestic and export revenues, capital, intermediate
inputs, energy and expenditures on environmental abatement. Data on revenues, investment and inputs
are combined with detailed wholesale price indices to deflate price changes over time.28 We abstract from
the firm’s initial (domestic) entry decision and focus on the set of continuing firms. Initially, we study
the period between 1994-1996 due to the potential concern that the 1997-1998 Asian crisis may affect
the results. However, as documented in the Supplemental Appendix, including this year leads to similar
estimates in both industries.
Table 1 describes size differences across firms measured by average sales in the saw mill (ISIC 3311)
and wood furniture (ISIC 3321) industries.29 Overall, we follow 583 saw mill producers and 460 wood
26In the first year of the data we do not observe dit−1. To deal with this initial conditions problem we model the initial decisions
using probit equations in the first year (Heckman, 1981).
27Due to the small estimated change in ΦX over time we also constrain it to be constant below.
28Price deflators are constructed as closely as possible to Blalock and Gertler (2004) and include separate deflators (1) output
and domestic intermediates, (2) capital, (3) energy, (4) imported intermediates and (5) export sales. Further details can be found
in the Supplemental Appendix.
29Throughout our paper we focus exclusively on domestically-owned firms where less than 10 percent of equity is held by
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Table 1: Average Sales
Saw Mills
Non-Exporters Exporters
Average Average Average
Domestic Sales Domestic Sales Export Sales
1994 19,267 23,913 140,742
1995 18,159 28,657 115,485
1996 12,207 27,884 142,923
Wood Furniture
Non-Exporters Exporters
Average Average Average
Domestic Sales Domestic Sales Export Sales
1994 3,702 6,352 13,147
1995 3,616 7,304 11,717
1996 3,933 6,616 14,588
Table 2: Average Sales Across Abatement Status 1994-1996
Non-Exporters Exporters
Non-Abate Abate Non-Abate Abate
Saw Mills 16,113 9,629 91,028 127,401
Wood Furniture 3,369 4,029 13,305 16,352
Notes: Abatement expenditures are measured in thousands of 1983 Indonesian rupiahs.
furniture producers who operate continuously between 1994 and 1996.30 In both industries, exporters
report larger average sales than non-exporters which is indicative of the superior productivity enjoyed
by firms who self-select into export markets. It is worth noting, however, that the distribution of sales
is highly skewed in each industry; the average level of domestic sales among domestic non-exporters
is approximately 7.6 and 4.7 times the size of the median level of domestic sales in the saw mill and
wood furniture industries, respectively. The distributions of domestic and export sales among exporters
are similarly skewed. Table 1 also documents important size differences across industries. The average
saw mill producer earns 3-5 times more domestic revenue than the average furniture producer, while the
average saw mill exporter earns 10-11 times more export revenue than the average furniture exporter.
While it is well known that exporting is relatively uncommon among manufacturing firms there are
few estimates of abatement rates in developing nations. Define an abating firm as one that invests a positive
amount in environmental abatement in the current year.31 Overall, 20 and 11 percent of producers in the
saw mill and wood furniture industry reported positive abatement expenditures during this period.
Table 2 presents the average sales across export and abatement status. Notably, among non-exporting
firms that abate in the saw mills industry, average sales at home are 40 percent smaller on average than
firms which do not abate. This pattern is reversed among exporting firms; among exporters total sales are
foreign investors. Using this definition, 94 percent of firms in the Indonesian manufacturing industry are domestically-owned
during this period.
30Summary statistics for the comparable 1994-1997 sample are reported in the Supplemental Appendix.
31Given the short time dimension of the panel data and the small number of firms which choose to abate estimating a model
with a continuous abatement choice variable is practically very difficult in this context. The small number of observations
severely restricts our ability to identify the firm’s abatement policy rule. We do, however, test this restriction and find that using
a continuous measure of abatement has little impact on the estimated demand parameters. See the Supplemental Appendix for
details.
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Table 3: Abatement and Export Behaviour
Saw Mills Wood Furniture
Abt. Rate Abt. Expend. Obs. Abt. Rate Abt. Expend. Obs.
Exporter 22.74 119.04 1148 15.52 56.36 1218
Non-Exporter 15.62 26.38 1934 9.58 6.47 1827
Exp. Rate Exp. Rev. Obs. Exp. Rate Exp. Rev. Obs.
Abater 46.36 106,263.10 563 51.92 14,712.77 364
Non-Abater 35.21 77,196.40 2519 38.38 10,972.06 2681
Notes: Abatement expenditures are measured in thousands of 1983 Indonesian rupiahs.
40 percent higher among abating firms. The difference across abating and non-abating firm is indicative
of the impact abatement may have on export sales in particular. In the wood furniture industry this pattern
is not nearly as stark. Abating firms tend to generate sales which are 20 percent higher than non-abaters
among non-exporting firms and 23 percent higher among exporting firms.
The top panel of Table 3 documents differences in abatement behavior across exporting and non-
exporting firms in Indonesia. Columns 1 and 4 present the percentage of exporting and non-exporting
firms which incur abatement expenditures in the saw mills and wood furniture industries. We observe
that exporting firms are always more likely to engage in abatement than their non-exporting counterparts
by 6 to 7 percent. Similarly, columns 2 and 5 present the average annual abatement expenditures across
exporting and non-exporting firms, conditional on the firms having incurred some positive abatement
expense. On average exporters spent 350 to 770 percent more on abatement than non-exporters over the
same period. Across industries, abatement expenditures tend to be higher in the saw mills industry than
in the wood furniture industry, capturing the size difference across industries. The average abatement
expenditure (among those who abate) in the saw mill and wood furniture industries were respectively,
69 and 32 thousand 1983 Indonesian rupiahs, and these represent approximately 2 percent of the median
firm’s total revenue in each industry. Even though abatement is captured by a binary variable in our model
it is worth noting that we do allow for abatement cost heterogeneity by drawing fixed and sunk costs from
exponential distributions. The bottom panel of Table 3 documents the export rate and the average size of
export revenues across abatement status. Similarly, we find that firms who choose to abate are more likely
to export and, among those who export, they tend to have much higher export sales.
Finally, Table 4 reports the transitions in and out of exporting and abatement across all four possible
combinations these variables could have taken in the preceding year. Only 10 percent of firms abate and
export in the saw mills industry, while only 5 percent of firms are simultaneously engaged in both activities
in the wood furniture industry. Export status is very persistent in the saw mill and wood furniture industries
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Table 4: Annual Transition Rates for Continuing Plants
Saw Mills
Status in t+1
Status in t Neither only Exp. only Abt. Both
All Firms 0.566 0.231 0.105 0.098
Neither 0.857 0.069 0.063 0.012
only Exp. 0.112 0.729 0.000 0.155
only Abt. 0.344 0.156 0.547 0.094
Both 0.059 0.314 0.098 0.529
Wood Furniture
Status in t+1
Status in t Neither only Exp. only Abt. Both
All Firms 0.682 0.209 0.065 0.045
Neither 0.901 0.054 0.041 0.005
only Exp. 0.167 0.790 0.016 0.027
only Abt. 0.375 0.063 0.469 0.094
Both 0.000 0.200 0.029 0.771
where exporters respectively receive 81 and 85 percent of revenues from export sales on average. Firms
engaged in either activity are much more likely to begin the other activity than are firms that are not
engaged in either activity. Moreover, the persistence in each state is suggestive of potential sunk costs
associated with each behavior.
The above tables suggest the potential interdependence of the export and abatement decisions. How-
ever, if both exporting and abatement are costly we might expect that only the most productive firms
are able to engage in either activity. Any correlation across activities may be spurious and offer no real
indication of an important interaction at the firm-level. Moreover, if there is a causal relationship be-
tween abatement and exporting, the simple correlations offer little indication on the mechanism through
which exporting affects the decision to abate or vice-versa. For example, if exporting encourages firms
to improve firm-level productivity, then we might expect that exporting encourages the adoption of costly
abatement technology. Similarly, abatement may introduce new highly productive technology to the firm
and improve productivity to the point where firms are willing to enter export markets. Most importantly, if
abatement influences export growth separately from changes in productivity the above correlations provide
little evidence of the differential return to abatement in different markets. We quantify and disentangle
these various effects below.32
Empirical Results
Elasticity of Demand, Cost and Productivity Evolution
The first-stage parameter estimates are reported in Table 5.33 The point estimate of the domestic market
elasticity in the saw mill and wood furniture industries are -5.5 and -7.4, respectively, which implies mark-
ups of 32 and 16 percent. Export market demand is estimated to be less elastic in both industries with an
estimated elasticity parameter of -2.5 in either case and an implied mark-up of 67 percent.
32The Supplemental Appendix provides further reduced form evidence. It is omitted here for brevity.
33Estimates based on the 1994-1997 sample are presented in the Supplemental Appendix.
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Table 5: First Stage Parameter Estimates
Saw Mills Wood Furniture
1+1/ηD 0.817 (0.025) 0.864 (0.170)
1+1/ηX 0.598 (0.032) 0.600 (0.043)
βk -0.028 (0.011) -0.005 (0.013)
α0 0.245 (0.067) 0.053 (0.099)
α1 0.863 (0.028) 0.901 (0.033)
α2 -0.029 (0.018) 0.011 (0.031)
α3 0.040 (0.018) 0.024 (0.048)
α4 0.036 (0.025) -0.023 (0.047)
Obs. 1329 1731
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
The coefficient on the log of capital stock is negative in each industry (though only significantly in
the saw mills industry) and implies that firms with larger capital stocks have lower marginal costs. The
parameter α1 captures the effect of lagged productivity on current productivity and implies a strong linear
relationship between the two variables. The coefficients α2 and α3 measure the impact of past abatement
and export experience on future productivity. In both industries α2 is estimated to be insignificantly
different from zero, implying that firms which abate witness almost identical productivity evolution to
those that do not. In contrast, there appear to be small, but positive and significant learning-by-exporting
effects in the saw mill industry. The estimated parameter implies that manufacturing firms in the saw mill
industry can expect productivity to improve by an extra 4.0 percent, in years subsequent to exporting. The
parameter α4 captures the interaction between export experience and abatement and is also insignificantly
different from zero in both industries. Overall, our first stage results present little evidence for any impact
of abatement on productivity. However, they may also indicate that any increases in domestic demand
from abatement are offset by increases in marginal cost.
Dynamic Estimates
Table 6 reports the means and standard deviations of the posterior distributions for all parameters in both
industries. The first set of estimates apply to the dynamic process on export demand and indicate that
abatement has a positive impact on future export demand growth in both the saw mill and wood furniture
industries. In the saw mills industry, the parameter γ2 implies that firms which abate expect export demand
to grow 1.4 percent faster than similar firms who do not while in the wood furniture industry abating firms
anticipate that export demand will grow 6 percent faster.
The difference in magnitude across wood products is striking and can be interpreted in a number of
ways. First, our estimates may reflect the fact that wood furniture is closer to a finished product than
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Table 6: Dynamic Parameter Estimates
Saw Mills Wood Furniture
γ0(Export Shock Intercept) 0.004 (0.002) 0.202 (0.049)
γ1(Export Shock AR process) 0.975 (0.002) 0.795 (0.022)
γ2(Abatement effect on Export) 0.014 (0.002) 0.060 (0.010)
γA(Abatement FC) 19.598 (0.953) 0.027 (0.006)
γD(Abatement SC) 113.485 (1.946) 2.194 (0.719)
γF (Export FC) 24.301 (0.490) 0.069 (0.006)
γS(Export SC) 164.770 (4.954) 20.578 (0.405)
ΦX (Export Rev Intercept) 7.851 (0.093) 8.615 (0.071)
σµ(Export Shock Std Dev) 0.973 (0.037) 1.304 (0.060)
Obs. 1154 886
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
the plywood and other basic lumber products produced by saw mills. As argued by Arora and Cason
(1996) firms which are closer to final consumers tend to be much more sensitive to their environmental
performance. Second, our estimates may simply reflect the fact that most products from the saw mills
industry are more common, easier to smuggle, and more difficult to credibly tie to unsustainable harvesting
practices. This evidence stands in contrast to the finding that abatement had little effect on productivity
and domestic revenues. Moreover, it suggests that the interaction between trade and abatement may leave
substantial room for policy intervention.
The parameter γ0 captures the growth in export demand over time. It is estimated to be positive in the
wood furniture industry, but close to zero in the saw mills industry. This is consistent with evidence at the
aggregate level which suggests that the volume of Indonesian plywood exports peaked in 1993, while the
exports of other timber products have demonstrated consistent increases over the period (Brann, 2002).
Finally, the parameter γ1 is the autocorrelation parameter in the export demand process and indicates that
export demand tends to be a highly persistent process across industries and that decisions to abate may
have a long-lived impact on export sales.
The reported values of the fixed and sunk cost parameters, γA, γD, γF and γS, capture the mean of the
exponential distributions for abatement fixed costs, abatement sunk costs, export fixed costs and export
sunk costs, respectively.34 The sunk costs parameters are estimated to be much larger than the fixed cost
parameters, though the difference is greatest for exporting. This implies that for each activity the sunk
cost distribution will have more mass concentrated in the high cost values. Thus, for the same marginal
benefit, a firm will be more likely to continue exporting or abating than to begin exporting or abating.35
34They are measured in millions of 1983 Indonesian rupiahs.
35Note as argued in Eaton et al. (2009) export sunk costs may be capturing longer-run entry dynamics associated with building
a customer base abroad.
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The reported parameters are the mean values of the distribution of fixed and sunk cost draws. Below we
show that the incurred costs by most firms are much smaller.
Model Performance
We simulate the model in order to assess its predictive ability relative to observed empirical patterns. We
compute patterns of abatement and export choice, transition patterns between choices and productivity
trajectories to compare the simulated patterns with those observed in the data. Specifically, we take the
Table 7: Predicted Abatement, Exporting and Productivity in 1996
Abatement Rate Export Rate Productivity
Saw Mills Wood Furn Saw Mill Wood Furn Saw Mill Wood Furn
Actual Data 0.204 0.111 0.329 0.263 3.175 0.876
Predicted 0.198 0.079 0.312 0.244 3.153 0.851
initial year status (ωi1,zi1,di1,ei1,ki) of all firms in our data as given and simulate the next 3 year’s export
demand shocks zit , abatement costs γA, γI and export costs γF , γS. Solving the firm’s dynamic problem we
compute the optimal export and abatement decisions year-by-year. For each firm, we repeat the simulation
exercise 100 times and report the average of these simulations.
Table 7 reports the mean abatement rate, export market participation rate and productivity level in both
the data and in the model. The model matches the empirical predictions very closely in both industries,
though it slightly underpredicts abatement in the wood furniture industry. Table 8 reports the actual and
predicted transition rates for the saw mill and wood furniture industries. In both industries the model
is successful in matching the broad patterns in the empirical transition matrix, though it does slightly
underpredict (overpredict) the persistence in export status and abatement status in the saw mills (wood
furniture) industry.
Determinants of Abatement and Exporting
In this section we isolate the roles that export and abatement history play across the distribution of firms
on the subsequent export or abatement decisions. The left panel of Table 9 reports the marginal benefit
to abatement across export status (columns) and productivity levels (rows). The right panel of Table 9
provides a similar decomposition for exporting across productivity and abatement. We observe that in
both industries the marginal benefit to exporting always large and strongly increasing in productivity.
The left panel of Table 9 indicates that the marginal benefit to abatement is positive, large and increas-
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Table 8: Actual and Predicted Transition Rates
Saw Mills
Data Status in t+1
Status in t Neither only Exp. only Abt. Both
Neither 0.857 0.069 0.063 0.012
only Exp. 0.112 0.729 0.000 0.155
only Abt. 0.344 0.156 0.547 0.094
Both 0.059 0.314 0.098 0.529
Model Status in t+1
Status in t Neither only Exp. only Abt. Both
Neither 0.841 0.070 0.070 0.020
only Exp. 0.306 0.514 0.026 0.096
only Abt. 0.437 0.025 0.442 0.154
Both 0.091 0.145 0.084 0.680
Wood Furniture
Data Status in t+1
Status in t Neither only Exp. only Abt. Both
Neither 0.901 0.054 0.041 0.005
only Exp. 0.167 0.790 0.016 0.027
only Abt. 0.375 0.063 0.469 0.094
Both 0.000 0.200 0.029 0.771
Model Status in t+1
Status in t Neither only Exp. only Abt. Both
Neither 0.949 0.034 0.013 0.003
only Exp. 0.039 0.914 0.000 0.047
only Abt. 0.311 0.001 0.612 0.077
Both 0.012 0.071 0.002 0.915
ing in productivity for exporting firms in both industries. In contrast, the marginal benefit to abatement
is decreasing and negative among non-exporting firms in the saw mills industry. This difference occurs
because non-exporting firms do not reap any immediate benefit from abatement, but are required to incur
start-up costs associated with this activity. Moreover, our first-stage point estimates implied that abate-
ment had small, but negative effects on productivity growth. Among saw mill producers who are likely
to export in the future, Table 9 suggests that it is often optimal to wait until entering the export market
before starting to abate. To this extent, the estimated model suggests that barriers to trade may also hinder
abatement.
Table 9: Marginal Benefit of Abatement and Exporting (Millions of Rupiahs)
Marginal Benefit of Abatement
Saw Mills Wood Furniture
ωt et = 1 et = 0 ωt et = 1 et = 0
2.78 333.0 -134.4 0.38 0.19 0.11
3.55 733.2 -1033.1 0.69 0.20 0.11
4.31 628.9 -894.9 1.00 0.21 0.12
5.08 1426.2 -2502.7 1.31 0.22 0.14
5.84 7704.0 -16614.6 1.62 0.24 0.15
Marginal Benefit of Exporting
Saw Mills Wood Furniture
ωt dt−1 = 1 dt−1 = 0 ωt dt−1 = 1 dt−1 = 0
2.78 6502.9 6494.0 0.38 2.52 2.45
3.55 20789.7 20771.1 0.69 3.15 3.08
4.31 56888.7 56850.5 1.00 4.12 4.06
5.08 176184.0 176119.5 1.31 5.62 5.56
5.84 574346.2 574265.5 1.62 7.93 7.87
In the wood furniture industry we observe the opposite pattern: the marginal value of abatement is
always positive and increasing in productivity, though we note that the marginal benefit is relatively small.
The explanation for this result is two-fold. First, this result is picking up the fact that the average producer
in the wood furniture industry is much smaller than the average producer in the saw mills industry. Second,
we estimated that non-exporting, abating firms tend to experience somewhat faster productivity growth
than those that do not abate in the wood furniture industry. As such, abatement has value even to firms
that are unlikely to begin exporting. Furthermore, there is a much larger immediate impact from abatement
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on export growth for wood furniture producers relative to their counterparts in the saw mills industry.36.
Table 10: Incurred Fixed and Sunk Abatement/Export Costs
Saw Mills Wood Furniture
dt−1 = 1 dt−1 = 0 dt−1 = 1 dt−1 = 0 dt−1 = 1 dt−1 = 0 dt−1 = 1 dt−1 = 0
ωt et−1 = 1 et−1 = 1 et−1 = 0 et−1 = 0 ωt et−1 = 1 et−1 = 1 et−1 = 0 et−1 = 0
2.78 9.9/14.8 38.3/12.7 13.1/ 71.1 62.3/ 56.5 0.38 0.02/0.06 0.09/0.06 0.01/1.17 0.05/1.14
3.55 10.6/17.6 41.5/17.3 17.5/ 66.0 81.4/ 65.0 0.69 0.02/0.06 0.09/0.06 0.01/1.43 0.05/1.39
4.31 13.5/23.9 47.3/23.8 17.7/ 99.3 95.7/ 96.7 1.00 0.02/0.06 0.10/0.06 0.01/1.78 0.06/1.75
5.08 18.9/24.3 68.5/24.3 19.6/158.2 113.4/157.1 1.31 0.02/0.06 0.10/0.06 0.01/2.25 0.06/2.23
5.84 19.2/24.3 90.2/24.3 19.6/163.8 113.4/163.7 1.62 0.02/0.06 0.11/0.06 0.01/2.82 0.07/2.80
Table 10 reports the average abatement and exporting fixed and sunk costs for each combination
of export and abatement history across productivity levels. These values correspond to predicted costs
incurred by firms with different export and abatement histories. For instance, given a productivity level
of say 4.31 in the saw mills industry, the average fixed cost of abatement and exporting incurred by
firms that have previous exporting and abatement experience is 13.5 and 23.9 million Indonesian Rupiahs,
respectively. Similarly, for the same productivity level and no past experience in either activity, the sunk
cost of abatement and exporting is 95.7 and 96.7 million, respectively. Fixed and sunk costs of both
activities increase with productivity but more so for exporting than abating.
In the wood furniture industry we observe relatively little difference in the fixed costs abatement across
the distribution of productivity. Together with the observation that sunk abatement costs are proportionally
much larger than fixed abatement costs, these results suggest that abatement behavior in the wood furni-
ture industry is largely driven by the sunk abatement costs. This is arguably reasonable for two reasons.
First, saw mills tend to be much bigger operations, which require greater year-to-year abatement expendi-
tures. Saw mills are more heavily involved in timber harvesting (cutting), forest-licensing and replanting
and, as such, incur larger costs each year to meet certification requirements. In contrast, wood furniture
producers are more likely to specialize in production of particular types of wood and do not always harvest
timber themselves. In this case certification would require that they purchase materials from a certified
source (Synnott, 2005). Auditing and administrative costs are likely to account for a larger percentage of
abatement costs in the wood furniture industry.
Policy Experiments
In this section we consider three distinct policy experiments. The first two experiments consider the
impact of trade liberalization and abatement subsidies, respectively, on future exporting and abatement.
36Setting the estimated first stage coefficients governing the productivity effects of abatement and export experience to zero,
α2 = α3 = α4 = 0, reveals a pattern which suggests that the marginal benefit to abatement is positive but also always increasing
in productivity for both non-exporters and exporters in both industries
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The last experiment considers the implications of tighter environmental export restrictions imposed by
countries which import Indonesian products. The experiments actual capture policies which have been
considered in the Indonesian context. In each case we simulate the model for 10 years after changing a
policy-influenced parameter. We assume throughout that Indonesia is a small country relative to the rest
of the world and that any general equilibrium effects from changes in policy are small.
Trade Liberalization
In the first experiment we increase in the size of the foreign market by 20 percent which, in this context,
may be interpreted as a reduction in variable trade costs.37 The top panel of Table 11 presents the change
in the proportion of firms which choose to abate relative to the baseline model after 1, 2, 5 and 10 years
in the first 4 columns. The increase in the size of the export market has a positive impact on abatement.
Across industries the proportion of firms who endogenously choose to abate rate increases by 7.5-8.6
percent in the first year and is 15.0 to 33.2 percentage points higher after 10 years.
Table 11: Trade Liberalization
Export Demand Endogenous, γ2 > 0 Exogenous, γ2 = 0
Years after 1996 1 2 5 10 1 2 5 10
Change in the Proportion of Abating Firms
Saw Mills 8.6 12.9 15.2 15.0 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.2
Wood Furniture 7.5 12.3 22.3 33.2 0 0 0 0
Change in the Proportion of Exporting Firms
Saw Mills 1.6 2.3 3.3 3.8 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.8
Wood Furniture 5.2 8.8 15.5 22.2 5.6 9.3 16.2 22.3
This experiment highlights the importance of the complementarity between exporting and abatement
on the export market. In other words, the above results are not driven by productivity dynamics but
rather the complementarity of export demand and abatement. To demonstrate this point we resimulate
the model under the baseline specification and after trade liberalization with the additional restriction
that γ2 = 0 before and after the change in policy. This amounts to assuming that the only impact of
abatement on the transition of the state variables occur through productivity. We observe that in either
case trade liberalization has a very small impact on abatement rates. After 10 years the change in policy
has increased the proportion of abating firms by 1.2 percentage points in the saw mills industry and has
had no effect in the wood furniture industry.
The bottom panel of Table 11 presents the same information for the response of exporting to trade
37We assume that tariffs are embedded in the effective size of the foreign market. Alternatively, we may interpret this experi-
ment as capturing the impact of growing demand for wood products from emerging markets. It is expected that demand for wood
products from emerging market countries such as China will grow substantially in the coming decades (FWI/GFW, 2002).
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liberalization. In either industry we observe moderate increases in export participation over time. In the
saw mills industry, the proportion of exporters rises by 1.6 percentage points in the first year and is 3.8
percentage points higher than the baseline level after 10 years. Similarly, the proportion of wood furniture
exporters rises by 5.2 percentage points in the first year and is over 22 percentage points higher 10 years
after the change in policy.
Note, however, a similar pattern is found when we consider an exogenous export demand process
where γ2 = 0. This is not surprising since increasing the size of the export market should induce firms to
export regardless of any complementarity with abatement decisions. What is more surprising is that we
observe a slightly stronger rise in exporting in the wood furniture industry after the change in policy with
exogenous rather endogenous export demand. There are two reasons for the effect. The primary reason
for this result is the effect (not shown Table 13) that the exogenous export demand has on baseline export
rates. In particular, baseline export rates are 1 percent lower in the first year under exogenous demand and
3 percent lower after 10 years (relative to baseline endogenous demand model). In the the wood furniture
industry the change in policy is large enough to draw in almost the same set of firms into exporting
regardless of the export abatement complementarity. A secondary reason for the difference in dynamics
is due to the complementarity between exporting and abatement. Exporting firms which have previously
abated tend to have slower productivity growth (given our first stage estimates) in the endogenous export
demand model than firms which export alone. By discouraging abatement the exogenous export demand
model has the effect of encouraging greater exporting through slightly stronger productivity growth.
Abatement Subsidies
The second policy experiment we consider is lowering the fixed abatement costs by 20 percent in each
industry.38 We interpret this experiment as broadly capturing the impact of firm-level subsidies to practice
sustainable production. Currently, the Indonesian government along with numerous foreign governments
and non-governmental agencies are actively engaged in subsidizing sustainable timber management in
Indonesia.39
The top panel of Table 12 documents the difference in abatement participation due to the change in
policy. A 20 percent reduction in the fixed cost of abatement has a moderate, positive impact on abatement
38In the saw mills industry this amounts to a reduction in the fixed abatement costs of 3.9 million 1983 Indonesian Rupiahs. In
the wood furniture industry the fixed abatement parameter is reduced by 5.4 thousand 1983 Indonesian Rupiahs. The reduction
in the cost parameter in the wood furniture industry is smaller since the estimated fixed cost parameter is smaller.
39Examples include (funding source in brackets): Tree Seed Source Development Project (Nordic Development Fund (NDF)
/ Nordic Development Bank (NDB)), Indonesian Forest Seed Project (Danida Forest Seed Centre), Overseas Economic Cooper-
ation Fund Project (Japan), and the Japan International Forestry Promotion and Cooperation Center Project (JIFPRO).
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rates. In the saw mills industry abatement rates increase by 3.4 percentage points in the first year and are
5.4 percentage points higher than the baseline model after 10 years. The impact of abatement subsidies
is similar in the wood furniture industry even though the immediate return to abatement is larger. We
observe that the model predicts that over the 10 year period abatement increases by 6.8 percentage points
relative to the baseline model.
Table 12: Abatement Subsidies
Export Demand Endogenous, γ2 > 0 Exogenous, γ2 = 0
Years after 1996 1 2 5 10 1 2 5 10
Change in the Proportion of Abating Firms
Saw Mills 3.4 4.5 5.4 5.4 1.0 1.3 1.0 0.5
Wood Furniture 2.6 3.5 4.7 6.8 0.1 0 0 0
Change in the Proportion of Exporting Firms
Saw Mills 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0
Wood Furniture 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5
The bottom panel of Table 12 presents the impact of abatement subsidies on export participation in
both industries. We observe that in either industry the subsidies have a small initial impact on exporting
and, even after 10 years, the export rates are still only 1 percent higher than the baseline model. These
results, in conjunction with the result in the top panel, are driven by the fact that new uptake in abatement
is largely coming from existing exporters in this case. Given the large sunk and fixed costs associated with
exporting, the abatement subsidies are not sufficient enough to get non-exporting firms to start abatement
until they have entered export markets.
The last four columns of Table 12 report the results for the model with exogenous export demand. They
indicate that the observed changes in abatement are again driven by the complementarity of exporting and
abatement on the export market. We note that ignoring the differential returns across markets we would
not otherwise be able to distinguish the group of firms most affected by the policy change (exporters).
Import Restrictions
In the last policy experiment, we constrain export markets in such a fashion that firms which did not abate
in the previous year are completely cut off from export markets. The idea we are trying to capture is one
where importing nations strictly reject uncertified products for import. Importantly, the cost of abatement
to producers does not change throughout this experiment. Although this policy is extreme we note that
this type of policy has been proposed as a potential mechanism to combat unsustainably harvested wood
in developing countries (Brack et al., 2002). Further this experiment allows us quantify the full impact of
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export participation on abatement rates over time.
Table 13: Import Restrictions
Export Demand Endogenous, γ2 > 0 Exogenous, γ2 = 0
Years after 1996 1 2 5 10 1 2 5 10
Change in the Proportion of Abating Firms
Saw Mills 14.7 18.8 19.7 17.3 10.9 12.4 12.8 12.7
Wood Furniture 10.6 17.9 31.6 43.2 11.5 13.6 20.9 29.1
Change in the Proportion of Exporting Firms
Saw Mills -23.2 -18.1 -8.9 -5.2 -26.8 -25.7 -22.4 19.1
Wood Furniture -20.0 -20.5 -22.2 -20.3 -20.6 -21.4 -24.8 -28.4
The first column of Table 13 demonstrates that abatement increases substantially relative to the base-
line model in the first year. By the tenth year proportion of firms abating has risen by 17 percentage points
in the saw mills industry and by 43 percentage points in the wood furniture industry, relative to baseline.
This also suggests that using the export markets as a means to encourage abatement may be an effective
policy tool, though we caution that the export market is very large in both industries studied here.
The last four columns of Table 13 present the same estimates for the exogenous export demand model.
In both industries we note that the increase in abatement relative to baseline is only slightly smaller than
that in the endogenous demand model in the first year. This suggests that closing export markets to en-
vironmentally damaging goods may be an effective abatement policy tool even if there is no differential
effect of abatement on export demand growth. Beyond the initial impact the two models differ more sub-
stantially. By the tenth year abatement gains in the exogenous demand model are 4.6 and 14.1 percentage
points smaller than the model with endogenous export demand.40
The bottom panel of Table 13 presents the impact of import restrictions on export participation. In
contrast to the previous policy experiments where encouraging trade (abatement) increased the incentive to
abate (export) over time, in this case encouraging abatement through import restrictions harms exporting.
In both industries export participation rate is reduced by at least 20 percentage points in the first year.
This is not surprising since only a small fraction of exporting firms initially abate and so most incumbent
exporters are forced to exit export markets. In the saw mills industry we observe a strong return to
exporting in the subsequent years. Ten years after the policy change the export participation rate is only 5
percentage points lower than the baseline rate. In the wood furniture industry export participation grows
much more slowly.
The last four columns of the bottom panel present the results for the exogenous export demand model
40Due to the difference in baseline rates we can interpret the estimated differences between the two models as capturing the
lower bound of the complementarity between exporting and abatement.
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in both industries. In the saw mills industry we observe an even larger fall in initial export participation and
a slower increase afterwards. In the wood furniture industry the results are even more stark; exporting falls
sharply after the implementation of the policy and continues to fall in each subsequent year. This result
presents a very different picture of the impact of this policy relative to the endogenous export demand
model. Exporting falls because fixed and sunk export costs are now effectively the sum of the respective
export and abatement costs. As such, many exporters incur higher annual expenditures to stay in export
markets and over time many firms no longer find exporting profitable. Once exporters have left the market
re-entry is also deterred by higher effective sunk export costs. In the endogenous export demand model
higher sunk and fixed costs are offset by a larger export market.
Conclusions
This paper presents and estimates a dynamic model of heterogenous firm which endogenously choose
to make environmental investments and export. The model is estimated using a panel of Indonesian
timber producers. Counterfactual policy experiments are employed to assess the impact of changing
environmental or trade policy on firm-level export and abatement decisions.
The model is able to broadly match environmental investment and exporting behavior among Indone-
sian timber producers. The model captures the differential export behavior across firms which abate and
those that do not. It emphasizes that accounting for the interaction between firm-level abatement and
export decisions is essential to recovering accurate estimates of the impact of changes in trade or environ-
mental policy on either outcome over time. The empirical estimates of the model’s parameters suggest
firm-level environmental investment may increase export demand growth by 1.4 to 6 percent across timber
industries.
The counterfactual experiments imply that import restrictions in destination markets can have a large
impact on exporting and environmental investment. Over ten years we estimate that closing export markets
to non-abating firms would increase abatement rates by 18 and 43 percentage points in the saw mills
and wood furniture industries, but cause export participation rates to fall by 5 and 20 percentage points,
respectively. In this sense our model confirms that environmental restrictions in destination markets can
act as trade barriers and suggests that these barriers may be an effective tool in encouraging firm-level
abatement. The experiments confirm that ignoring the differential returns to the same activity on different
markets can potentially lead to misleading policy conclusions.
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This document is the Supplemental Appendix for the paper “Environmental Investment and Export
Dynamics.” The following sections provide (A) a description of major export markets for Indonesian
timber products, (B) a historical timeline of corporate timber purchasing policies in export markets, (C) a
description of the data construction, (D) a detailed data description and all summary statistics which were
omitted from the main text, (E) a description of basic abatement and exporting patterns, (F) reduced-form
evidence of the impact abatement has on firm-level energy, materials and capital intensity, (G) robustness
checks of the main estimates, (H) a detailed description of the computation method used to obtain the
dynamic estimates (I) additional results for the dynamic parameter estimates and (J) a simple model used
to provide intuition behind our counterfactual experiments.
Indonesian Timber Industry Exports
It is well known that Indonesian’s success in the timber industry has been tied to a rich endowment of
dense forests. Table 17 describes the destinations of Indonesian exports in the wood and cork industries
(ISIC code 331) and the wood furniture and fixtures industry (ISIC code 332).41 We observe that in each
industry Japan, Europe and the United States are all important export markets for Indonesian producers.
Although these statistics provide support for the hypothesis in the main text they may largely underes-
timate the percentage of timber products destined for these markets. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF,
2008) notes that Indonesian timber products are often shipped to intermediary countries such as Hong
Kong or Singapore only to be reexported. Even more importantly Indonesian wood products produced
from illegally harvested wood are often smuggled out of the country. For example, the WWF (2008)
reports that Indonesia is the second largest exporter of illegally harvested timber products to Europe in
41While these definitions are not an exact match to the industrial classification used in the paper, they are reasonably close
since the saw mills industry (3311) and wood furniture industry (3321) are the largest sub-industry in classifications (331) and
(332), respectively.
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the world (behind Russia) and up to 40 of European wood imports are from illegally harvested wood.42
Obidzinski et al (2006) argue as much as 25 percent of illegally harvested Indonesian wood during this
period may have been smuggled out of the country and are not counted in official statistics. Remark-
ably, Obidzinski et al (2006) further note that this practice has been curtailed since the year 2000 and that
international scrutiny and pressure has played a key role in reducing illegal harvesting and smuggling.
Table SA1: Percentage of Indonesian Exports by Country Destinations
Wood & Cork Wood Furniture
Japan 34 31
Europe 11 25
USA 9 21
South Korea 9 3
Hong Kong 6 1
Singapore 2 4
Australia 1 4
The share of exports by destination is computed using data from the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database.
Corporate Timber Purchasing Policies
In the section we provide documentation for a number of timber purchasing policies which were enacted
during our sample period among firms which are global purchasers of tropical timber products. This list
is not intended to be exhaustive; there were many of these policies enacted in many different countries
during our sample period. Unfortunately, there is no complete source that documents all such policies.
Instead, we chose to focus on only those firms with international profiles for whom we could find ready
information on their timber purchasing history.
Tables SA2-SA6 document the timber purchasing policy in over 40 large international firms during
our sample period. We include information for these firms beyond the sample period to document their
continuing commitment to international environmental issues in timber markets. Similarly, Table SA7
documents the founding date of national timber-purchasing groups dedicated to only purchasing tim-
ber products from environmentally certified producers. Again, we document that numerous groups were
founded before or during our sample period and many more were founded in the years that followed our
42Specifically, among the products included in the saw mill industry, WWF estimates that approximately 25 percent of Euro-
pean plywood imports and 40 percent of European profiled wood imports are from illegally harvested wood. Similarly, between
10 to 15 percent of European wood imports of wood furniture and finished wood products are produced from illegally harvested
wood.
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sample period. We also document the year the buying group joined the Global Forest and Trade Network
(GFTN), a global timber purchasing group administered by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). While na-
tional timber purchasing groups differed in policy before joining the GFTN, the firms and countries joined
to the GFTN follow similar purchasing guidelines. These guidelines include independent certification
requirements, such as FSC certification. Details can be found on the website: http://gftn.panda.org/ along
with a list of the hundreds of corporations committed to following GFTN purchasing policies. The infor-
mation contained in these tables was compiled from Kupfer (1993), Viana (1996), Hansen (1998), Owens
(1998), Fletcher and Hansen (1999), Greenpeace International (1999), Howard and Rainey (2000), IKEA
(2004), World Wildlife Fund (2006), GFTN (2011) and the corporate web sites for B&Q, Carrefour, Home
Depot and Walmart.
Table SA7: A History of National Timber Purchasing Groups
First Launched First Launched
Country Buyer’s Group Joined GFTN Country∗ Buyer’s Group Joined GFTN
United Kingdom 1991 1999 Japan 1999 —
Belgium 1994 1999 Brazil 2000 2000
Netherlands 1992 1999 Russiac 2000 2000
France 1995 1999 Malaysia 2004 2004
Ireland 1995 2000 Cameroon 2005 2005
Switzerland 1995 1999 China 2005 2005
Austria 1995 1999 Indonesia 2005 2005
Germany 1995 1999 Romania 2005 2005
Spain 1995 1999 Bolivia 2006 2006
Sweden 1995 1999 Peru 2006 2006
North Americaa 1995 1999 Vietnam 2006 2006
Denmark 1998 1999 Republic of Congo 2007 2007
Finland 1998 1999 Portugal 2008 2008
Norway 1998 1999 India 2009 2009
Australiab 1999 2006 Lao PDR 2009 2009
Italy 1999 —
Notes: (a) United States and Canada. (b) GFTN date is estimated based on the year the first available member in that country joined GFTN. (c) In
Russia, this is a producer group rather than a consumer group. (*) GFTN is also has groups operating in Ghana, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Puerto Rico. We were not able to determine the earliest date at which
these groups began operating and excluded them from the table for this reason.
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Data Construction
The primary source of data is the Indonesian manufacturing census between 1994 and 1997. We focus
on these years due to the fact that these are the only years the abatement expenditure data is collected.
Collected annually by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Budan Pusat Statistik (BPS), the survey covers
the population of manufacturing plants in Indonesia with at least 20 employees. The data capture the
formal manufacturing sector and record detailed plant-level information on over 100 variables covering
industrial classification (5-digit ISIC), revenues, intermediate inputs, labour, capital, energy, wages, trade
behavior and foreign ownership. Nominal values of total sales, capital and inputs are converted to the real
values using the manufacturing output, input, and export price deflators at the industry level.43 In order to
focus on the domestic industry, we drop all plants where more than 10 percent of equity is held by foreign
investors.
Data Description
In this section we report summary statistics for the variables used in our study, either in the main text or
the supplemental appendix. Table SA8 contains a list of the variables under study and a very brief set
of sample moments for the entire manufacturing sector and both industries we study in particular. For
brevity, we first report statistics for the 1994-1996 time period. Differences in the 1994-1997 sample
described below.44
1994-1997 Sample Summary Statistics
In this section we present summary statistics for the 1994-1997 sample. Tables SA9-SA12 are analogous
to Tables 1-4 in the main text. In general, the all tables are very similar to those in the main text with only
one exception in Table SA9. As such, we largely refer the reader to the main text for a longer discussion
of the features of the data.
In Table SA9 we observe that average domestic sales increase in both industries. This is largely due to
changing composition of exporting and non-exporting firms. The Asian crisis reaches Indonesia in the fall
of 1997. Because of this many previous exporters choose to stop exporting in 1997 and focus on domestic
markets. This has two effects. First, since exporting firms are generally larger and more productive than
43Price deflators are constructed as closely as possible to Blalock and Gertler (2004). A concordance table between the industry
price deflators and the 5-digit industrial classification was provided by BPS Indonesia.
44We do not report a table analogous to Table SA8 for the 1994-1997 since the sample moments are very similar to that of
Table SA8 for each variable.
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non-exporting firms when former exporters choose to stop exporting they increase the average size of a
non-exporting firm. Second, smaller exporters, though still larger than domestic firms, were those most
likely to stop exporting. As such, the group of remaining exporters are on average larger than before.
Despite the similarity in the two samples, the change in export behaviour in 1997 was a potential
cause for concern. Because of this we focus on the 1994-1996 in the main text. However, when we repeat
the estimation exercise including 1997 we find almost identical parameter estimates. These results are
reported below.
Table SA9: Average Sales, 1994-1997
Saw Mills
Non-Exporters Exporters
Average Average Average
Domestic Sales Domestic Sales Export Sales
1994 20,770 27,504 161,527
1995 20,317 31,811 127,487
1996 13,907 32,176 165,744
1997 31,872 53,664 157,296
Wood Furniture
Non-Exporters Exporters
Average Average Average
Domestic Sales Domestic Sales Export Sales
1994 3,599 7,122 13,181
1995 3,450 8,109 12,629
1996 3,693 6,999 15,820
1997 5,483 13,593 18,303
Table SA10: Average Sales Across Abatement Status 1994-1997
Non-Exporters Exporters
Non-Abate Abate Non-Abate Abate
Saw Mills 22,956 17,772 173,141 223,716
Wood Furniture 3,943 5,814 18,838 20,395
Notes: Abatement expenditures are measured in thousands of 1983 Indonesian rupiahs.
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Table SA11: Abatement and Export Behaviour, 1994-1997
Abatement Rates and Expenditures
Industry Saw Mills Wood Furniture All
Rate Expend. Obs. Rate Expend. Obs. Rate Expend. Obs.
Exporter 28.26 225.71 559 16.15 16.35 322 20.52 218.82 10171
Non-Exporter 16.53 41.05 1337 9.21 7.44 1162 13.33 50.31 60423
Export Rates and Revenues
Industry Saw Mills Wood Furniture All
Rate Revenues Obs. Rate Revenues Obs. Rate Revenues Obs.
Abater 41.69 183,196.00 379 32.70 15,839.40 159 20.58 71,029.81 10140
Non-Abater 26.43 140,619.70 1517 20.38 12,388.23 1325 13.37 39,612.86 60454
Notes: Abatement expenditures are measured in thousands of 1983 Indonesian rupiahs.
Table SA12: Annual Transition Rates for Continuing Plants, 1994-1997
Saw Mills
Status in t+1
Status in t Neither only Exp. only Abt. Both
All Firms 0.594 0.202 0.119 0.086
Neither 0.888 0.043 0.059 0.099
only Exp. 0.199 0.661 0.028 0.113
only Abt. 0.306 0.006 0.612 0.076
Both 0.101 0.271 0.124 0.504
Wood Furniture
Status in t+1
Status in t Neither only Exp. only Abt. Both
All Firms 0.717 0.174 0.074 0.035
Neither 0.913 0.037 0.046 0.004
only Exp. 0.293 0.660 0.026 0.022
only Abt. 0.413 0.053 0.453 0.080
Both 0.109 0.196 0.152 0.544
Exporting and Abatement Correlation
Below we examine the raw correlation between exporting and abatement. Figure SA1 plots the relation-
ship between export sales and abatement expenditures at the firm-level in Indonesia over the 1994-1996
period. We observe a strong positive correlation between these variables. However, this result is not nec-
essarily indicative of a causal relationship between exporting and environmental abatement; it is likely
that both are related to firm size and/or firm efficiency. In fact, as shown in Figure SA2, we observe
a very similar relationship between domestic sales and environmental expenditure, suggesting that large,
productive plants may be more likely to engage in such activities. In particular, Pargal and Wheeler (1996)
suggest that environmental abuses are more easily observable among larger plants (which employ more
workers) in the Indonesian context. This may in turn increase the incentive to abate.
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Figure SA2: Domestic Sales and Abate. Exp.
In order to provide some very basic evidence which controls for firm-size in a fairly unconditional
manner we plot firm-level export-intensity against abatement-intensity in Figure SA3. In this figure, we
normalize both export sales and abatement expenditures by domestic sales. Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and
Kortum (2003) suggest that domestic sales are a reasonable proxy for both firm size (and productivity)
since they compare firm-level performance on the same market. In this figure we continue to see a strong
positive relationship between exporting and abatement. In particular, our figure shows that among firms
which engage in these activities, firms which invest in abatement activities more intensively are more
likely to have relatively large export sales. It is important to note that these figures do not contain any
causal evidence and ignore the fact that few firms choose to engage in either activity. However, they are
suggestive of a distinct relationship between firm-level abatement activities and export performance.
Abatement, Investment and Energy Intensity
In the main text we outlined that there is little reason to believe that environmental expenditures may
be directed towards changing the production process to reduce the impact of industrial production on
emissions or energy use. While we cannot directly observe the exact nature of firm-level expenditures
on abatement, we can check if abatement has any significant impact on energy use, intermediate demand
or capital stock. As noted by Cole and Elliott (2003) capital stock is strongly correlated to air and water
pollutants. If we find that capital stock or energy usage falls in response to abatement we may be concerned
that abatement in the wood products industry is directed towards air or water pollution abatement rather
than deforestation.
To examine this possibility we consider the following reduced form specification for the indirect im-
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Figure SA3: Export Intensity and Abatement Intensity
pact of expenditures on energy use:
∆ fit = ∆ditα+∆Zitβ+ζit
where fit is the logarithm of the firm’s energy/input choice, dit is the firm’s decision to abate or not and
the matrix Zit contains a number of control variables including firm-specific productivity, the logarithm
of firm-specific capital and year dummies. Note firm-specific productivity is measured using Olley-Pakes
(1996) control-function methods (detailed in Section G of the Supplemental Appendix). The results for
the saw mills and wood furniture industries are presented in Tables SA13 and SA14. We expect that if
changes in abatement behavior reduce energy use we should observe a negative coefficient on the firm-
level change in abatement status, α.
Tables SA13 and SA14 document the impact of abatement on four firm-level inputs: fuel, electricity,
intermediate materials, and capital stock in the saw mill and wood furniture industries. In all the regres-
sions it appears that input use, regardless of type, is almost entirely driven by firm-level productivity.
More productive firms will, on average, have greater sales and as such demand greater amounts of inputs.
The results also indicate that there are important differences across firms of different sizes, larger plants
(with larger capital stocks) use less energy, conditional on productivity. This may reflect economies of
scale. Surprisingly the coefficient on abatement status, either in the current period or in the previous year,
51
Table SA13: Energy Use and Abatement in the Saw Mill Industry
Dependent Variable Fuel Electricity
Change in Abatement Status (∆dt ) -0.141 -0.149 0.070 0.063
(0.092) (0.093) (0.131) (0.131)
Lagged Change in Abatement Status 0.109 0.108 0.016 0.014
(0.106) (0.106) (0.150) (0.151)
Change in Export Status (∆et ) 0.062 0.385
(0.210) (0.301)
Lagged Change in Export Status -0.095 0.054
(0.114) (0.160)
∆(dt × et) 0.052 -0.159
(0.125) (0.178)
Change in Total Factor Productivity 2.751 2.766 2.771 2.780 2.905 2.916 2.903 2.891
(0.270) (0.270) (0.271) (0.271) (0.397) (0.399) (0.397) (0.399)
Change in Capital Stock -0.338 -0.341 -0.339 -0.341 -0.335 -0.338 -0.333 -0.331
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076)
Observations 566 322
Dependent Variable Inter. Inputs Capital
Change in Abatement Status (∆dt ) -0.044 -0.046 0.002 -0.006
(0.033) (0.033) (0.073) (0.073)
Lagged Change in Abatement Status 0.179 0.179 0.083 0.083
(0.037) (0.037) (0.083) (0.083)
Change in Export Status (∆et ) 0.077 0.069
(0.075) (0.166)
Lagged Change in Export Status 0.034 -0.067
(0.040) (0.083)
∆(dt × et) -0.044 0.028
(0.045) (0.099)
Change in Total Factor Productivity 5.186 5.185 5.219 5.216 3.928 3.928 3.928 3.937
(0.096) (0.096) (0.094) (0.094) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.134)
Change in Capital Stock -0.675 -0.675 -0.679 -0.678
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Observations 577 577
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table SA14: Energy Use and Abatement in the Wood Furniture Industry
Dependent Variable Fuel Electricity
Change in Abatement Status (∆dt ) 0.107 0.100 -0.095 -0.102
(0.130) (0.130) (0.161) (0.162)
Lagged Change in Abatement Status 0.132 0.134 -0.081 -0.074
(0.128) (0.128) (0.159) (0.159)
Change in Export Status (∆et ) -0.051 0.102
(0.205) (0.256)
Lagged Change in Export Status 0.073 0.191
(0.122) (0.153)
∆(dt × et) -0.043 -0.172
(0.128) (0.160)
Change in Total Factor Productivity 4.116 4.165 4.140 4.164 4.059 4.119 4.037 4.074
(0.821) (0.824) (0.821) (0.823) (0.976) (0.978) (0.977) (0.976)
Change in Capital Stock -0.093 -0.092 -0.095 -0.094 -0.093 -0.089 -0.093 -0.087
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Observations 420 398
Dependent Variable Inter. Inputs Capital
Change in Abatement Status (∆dt ) -0.029 -0.029 -0.111 -0.119
(0.056) (0.056) (0.146) (0.147)
Lagged Change in Abatement Status 0.107 0.109 0.002 -0.003
(0.053) (0.054) (0.142) (0.142)
Change in Export Status (∆et ) 0.023 -0.214
(0.089) (0.233)
Lagged Change in Export Status 0.047 -0.159
(0.053) (0.139)
∆(dt × et) -0.038 0.173
(0.056) (0.146)
Change in Total Factor Productivity 14.024 14.04 14.041 14.056 12.099 12.021 12.101 12.022
(0.350) (0.351) (0.348) (0.349) (0.714) (0.718) (0.714) (0.718)
Change in Capital Stock -0.448 -0.447 -0.448 -0.447
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Observations 443 443
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table SA15: Energy Intensity and Abatement in the Saw Mill Industry
Dependent Variable Fuel/Worker Elec./Worker
Change in Abatement Status (∆dt ) -0.084 -0.093 0.073 0.063
(0.092) (0.092) (0.134) (0.134)
Lagged Change in Abatement Status 0.065 0.063 0.073 0.074
(0.105) (0.105) (0.154) (0.154)
Change in Export Status (∆et ) 0.038 0.273
(0.208) (0.308)
Lagged Change in Export Status -0.136 -0.045
(0.114) (0.164)
∆(dt × et) 0.088 -0.058
(0.124) (0.182)
Change in Total Factor Productivity 2.286 2.305 2.298 2.310 2.341 2.372 2.345 2.355
(0.269) (0.269) (0.269) (0.270) (0.406) (0.408) (0.406) (0.408)
Change in Capital Stock -0.304 -0.308 -0.305 -0.307 -0.279 -0.286 -0.277 -0.279
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078)
Observations 566 322
Dependent Variable Inter. Inputs/Worker Capital/Worker
Change in Abatement Status (∆dt ) 0.013 0.010 0.059 0.050
(0.041) (0.042) (0.081) (0.081)
Lagged Change in Abatement Status 0.139 0.139 0.047 0.046
(0.047) (0.047) (0.092) (0.092)
Change in Export Status (∆et ) 0.054 0.048
(0.094) (0.183)
Lagged Change in Export Status -0.007 -0.111
(0.051) (0.010)
∆(dt × et) -0.009 0.064
(0.056) (0.109)
Change in Total Factor Productivity 4.702 4.705 4.727 4.728 3.586 3.587 3.590 3.593
(0.120) (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.147) (0.147) (0.148) (0.148)
Change in Capital Stock -0.639 -0.640 -0.642 -0.642
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 577 577
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table SA16: Energy Intensity and Abatement in the Wood Furniture Industry
Dependent Variable Fuel/Worker Elec./Worker
Change in Abatement Status (∆dt ) 0.094 0.085 -0.111 -0.121
(0.134) (0.135) (0.168) (0.169)
Lagged Change in Abatement Status 0.050 0.053 -0.164 -0.155
(0.132) (0.132) (0.166) (0.166)
Change in Export Status (∆et ) -0.073 0.084
(0.212) (0.267)
Lagged Change in Export Status 0.110 0.224
(0.126) (0.160)
∆(dt × et) -0.068 -0.197
(0.132) (0.167)
Change in Total Factor Productivity 3.342 3.415 3.356 3.392 3.066 3.146 3.023 3.067
(0.850) (0.852) (0.851) (0.852) (1.02) (1.021) (1.02) (1.019)
Change in Capital Stock -0.118 -0.116 -0.120 -0.118 -0.105 -0.101 -0.106 -0.10
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Observations 420 398
Dependent Variable Inter. Inputs/Worker Capital/Worker
Change in Abatement Status (∆dt ) -0.034 -0.037 -0.114 -0.125
(0.064) (0.064) (0.149) (0.150)
Lagged Change in Abatement Status 0.030 0.139 -0.075 -0.079
(0.062) (0.047) (0.145) (0.145)
Change in Export Status (∆et ) 0.001 -0.232
(0.102) (0.237)
Lagged Change in Export Status -0.007 -0.121
(0.051) (0.142)
∆(dt × et) -.062 0.148
(0.064) (0.149)
Change in Total Factor Productivity 13.074 13.112 13.077 13.102 10.915 10.867 10.908 10.845
(0.403) (0.404) (0.403) (0.403) (0.729) (0.734) (0.730) (0.734)
Change in Capital Stock -0.468 -0.466 -0.467 -0.466
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 443 443
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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are always insignificant with one exception in both industries. In the third and fourth columns of Tables
SA13 and SA14 the coefficient on abatement status implies a statistically significant impact of abatement
on intermediate input use. However, the coefficient takes the wrong sign indicating that abating firms tend
to use more intermediate inputs relative to similar non-abating firms. Similarly, the insignificant impact
of abatement on capital stock in Tables SA13 and SA14 suggest that firm-level abatement does not have
a strong influence on the capital stock of firms in the saw mill and wood furniture industries. As such,
we find no evidence that abatement is strongly correlated with (air or water) emissions-related variables
in these industries. Moreover, our assumption that there is little variation in firm-level capital stock over
time in Section 3 of the main text appears quite plausible.45
The results, however, may be contaminated by the fact that firms which choose to adopt abatement
technology tend to be larger and, as such, demand more inputs. We repeat the experiment using the
log of input intensity, measured as fuel, electricity, intermediate inputs, and capital per worker, in place
of the logarithm of the level variables. The results are reported in Tables SA15 and SA16. Again, we
find that changes in input intensity are largely driven by firm-specific productivity changes where more
productive firms still demand higher amounts of inputs even after controlling for firm size. Consistent
with the results in the previous tables, we find no evidence that abatement causes any significant reduction
in input-intensity across all input groups. In fact, the results for exporting are also very similar; export
status has little impact on energy use once we control for productivity.
Overall, these results would suggest that if firms are reducing their environmental impact through
their abatement choices it is not greatly affecting these margins. While this does not imply that abatement
choices are not improving local environmental quality,46 it is consistent with observation that firms in the
wood products sector are largely concerned with mitigating deforestation rather than other environmental
concerns. Furthermore, our evidence is consistent with that in Pargal and Wheeler (1996) which suggests
that local pollution in the Indonesian timber industry is relatively small.
Robustness Checks: Control-Function Estimation
Below we describe a three-step, reduced-form method which measures both productivity and export de-
mand and estimates the impact of firm-level abatement decisions on their evolution over time. While this
method is consistent with the structural estimates provided in the main text it uses a more flexible (but
45We have also examined the correlation with the level of abatement expenditure and have found similar results.
46Pargal and Wheeler (1996) find that larger firms in more easily observable parts of Indonesia were more likely to create less
water pollution, a dimension we cannot observe in our data.
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less efficient) method to identify the dynamic process on export demand. The first two steps are identical
to those presented in the main text, while the third step extends the standard control function method to
examine the evolution of export demand.
As in the main text we assume that each firm’s marginal cost, cit is constant with respect to total output
and equal across domestic and export markets. Setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost in each
market we can write total variable cost, tvcit , as a combination of domestic and export revenue weighted
by their respective elasticities:
tvcit = qDit cit +q
X
it cit
= rDit
(
1+
1
ηD
)
+ rXit
(
1+
1
ηX
)
+ εit (20)
where the error term εit captures measurement error in total variable cost. Estimating equation (20) by
OLS we retrieve the estimates of ηD, and ηX and turn next to estimating the parameters of the productivity
process. Note that these elasticity estimates will be used to rescale productivity and export demand esti-
mates. While the elasticity estimates will affect the magnitude of abatement on productivity and export
demand shocks, they will not affect the sign or significance of such estimates. For instance, recall that the
domestic revenue function in the main text is written as
lnrDit = (ηD+1) ln
(
ηD
ηD+1
)
+ lnΦDt +(ηD+1)(β0+βk lnkit +βw lnwt −ωit)+uit . (21)
The composite error includes both unobserved iid, uit component and plant-specific, time varying produc-
tivity, ωit , rescaled by the domestic elasticity estimate, ηD: −(ηD + 1)ωit + uit . As in Olley and Pakes
(1996) we pursue a strategy where we will rewrite unobserved productivity as an approximation of a non-
parametric function of observables that are correlated with it. Under certain regularity conditions observed
material and electricity demand, mit and nit , are invertible so that we can write productivity as an unknown
function of the input choices
ωit = ωt(kit ,mit ,nit ,dit−1).
Letting a constant capture the intercept term we can rewrite the domestic revenue function in (21) as
lnrDit = ρ0+Dtρt + f (kit ,mit ,nit ,dit−1)+ vit (22)
where Dt is a matrix of year dummies, and f (·) is a fourth order polynomial of its arguments. The essence
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of the above method is that the approximated non-parametric function f (·) captures the combined effects
of exporting, abatement, capital and productivity on domestic revenue.
We denote the fitted value of the f (·) function as ϕˆit . According to our model the estimate of ϕˆit
captures (ηD+1)(βk lnkit −ωit) which is a function of capital and productivity. We first estimate (22) by
OLS and recover an estimate of the composite term, ϕˆit . Following Olley and Pakes (1996), Doraszelski
and Jaumandreu (2008) and Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011) we construct a productivity series for each firm.
Inserting ϕit into the first order Markov process for productivity
ωit = g(ωit−1,dit−1,eit−1)+ξit
= α0+α1ωit−1+α2dit−1+α3eit−1+α4dit−1eit−1+ξit
we write the estimating equation
ϕˆit = β∗k lnkit −α∗0+α1(ϕˆit−1−β∗k lnkit−1)−α∗2dit−1−α∗3eit−1−α∗4dit−1eit−1+ξit
where the asterisk indicates that the coefficients are scaled by (ηD + 1). This equation can be estimated
by non-linear least squares where all of the right-hand side variables are predetermined to the innovations
in productivity and the parameters can be retrieved for a given value of ηD. In particular, the productivity
innovations ξit are orthogonal to all information available at time t− 1 and can be used to construct the
orthogonality conditions. In fact, for each candidate parameter vector α′ = (β′k,α
′
0,α′1,α′2,α′3,α′4), we
may construct an estimate for the residual as:47
ξˆit(α′) = φˆit −β′kkit − Eˆ[ωit |ωi,t−1,di,t−1,ei,t−1]. (23)
This completes the second step.
We use a similar procedure to capture the impact of abatement on the evolution of the export demand
process. The logic behind applying the Olley-Pakes (1996) methodology to export demand is a straight-
forward extension of that from the productivity literature. Conditional on abatement, capital and firm-level
productivity, if export demand shocks are (a) uncorrelated with domestic market outcomes and (b) cause
firms to change their choice of intermediate materials over time, then there remains some variation in input
demand that contains information regarding export-specific shocks.
47Because we are only including continuing plants, we ignore the issue of endogenous attrition as in Olley and Pakes (1996).
58
However, we only observe export revenues for firms that choose to enter the export market. This
potentially creates a severe selection issue since only firms with sufficiently high export demand shocks
will choose to enter export markets. In order to account for this possibility we follow the suggestion in
Olley and Pakes (1996) and estimate a first stage selection equation for the probability of exporting as a
function of firm-level productivity, capital and previous export and abatement decisions.
The model suggests that the decision to export may be correlated with the decision to abate. As such,
the proposed model suggests that a single equation probit would ignore potential information in current
abatement decisions. In order to exploit the correlation across current abatement and export decisions we
estimate a bivariate probit where we jointly estimate the decision to export and the decision to abate.48
Define the threshold value of ξit that induces a plant to export at t by ξ¯it and let Sit = (ωi,t ,di,t−1,ei,t−1).
Since a plant exports if ξit ≥ ξ¯it , the export probabilities are given by
Pr{eit = 1|ξ¯it ,Sit}= Pr{eit = 1,dit = 1|ξ¯it ,Sit}
Pr{dit = 1|eit = 1, ξ¯it ,Sit}
= 1−F(ξ¯it)≡ θit . (24)
By inverting (24), we may obtain ξ¯it as a function of θit and write this inverse function as ξ¯it = ξ¯∗(θit).
We then estimate the empirical export revenue function as
lnrXit = Γ0+DtΓt +F(kit ,ωit ,nit ,mit ,dit−1)+H(θˆit)+νit (25)
where F and H are fourth order polynomials in their respective arguments.
We denote the fitted value of the F(·) function as ψˆit . According to our model the estimate of ψˆit
captures (ηX + 1)(βk lnkit −ωit)+ zit which is a function of capital, productivity and the export demand
shock for exporting firms. We first estimate (25) by OLS and recover an estimate of the composite term,
ψˆit . Given the estimates ψˆit , ωˆit , ηˆX , and βˆk we can recover a firm-specific export demand, zˆit , whenever
the firm chooses to export. This estimate captures the remaining variation in export sales which is not
explained by firm-level differences in total productivity or capital stock (or size), but is related to firm-
level choices of electricity or materials.
Our aim is to provide some reduced-form evidence for the effects we discuss in the main text. Un-
fortunately, the data requirements are more rigorous in this context since the last step of the estimation
requires that in order for the firm to be included in a dynamic regression of export demand it must have
exported for at least 2 consecutive years. In our short panel, this proves to be a strongly binding con-
48Our later results were insensitive to using a single-equation probit.
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straint since there are few exporters in any given year. As such, we aggregate the industry data in order
to perform this experiment. Specifically, we consider the wood products sector as a whole at the 2-digit
industry level (ISIC code 33) instead of 4-digit industries presented in the main text, saw mills (ISIC code
3311) and wood furniture industry (ISIC code 3321). Where possible we will note differences between
the aggregated and disaggregated industries.
Given the estimated series of productivity and export demand we can examine the firm-level variation
in these variables with export and abatement behavior. We first examine how firm-level productivity
varies across firms with different abatement and export histories. In particular, we consider the following
specification for current productivity
ωit = α0+α1ωit−1+α2dit−1+α3eit−1+α4dit−1eit−1+ξit
This equation is identical to equation (7) in the main text. Estimates of the coefficients for the wood
products industry are reported in Table SA17. Standard errors are computed using the bootstrap.
Consistent with the results reported in the main text of the paper, we find little evidence that abatement
has any effect on productivity growth. The first column of Table SA17 suggests that there is no evidence
that previous abatement improves productivity at the firm-level. As in the main text, there is some evi-
dence that previous export experience can have a positive effect on firm-level productivity growth. The
interaction between previous export and previous abatement experience is also again insignificant. For ro-
bustness, we also examine firm-level differences across current export and abatement decisions in column
2 of Table SA17. It is important to note that the estimates may not necessarily reflect a causal relationship
between abatement and/or exporting and productivity since the current values are not treated as state vari-
ables in the above procedure.49 Examining current instead of lagged abatement and export decisions has
almost no impact on all of the estimated coefficients. The one exception would be the coefficient on cur-
rent exporting which doubles in magnitude. To further test our results we drop the lagged productivity and
add firm-level fixed effects to the regression. Columns 3 and 4 report the results from these regressions.
We again find no evidence that abatement has any effect on productivity.
A potential concern with these results is that our discrete measure of abatement may not do a good job
of capturing the variation in abatement activity across firms. To test this concern we replace the discrete
measure of abatement with a continuous measure in above algorithm and repeat the above estimation
49To the extent that the lagged values may be treated as instruments for the current firm decisions we might expect that the
productivity estimates are still estimated reasonably precisely.
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Table SA17: Productivity, Abatement and Exporting
Industry All Wood Products
dt discrete dt continuous
ωt−1 0.888 0.861 0.867 0.856
(0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
dt−1 -0.002 -0.019 0.005 -0.002
(0.011) (0.023) (0.008) (0.011)
et−1 0.029 -0.003 0.049 -0.003
(0.011) (0.025) (0.012) (0.027)
dt−1et−1 0.009 -0.020 0.005 -0.006
(0.018) (0.029) (0.008) (0.011)
dt -0.009 -0.018 0.003 0.0001
(0.017) (0.026) (0.008) (0.012)
et 0.060 -0.003 0.060 0.006
(0.013) (0.023) (0.012) (0.021)
dt et 0.040 -0.020 0.013 0.005
(0.023) (0.030) (0.008) (0.011)
Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Obs. 1233
Notes: Two hundred bootstrap samples are used to compute standard errors (in parentheses). Similar results for the disaggregated industries can
be found in the main text.
procedure. Specifically, we replace the binary variable dt with
dt = log(1+ total abatement expenditures in year t).
The results are reported in the last four columns of Table SA17. Remarkably, the coefficients are very sim-
ilar to those estimated using the binary variable. We find that even when using the continuous abatement
variable there is no evidence that abatement expenditures have any impact on firm productivity.
Table SA18 documents the estimated coefficients in the reduced-form bivariate probit for abatement
(columns 1, 3 and 5) and exporting (columns 2, 4 and 6) for all wood products industries (columns 1
and 2), saw mills (columns 3 and 4) and wood furniture (columns 5 and 6) individually.50 In all three
cases we observe that previous abatement (exporting) experience strongly encourages future abatement
(exporting). More interestingly we further observe that past abatement experience significantly increases
the probability of future export in all three cases, though it is important to note that this effect is only
marginally significant in the saw mills industry (the associated p-value is 0.07). Similarly, previous ex-
port experience appears to always positively impact future abatement decisions though this effect is not
strongly significant in any case. This may suggest that firms wait to invest in abatement until they have
entered export markets.51
Firm-level productivity is also a strong predictor of abatement and export decisions with the exception
of column (5), the abatement decision in the wood furniture industry. There are a number of explanations
50In Table SA18 dit is always treated as binary variable.
51This interpretation is consistent with the timing assumption in the main text.
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Table SA18: Bivariate Probit for Abatement and Exporting
Industry All Wood Products Saw Mills Wood Furniture
Dependent Variable dit eit dit eit dit eit
dt−1 1.865 0.242 1.799 0.255 2.045 0.522
(0.080) (0.098) (0.106) (0.138) (0.153) (0.186)
et−1 0.128 2.152 0.097 1.924 0.175 2.379
(0.088) (0.077) (0.131) (0.120) (0.157) (0.134)
ωt 0.273 0.895 0.200 1.233 -0.030 1.669
(0.084) (0.084) (0.109) (0.122) (0.332) (0.289)
ρ 0.049 0.163 0.037
Obs. 2466 1157 895
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
for the result that productivity has little impact on abatement decisions in this industry. The results in the
main text suggest that the sunk costs of abatement in the wood furniture industry are much larger than the
fixed costs of maintaining abatement activities. This may suggest that while beginning abatement (poten-
tially of rare tropical forests) is particularly costly, the smaller degree harvesting in this industry is less
costly to sustainably maintain. As such, once firms have begun abatement their previous abatement expe-
rience is the primary driver of future abatement activities. Alternatively, since we use domestic revenues
to estimate productivity, this result may simply reflect that there is little firm-level benefit, either in terms
of productivity or profitability, from abatement among domestic firms in the wood furniture industry. To
the extent that our simple specification does not capture the return to abatement on export markets, the
coefficients of abatement or exporting may be biased. Nonetheless, the results on previous abatement
and export history along with the correlation parameter between abatement and export decisions, ρ, are
suggestive that we may expect these decisions to be interrelated.
The third equation we report is the dynamic process on export demand. Specifically, we write the
estimating equation as
zˆit = γ0+ γ1zˆit−1+ γ2dit−1+ J(θ˜it)+µit
where J(θ˜it) is a fourth order polynomial in the predicted probability of exporting in two consecutive
years, θ˜, to again control for selection into export markets. The results for the estimation of this equation
are presented in Table SA19.
The results are broadly consistent with those reported in the main text of the paper. In the first column
we omit the lagged export demand term, zt−1, and estimate that lagged abatement increases export demand
by 19.5 percent. This estimate statistically significant and much larger than the estimated coefficient in
the main text. In the second column we repeat this exercise with zt−1 and the coefficient on abatement
falls to 6.2 percent in the wood products industry. We emphasize that this result is very close to parameter
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estimates reported in the main text, but recognize that this coefficient is no longer significant here. The
lack of significance is not surprising as we have few observations on which we can estimate the export
demand process since our panel is relatively short, few firms export in two consecutive years and export
sales are highly persistent. A primary advantage of using the Bayesian MCMC methods described in the
main text is that we are able to exploit all of variation in export sales in the data. Similar results are found
in columns 3 and 4 when we use current abatement status in place of lagged abatement status. In this case
we again observe a coefficient which is very close to that reported in the main text, except it is statistically
significant at conventional levels of confidence. It is encouraging that the estimated coefficients are similar
to that returned by the Bayesian MCMC method implemented in the main text even though the industry
under consideration are not an exact match to those in the main text and the available variation to the
identify the coefficients is much more restricted.
In the final four columns we again test whether using a continuous measure of abatement alters our
results. We again generally find abatement has a positive, statistically significant impact on export demand
in each case, though it is only marginally significant in column 6. While the estimated coefficients are
somewhat smaller than those estimated using the discrete variable, they imply similar total effects for the
median abater and are all well within the range estimated across industries in the main text.52
Table SA19: Export Demand and Abatement
Industry All Wood Products
dt discrete dt continuous
zt−1 0.695 0.691 0.717 0.720
(0.069) (0.073) (0.069) (0.076)
dt−1 0.195 0.062 0.088 0.023 0.027
(0.098) (0.052) (0.031) (0.013) (0.013)
dt 0.214 0.106 0.086
(0.097) (0.043) (0.032)
Obs. 286
Notes: Two hundred bootstrap samples are used to compute standard errors.
Estimation Methodology
In this section we provide detailed information regarding the estimation of the dynamic parameters. The
following subsection discuss the computation of the firm’s dynamic problem, the assumptions on the prior
52Among abating firm the median value for the continuous variable dt is approximately 2.
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distributions of each parameter, the construction of the marginal density of export shocks and a description
of how to simulate endogenously determined, partially observed export demand shocks.
Computation of the Firm’s Dynamic Problem
We need to solve each firm’s dynamic optimization problem in order to compute the conditional choice
probabilities for exporting , P(eit |zit ,kit ,ωit ,ΦX ,eit−1,dit−1), and abatement, P(dit |zit ,kit ,ωit ,ΦX ,eit−1,dit−1).
For a state vector s = (z,ω,e−1,d−1,k,φX) we use equations (6)-(9) in the main text and the following al-
gorithm to calculate the value functions for each firm.
1. Guess the value of the initial value function V 0(s).
2. Calculate the expected value
EV 0 =
∫
z′
∫
ω′
(z′,ω′,e,k,ΦX)dF(ω′|ω,d,e)dF(z′|z,d)
where we calculate F(ω′|ω,d,e) and F(z′|z,d) are calculated according to equations (4) and (5),
respectively.
3. Using EV 0 we calculate V E0t and V
D0
t using equations (7) and (8):
V E0(d−1) = P[δEV 0(e = 1,d = 1)−δEV 0(e = 1,d = 0)> d−1γA+(1−d−1)γD] ·
(EV 0(e = 1,d = 1)−d−1E(γA|·)− (1−d−1)E(γD|·))+
P[δEV 0(e = 1,d = 1)−δEV 0(e = 1,d = 0)≤ d−1γA+(1−d−1)γD] ·
EV 0(e = 1,d = 0)
and
V D0(d−1) = P[δEV 0(e = 0,d = 1)−δEV 0(e = 0,d = 0)> d−1γA+(1−d−1)γD] ·
(EV 0(e = 0,d = 1)−d−1E(γA|·)− (1−d−1)E(γD|·))+
P[δEV 0(e = 0,d = 1)−δEV 0(e = 0,d = 0)≤ d−1γA+(1−d−1)γD] ·
EV 0(e = 0,d = 0)
4. Using our calculations in step (3) we construct the value function V 1(z,ω,e−1,d−1,k,ΦX) using
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equation (9) as:
V 1(z,ω,e−1,d−1,k,ΦX) =
piD(z,ω,k)+P[piX(z,ω,k,ΦX)+V E0(d−1)−V D0(d−1)> e−1γF +(1− e−1)γS] ·
(piX(z,ω,k,ΦX)+V E0(d−1)−V D0(d−1)− e−1E(γF |·)− (1− e−1)E(γS|·))
P[piX(z,ω,k,ΦX)+V E0(d−1)−V D0(d−1)≤ e−1γF +(1− e−1)γS] ·V D0(d−1)
5. We then repeat steps (2)-(4) until convergence, V j+1−V j < ε.
We adopt Rust’s (1997) method to discretize the state space since it is very large in this case. We
fix the grid values for k with 8 categories and select N = 100 low-discrepancy points for ω and z:
(ω1,z1), . . . ,(ωn,zn), . . . ,(ωN ,zN). On each grid point we solve the firm’s dynamic problem as described
above for the value function Vˆ . We can then calculate EV using the discrete Markov operator:
EV =
∫
z′
∫
ω′
V 0(z′,ω′,e,k,ΦX)dF(ω′|ω,d,e)dF(z′|z,d)
=
1
N
N
∑
n=1
Vˆ (zn,ωn,e,d,k,ΦX)pN(zn,ωn|z,ω,e,d)
where pN(zn,ωn|z,ω,e,d) = p(zn|z)p(ωn|ω,e,d)∑Nn=1 p(zn|z)p(ωn|ω,e,d) .
Details of Bayesian MCMC Estimation
The set of dynamic parameters we estimate in the second stage areΘ=(γA,γD,γF ,γS,γ0, γ1,γ2,σz,ΦX ,θd ,θe)
where θd and θe are, respectively, the parameters for the probit equations for the initial conditions of abate-
ment and exporting. Our sampling algorithm follows Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007) and Aw, Roberts
and Xu (2011) closely and we adopt their priors where possible. In general, the priors we adopt are
very diffuse; the means of all fixed and sunk cost distributions are assumed to have priors that follow a
N(0,1000) distribution while the prior for the revenue intercept and the prior for the effect of abatement
on export demand are also set to follow a N(0,1000) distribution. The autoregressive coefficient in export
demand is set to follow a U [−1,1] distribution while the log σz distribution is set to follow a N(0,10)
distribution as in the above citations.
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Constructing h(z+i |d−i )
Here we follow Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007) closely, but extend their exercise to account for the history
of abatement on the firm’s current export demand. Define the set of uncensored export demand shocks for
firm i as
z+i =
{
z+it = lnr
X
it − (ηX +1) ln
(
ηX
ηX +1
)
− lnΦXt − (ηX +1)(β0+βk lnkit +βw lnwt
−ωit);rXit > 0
}
Let v+it be the demeaned autoregressive export demand process v
+
it ≡= z+it −(γ0+γ2dit−1)(1−γ1)−1 condi-
tional on dit−1 and let d−i represent the set of previous export decisions d
−
i ≡ {di,−1, ....,di,T−1}. To derive
the density function of the uncensored export demand shocks we assume that the zit process is in long-run
equilibrium. The transition density of zit then implies that z+it |dit−1 ∼ N((γ0 + γ2dit−1)(1− γ1)−1,σ2µ(1−
γ21)−1) and h(z
+
i |d−i ) =N((γ0+γ2dit−1)(1−γ1)−1,Σzz) where the diagonal elements of Σzz are determined
by E[v2it ] = σ2µ(1− γ21)−1 and the off-diagonal elements are E[vitvit−k] = γ|k|1 σ2µ(1− γ21)−1 ∀ k 6= 0. Note
that the key difference here is that the mean of distribution of export demand shocks varies across the
distribution of heterogeneous firms with different abatement histories.
Simulating zTi1
To simulate the entire vector of export demand shocks z we first consider the vector of export shocks
for firm i from year 1 to T as an T × 1 vector zTi1 = (zi1, ...,ziT ). The set of uncensored export demand
shocks z+i is expressed as a qi× 1 vector where qi = ∑Tt=1 eit . Exploiting the fact that µit ∼ N(0,σ2µ) we
can write zTi1|z+i ,d−i ∼ N(Γ0ι+Γ1v+i +Γ2d−i ,Σzz−Σzz+Σ−1z+z+Σ′zz+) where Σzz = E[vTi1vT ′i1 ], Σzz+ = E[vTi1v+′i ]
and Γ1 = Σzz+Σz+z+ . The elements of these matrices are determined by E(vitv′it+s) = γ
|k|
1 σ
2
µ(1− γ21)−1.
The matrices Γ0 and Γ2 are T × T lower triangular matrices where the elements are given by (γ0(1−
γ21))(σ2µ(1−γ1))−1Σlzz in the first case and (γ2(1−γ21))(σ2µ(1−γ1))−1Σlzz in the second and Σlzz is the lower
triangle of Σzz.
A number of these expressions merit comment. First, as in Das, Roberts and Tybout (2007) the dimen-
sion and composition of the Σzz+ and Σz+z+ matrices vary across firms with different export participation
patterns. Because the zit are serially correlated we exploit information in each year that the firm exports
to calculate E[zTi1|d−i ,v+i ]. Moreover, because zit is stationary the weight placed on vit is highest in year
t and declines monotonically with |s|. Second, a key difference here is that we also use the entire his-
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tory of abatement decisions to simulate export profit shocks for both exporting and non-exporting firms.
However, unlike the demeaned export profit shocks vit , abatement decisions in year t do not reveal any
additional information about the level previous (or current) export demand once we have accounted for its
impact on the mean of the distribution of zit . For this reason Γ0 and Γ2 are lower triangular.
The distributions above allow us to write the vector of export demand shock components as
zTi0 =
 Γ0ι+Γ1v
+
i +Γ2d
−
i +Γ3ηi if q > 0
Γ0ι+Γ2d−i +Γ3ηi if q = 0
(26)
where Γ3Γ′3 = Σzz− Σzz+Σ−1z+z+Σ′zz+ and ηi is a T × 1 vector of independent and identically distributed
standard normal random variable. Note that Γ3Γ′3 has rank T − qi reflecting that Γ3 has qi zero columns
and only T − qi elements of ηi actually have an impact in determining zTi0. In contrast, Γ2 impacts the
estimate of zit in each year for each firm regardless of export status. This function allows us to simu-
late P(ei,di,rXi |ωi,ki,Φ) = P(ei,di|ωi,ki,Φ,z+i )h(z+i |di) which appears in equation (20) in the main text.
Specifically, we draw a set of S ηi vectors and use (26) to evaluate P(ei,di|ωi,ki,Φ,z+i )h(z+i |d−i ) at each
ηi and averaging over the S outcomes.
Estimates from the 1994-1997 sample
Below we present first and second stage estimates, analogous to those presented in the text, for the longer
1994-1997 sample. The advantage of the this sample is that with an additional year’s worth of data we are
able to better the dynamic processes on productivity and export demand. The disadvantage of this sample
is that it is unclear how much the Asian crisis affected abatement and export behavior in 1997.
Nonetheless, we repeat the full estimation procedure detailed in the main text on the full 1994-1997
sample. We find that estimates in both stages of the estimation routine are very close to the results found
using the 1994-1996 sample. The results are presented in Tables SA20-SA21. We refer the reader to the
main text for further discussion of the individual parameters.53
53We have also estimated the model on other manufacturing industries unrelated to forestry. Given that these results shed little
insight on the issue of deforestation we have not chosen not to include them here. However, they are available on request.
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Table 14: First Stage Parameter Estimates, 1994-1997
Saw Mills Wood Furniture
1+1/ηD 0.734 (0.053) 0.810 (0.149)
1+1/ηX 0.616 (0.031) 0.707 (0.067)
βk -0.041 (0.015) -0.005 (0.011)
α0 0.212 (0.076) 0.094 (0.112)
α1 0.900 (0.019) 0.908 (0.023)
α2 -0.023 (0.026) 0.001 (0.023)
α3 0.086 (0.034) 0.030 (0.037)
α4 0.026 (0.035) -0.011 (0.032)
Obs. 1407 1075
Notes: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 15: Dynamic Parameter Estimates, 1994-1997
Saw Mills Wood Furniture
γ0(Export Shock Intercept) 0.059 (0.013) 0.329 (0.114)
γ1(Export Shock AR process) 0.932 (0.008) 0.699 (0.038)
γ2(Abatement effect on Export) 0.034 (0.005) 0.040 (0.004)
γA(Abatement FC) 16.355 (1.185) 0.003 (0.001)
γD(Abatement SC) 94.072 (1.736) 0.040 (0.020)
γF (Export FC) 19.734 (1.757) 0.064 (0.004)
γS(Export SC) 166.960 (1.418) 19.826 (1.076)
ΦX (Export Rev Intercept) 8.000 (0.152) 6.098 (0.214)
σµ(Export Shock Std Dev) 1.407 (0.022) 1.199 (0.024)
Obs. 1407 1075
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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A Simple Model of Abatement and Exporting
In the section we describe a simple, static model of exporting and abatement. In order to provide intuition
for the firm-level decisions in the spirit of Melitz (2003) we simplify the model described in Section 2 of
the main text using the following assumptions:
• Firm-level productivity is constant over time and invariant to exporting decisions.
• All firms face the export demand shock zn which is constant over time.
• Define z˜n ≡ exp{zn}. If a firm chooses to abate its export demand shock increases to z˜a = βz˜n where
β> 1 in the current period. Any benefit from abatement on the export market lasts only 1 period.
• Firms pay the same fixed cost of exporting, γF , and there are no sunk export costs.
• Firms that choose to abate also incur a fixed abatement cost, γA. There are no sunk abatement costs.
• Capital and input prices are normalized to 1 and β0 is normalized to 0 in equation (5) from the main
text.
• Firms expect that the size of the export market, ΦX , is constant over time.
Using the above restrictions and equation (5) from the main text we can write the profit from exporting
for a non-abating firm as
piX = ρΦX ω˜z˜n− γF ,
while for the abating firm export profit can be written as
piXA = ρΦX ω˜z˜a− γF − γA
where ρ= (ηX/(ηX +1))ηX+1 and ω˜= exp{−ω(ηX +1)} is an index of productivity.
Suppose that the marginal exporter chooses not to abate. In this case, we can derive the threshold
productivity for exporting, ω˜X , without abatement by setting the profit from exporting to zero
piX = 0 ⇒ ω˜X = γ
F
ρΦX z˜n
.
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Similarly, we can determine the threshold for productivity for exporting and abatement in this case by
comparing the two current export profit levels across abatement status
piX = piXA ⇒ ω˜XA = γ
A
βρΦX z˜n
Examining these two conditions it is evident that there is no reason to expect that the threshold for abate-
ment and exporting to necessarily be above the threshold for exporting alone. In fact, we will have the
threshold ordering ω˜XA < ω˜X only when γF(β− 1) > γA.54 These conditions imply that it is more likely
that the marginal exporter will also optimally choose to abate when β is large and γA is relatively small.
Allowing zn to vary across firms it is straightforward to further demonstrate that among firms with a large
export market (large zn) the marginal exporter will also choose to abate, while the marginal exporter will
not necessarily choose to abate among firms with a relatively small export market (small zn).
In order to capture the differential effects of policy change across firms and industries we focus on two
cases below. In scenario 1 (sc 1), ω˜XA > ω˜X we predict that some firms will choose to export but not abate.
This case is likely for firms with smaller export markets (small zn) and in industries where the export gain
from abatement is small (β is small), the fixed abatement cost is large (γA is large) and the fixed export
cost is small (γX is small). This case is depicted in Figure SA4. In scenario 2 (sc 2), ω˜XA < ω˜X we predict
that all firms which choose to export will also abate. This case is likely for firms with large export markets
and in industries where the export gain from abatement is large, the fixed abatement cost is small and the
fixed export cost is large. We demonstrate this case in Figure SA5.
In what follows, we now consider the effect of the three policy experiments discussed in the main
text. Throughout we continue to consider the partial equilibrium effects of the changes in policy. First,
we analyze the impact of trade liberalization which we interpret as an increase in the effective size of the
export market,ΦX . The change in trade policy increases the export profits for both abaters and non-abaters
without influencing fixed costs. This results in an upward rotation in the slope of both profit functions in
Figure SA6 where piX moves up to piX ′ and piXA to piXA′. Note that the profit function rotates further inward
because β> 1 and the trade liberalization is particularly beneficial for firms which abate. For a sufficiently
large increase in the size of the export market this change in policy could shift the threshold for exporting
and abatement below the threshold for exporting alone (scenario 2).
54If all exporting firms abate the productivity of the marginal exporter (and abater) can be found where piXA = 0 which implies
ω˜XA = γ
F+γA
ρΦX z˜nβ .
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Figure SA4: Export Profits (sc 1)
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Figure SA5: Export Profits (sc 2)
The productivity threshold for exporting drops from ω˜X to ω˜X ′ while that for both exporting and
abating is lowered from ω˜XA to ω˜XA′. As a result of the change in trade policy, less productive firms who
were not able to export can now do so. Likewise, some exporting firms which were not previously abating
now find it profitable to export and abate. Hence, firms with productivity between ω˜X ′ and ω˜X enter the
export market and firms which have productivity between ωXA′ and ωXA begin abating and exporting.
In Figure SA7 we present the effect of the same policy change on firms in scenario 2. Again we observe
an inward rotation of the export profit functions, where the rotation is largest for the profit function for
abating firms. In this case the simple model implies that trade liberalization will reinforce the fact that
threshold for abatement and exporting is below the threshold for exporting alone. Among the firms that
are induced to begin exporting because of the change in policy they will also all begin abating.
The second policy experiment we consider is abatement subsidies which we interpret as a decrease in
the fixed cost of abatement. The fixed cost of abating and exporting is lower as γA decreases to γA′. In
Figures SA8 and SA9 this is represented by a parallel leftward shift of the profit function, piXA, to piXA′.
The profit line for exporting alone is unaffected. In Figure SA8, the cutoff productivity for exporting and
abating decreases to ωXA′. A number of exporting firms with productivity less than the previous cutoff,
ωXA, now find it profitable to abate. Since the productivity threshold for firms that only export is the
same, the proportion of firms that only export shrinks with an abatement subsidy. Again if the subsidy
is large enough the export profit function piXA could shift far enough to the left such that the productivity
threshold for abating and exporting is now lower than that for exporting only (scenario 2). In Figure
71
ω˜−γF
piX
piXA
−γF − γA
ω˜X ω˜XA
piX
′piXA
′
pi(ω˜)
ω˜XA
′
ω˜
′X
0
Figure SA6: Trade Liberalization (sc 1)
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Figure SA7: Trade Liberalization (sc 2)
SA9 the abatement subsidy will increase both the number of firms which abate and the number of firms
which export since all exporting firms optimally choose to abate. In this scenario, the export threshold
is a function of the abatement fixed cost directly and, as such, sensitive to the changes in environmental
policy.
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0
Figure SA8: Abatement Subsidies (sc 1)
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Figure SA9: Abatement Subsidies (sc 2)
In the last policy experiment we constrain export markets to firms which abate. The policy change
forces firms with productivity between ωX and ωXA′ in Figure SA10 out of the export market, lowering
the fraction of firms that decide only to export. Firms that have productivity levels between ωXA′ and ωXA
that otherwise would only export begin abating as a result of the import restriction. In scenario 2, depicted
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Figure SA10: Import Restrictions (sc 1)
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Figure SA11: Import Restrictions (sc 2)
in Figure SA11, the change in policy has no effect on firm-level abatement or export decisions.
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Chapter II
Cross-Border Pollution Externalities and Trade Agreements
Introduction
This paper investigates the impact of the absence of an international environmental agreement on trade
negotiations. Specifically, the paper focuses on the implication of a cross-border pollution externality for
non-cooperative environmental policies and cooperative trade taxes. In the case of no cross-border pollu-
tion, the efficient outcome is free trade and a pollution tax that is equal to the marginal cost of domestic
pollution as in Limao (2005). With transboundary pollution, the efficient trade policy outcome includes
free trade and pollution taxes take into account the cost of polluting trading partners as well.55 These
first-best policy outcomes obtain irrespective of whether policy choices are made strategically or simul-
taneously. Focusing on the case of cross-border pollution, I find that choosing trade and environmental
policies strategically matters for efficiency in the absence of an environmental agreement. The model in
this paper shows that the efficient outcome can be supported when trade cooperation occurs after unilat-
eral pollution taxes are set. Thus, without an environmental agreement, countries can exploit the timing
of trade negotiations to achieve efficiency.
To obtain my results, I analyze a two-stage game of trade and environmental policy choices between
national governments. In the first stage, each government sets a level of pollution tax. The pollution
tax can only be applied to domestic output.56 In the second stage, governments negotiate the level of
trade taxes that maximizes joint welfare. In this paper, governments care only about the welfare of their
residents where no consideration is given to political motivations. The equilibrium from this game is
efficient as discussed above. However, when governments cooperate over trade policy in the first stage
and unilaterally set pollution taxes in the second stage, the resulting pollution taxes are inefficiently low.
The framework in this paper provides an alternate mechanism through which efficiency may be reached
in the absence of an environmental agreement. It also allows for an in-depth analysis of the strategic
interaction between trade policy choices and the pollution spill over effect.
The relationship between trade agreements and environmental policies has already received significant
attention in the literature. Bagwell and Staiger (2001) investigate how domestic standards should be
55The efficiency result is obtained by cooperating over both trade and environmental policies.
56Governments typically do not have judicial power to tax pollution in other countries. However, given the strategic nature
of the policy game, the level of pollution tax set in one country may influence pollution indirectly in another country. Also, the
focus here is on production-related pollution where no consideration is given to pollution externalities related to consumption.
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handled in the WTO in light of their associated trade effects while Ferrara, Missios, and Yildiz (2009)
emphasize the impact of tariff regimes on the outcome of environmental agreements and on welfare.
Basically, key papers have either abstracted from nonpecuniary international externalities as in Bagwell
and Staiger (2001) or have focused on enforcement of agreements such as Limao (2005) and Ederington
(2002).57 Other papers have examined the impact of strategic interaction between governments on the
motives for linking trade and environmental policy or keeping them separate.58 None of these papers,
however, consider the impact of the timing of trade negotiations when pollution from production crosses
borders and when countries cannot coordinate their environmental policies. Also, these previous studies
say nothing about the use of trade policy to pursue environmental goals especially when countries are
constrained by trade agreements.59
In this paper I show that there exists a unique choice of unilateral first-stage pollution taxes such that
free trade is the outcome of negotiations in the second-stage. The selection of any other pollution tax level
introduces barriers to trade in the cooperation stage with the aim of addressing the cross-border pollution
externality issue. The first-stage pollution taxes that result in efficient trade policies are equivalent to the
first-best, efficient pollution taxes. The findings in this paper suggest that an environmental agreement
may not be required as countries could strategically choose policies that achieve global efficiency with
just a trade agreement. Furthermore, with regards to the pollution spill over effect, the results in this paper
ought to provide some insight on the impact of environmentally conscious trade policies. From a policy
perspective, it addresses the question of whether Article XX of the GATT is justified when taking into
account cross-border pollution externalities.60
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 the basic model is set up. In Section 3 the efficient
solution is solved for under the assumption that a trade and environmental agreement can be reached.
Section 4 models a game of trade and environmental policy choice between countries, characterizing
57Limao (2005) considers cross-border externalities but in the context of self-enforcing agreements. Staiger and Sykes (2009)
take into account a negative consumption externality that does not cross international borders. Ederington (2002) analyzes a
model where the government maximizes social welfare and the pollution externality has no cross-border effects.
58See Copeland (1990) who examines strategic interactions with negotiable (tariffs) and non-negotiable (subsidies) trade bar-
riers but does not consider transnational production or consumption externalities. Furthermore, he assumes the trade policy game
is cooperative in the first stage but non-cooperative in the second stage. Other examples include Ludema and Wooton (1994),
Copeland (2000), and Horn (2006).
59In a model that has a negative production externality only affecting the importing country, Ludema and Wooton (1994) show
that the equilibrium tariff is higher in the importing country due to the externality. However, in their model, they do not consider
the implications of strategically timing trade negotiations. Also there is no scope for domestic policy analysis in their study since
home production generates no externality.
60Article XX may be viewed as a contingent contract that restricts governments’ use of domestic policy to extract gains
from trading partners while also taking into account environmental concerns. The particular nature of these contracts and the
constraints that the WTO can incorporate into agreements to limit ex-post WTO violations is also of interest but is outside the
scope of this paper.
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a non-cooperative equilibrium. In Section 5, I consider policy choices when the pollution tax is set first
followed by coordination over tariffs and examine the reverse timing of trade negotiations as well. Section
6 concludes.
The Model
Consider an economy with two countries, Home and Foreign, two non-numeraire manufacturing goods,
x and y, and one numeraire good denoted by n. The government in each country sets the level of trade
taxes, τ and τ∗ respectively, and the pollution tax level, t and t∗ respectively for each manufacturing
good in its country.61 Preferences of the representative consumer in both countries are given by U =
cn +∑2i=1 u(ci) where ci is consumption of good i, for i = {x,y}. Assume u(ci) = ci− c
2
i
2 so that Home’s
demand function for good i is d(pi) = 1− pi. Home’s consumer surplus associated with good i is then
CS(pi) = u(d(pi))− pid(pi). Foreign demand functions and consumer surplus are symmetrically defined
in terms of the foreign prices, p∗x and p∗y . I assume that n is sufficiently abundant in each country such that
it is always consumed in positive amounts by all agents and the marginal utility of income is fixed at one.
As such, the partial-equilibrium analysis of the non-numeraire sectors, x and y is comparable to a general-
equilibrium trade model since consumption of the additional numeraire good occurs quasi-linearly. Trade
in the numeraire good is then determined by the overall trade balance condition.
Each good is produced in both Home and Foreign. Production functions are assumed to be of the form
Sx = (Lx)1/2 and Sy = (2Ly)1/2 for Home and S∗x = (2L∗x)1/2 and S∗y = (L∗y)1/2 for Foreign, where Li(L∗i )
is the labor used in the production of good i in Home (Foreign). Home is more productive in sector y
than in sector x and vice-versa for Foreign. So, Home exports good y and imports good x while Foreign
exports good x and imports good y. Given perfectly competitive markets, Home’s supply functions are
represented by the increasing functions Sx(qx) and Sy(qy) and Foreign’s by S∗x(q∗x) and S∗y(q∗y) where qi(q∗i )
is the producer price of good i = {x,y} in Home (Foreign). The supply functions for goods x and y are:
Sx(qx) = qx/2, Sy(qy) = qy, S∗x(q∗x) = q∗x , and S∗y(q∗y) = q∗y/2. The related domestic and foreign profit
functions are given by Πx(qx) = q2x/4, Πy(qy) = q2y/2, Π∗x(q∗x) = q∗2x /2, and Π∗y(q∗y) = q∗2y /4.
Production of good x emits pollution in both Home and Foreign.62 The total pollution damage to
Home is z(q,q∗) = S(q)+δS∗(q∗) and to Foreign is z∗(q,q∗) = S∗(q∗)+δS(q) where 0≤ δ≤ 1 captures
the geographical scope or range of the externality. As such, δ may be interpreted as the fraction of foreign
pollution that affects the domestic country and equals zero if pollution is purely local or one if pollution is
61Home country variables are denoted without a * while variables for the foreign country have * attached to them.
62The focus here is on production-related pollution where no consideration is given to pollution externalities related to con-
sumption.
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perfectly transboundary.63 The cost of this externality is given by the function φ(z(q,q∗)) which I assume
is twice differentiable and convex, and φ(0)= 0. The cost function takes the form φ(z(q,q∗))=α ·z(q,q∗)2
at home and φ∗(z∗(q,q∗)) = α ·z∗(q,q∗)2 in Foreign. Good y production does not generate externalities, so
αy = 0 in both Home and Foreign. The nonnegative weight, α ∈ [0,1], reflects valuation of the externality
in each country. The parameter α may also indicate the strength of domestic environmental lobbies. Note
that in this paper I assume α is the same in both countries.64
Let τx and tx denote Home’s specific import tariff and pollution tax in sector x. Likewise, t∗x and τ∗x
denote Foreign’s pollution tax and Foreign’s specific export tax on good x. The net trade tax for good x
is defined as rx ≡ τx+ τ∗x . If trade and pollution taxes are not prohibitive, home’s consumer and producer
price for good x are given by px = pwx + τx and qx = pwx + τx− tx respectively where pwx is the world price
of good x. Foreign’s local consumer and producer prices can be expressed as p∗x = pwx −τ∗x and q∗x = pwx −
τ∗x−t∗x correspondingly. Market prices for good y are defined in a similar fashion for both countries.65 The
international market-clearing condition for good i is D(pi)+D∗(p∗i )= S(qi)+S
∗(q∗i ). Upon determination
of tariffs and pollution taxes, the arbitrage condition for good x is px = p∗x + τx + τ∗x for consumer prices
and qx = q∗x + τx+ τ∗x− tx+ t∗x for producer prices. In sector y, the arbitrage condition is py = p∗y− τy− τ∗y
for consumer prices and qy = q∗y − τy− τ∗y for producer prices. This yields market-clearing world prices,
p˜wx = p
w
x (τx, tx,τ∗x , t∗x ), p˜y(p˜wy ,τy), and local prices for good x and y in Home: p˜x(p˜wx ,τx), q˜x(p˜wx ,τx, tx),
q˜y(p˜wy ,τy, ty), and p˜wy = pwy (τ∗y , t∗y ,τy, ty).66 Similarly, equilibrium consumer and producer prices for good
x in Foreign are p˜∗x(pwx ,τ∗x) and q˜∗x(pwx ,τ∗x , t∗x ) and for good y are p˜∗y(pwy ,τ∗y) and q˜∗y(pwy ,τ∗y , t∗y ).
Total Home welfare is the sum of welfare in both sectors and is defined as W ≡Wx +Wy. Similarly,
total Foreign welfare is W ∗ ≡W ∗x +W ∗y . Furthermore, welfare in each sector is measured as the sum
of consumer surplus and producer surplus, plus trade and domestic policy revenue, less environmental
damage costs.67 The government’s objective is to maximize total welfare where welfare in each sector is:
Wi ≡
∫ 1
pi
D(pi)d pi+
∫ qi
0
S(qi)dqi+ τiMi(pi,qi)+ tiS(qi)−φi(z(qi,q∗i )); i = {x,y}
For good x, this could be written as:
63I assume here that the spill over effect is the same in Home and Foreign. It should also be noted that the degree to which
pollution crosses borders is completely independent of the amount of trade. One can think of δ as being determined solely by
geographical and chemical factors.
64Also notice that the only asymmetry present in this model is in the comparative advantage of Home and Foreign.
65Given that production of good y does not emit pollution, the pollution tax is set to zero in that industry and the only policy
instrument available is a trade tax.
66Note that the market-clearing local prices depend on trade policy through the net trade tax, r.
67Alternatively, the externality could be included in the consumer’s utility function but given the structure of the model and
the additive separability of the welfare function, this is equivalent to the exposition done here.
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Wx(pwx , px,qx,q
∗
x)≡
∫ 1
p˜x
D(px)d px+
∫ q˜x
0
S(qx)dqx+(px− pwx )Mx(px,qx)+(px−qx)S(px)−φx(z(qx,q∗x))
where Home’s excess demand for good i is Mi ≡ D(pi)− S(qi) and Foreign’s excess supply is similarly
defined. Since prices are determined by tariffs and pollution taxes, government welfare is ultimately a
function of the policy instruments.
To highlight the effect of the cross-border pollution externality on strategic behavior vis-a-vis trade
and environmental policies, we focus our analysis on the polluting sector, x. Recall that this is Home’s
import sector and Foreign’s export sector.68 The world and local price functions take the following form:
pw = [4+2t∗−3τ+ t+4τ∗]/7
p = [4+2t∗+4τ+ t+4τ∗]/7
p∗ = [4+2t∗−3τ+ t−3τ∗]/7
q = [4+2t∗+4τ−6t+4τ∗]/7
q∗ = [4−5t∗−3τ+ t−3τ∗]/7
The monotonicity of the demand and supply functions gives world prices that are decreasing in the
import tariff and increasing in export and pollution taxes. Basically, tariffs depress imports, leading to
lower world prices and taxes lower world supply, resulting in higher world prices. Import tariffs raise
domestic prices for consumers and producers as the traded good becomes more expensive in the domestic
market. Alternatively, export taxes reduce domestic consumer and producer prices. The reason is that
world prices are now higher as a result of the export tax and all else equal given the arbitrage condition,
prices in the exporting country fall. Pollution taxes raise domestic consumer prices but lower producer
prices for the simple fact that the direct pollution tax effect dominates the rise in world prices. Lastly, to
ensure positive trade volume, I assume that trade taxes are not too large such that trade is prohibited.
68We drop the subscript, x, from now on.
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Efficiency
In this section, I define a plan as efficient if it implies the largest possible surplus for division between
the two countries.69 The planner’s problem is to choose trade and environmental policies that maximize
joint welfare, which is given by:
J(p,q, p∗,q∗) =W (pw, p,q,q∗)+W ∗(pw, p∗,q∗, p,q) (1)
First, note that joint welfare is independent of world prices due to the market clearing condition that Home
good x imports are exactly Foreign’s exports of good x. Basically, world price changes that occur when
local prices are fixed merely result in income redistribution across countries. Hence, local prices alone
matter for efficiency here and since local prices only depend on net trade barriers given pollution taxes,
joint welfare is also fully determined by net tariffs. Totally differentiating the joint welfare function, we
get:
dJ = (τ+ τ∗)dM+(t− tˆ)dS+(t∗− tˆ∗)dS∗ (2)
where tˆ = φ′z−δφ∗′z and tˆ∗ = φ∗′z∗ −δφ′z∗ may be defined as the marginal costs of global pollution. Also,
φ′(φ∗′) is the derivative of Home’s (Foreign’s) pollution externality cost with respect to Home’s (Foreign’s)
total pollution damage. It is easy to see that if taxes are set efficiently and prices equalize across countries,
the expression in (2) becomes zero.
Proposition 1. The efficient trade policy outcome is rE = τE + τ∗E = 0. The efficient pollution tax is
tE = tˆ(δ,α) for home and t∗E = tˆ∗(δ,α) for foreign. The efficient pollution taxes consider the marginal
costs of global pollution.
This proposition establishes that, even in the presence of a cross-border pollution externality, trade
policies are efficient. Intuitively, because the efficient pollution tax takes into account global pollution,
the only motive governments have for trade protection is to influence the terms-of-trade at the expense of
69This is equivalent to the policy outcome from reciprocal trade and environmental agreements in the context of the present
model. See Bagwell and Staiger (2001) and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998; 2007).
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trading partners. However, the efficient plan takes away this terms-of-trade externality motive given that
the planner maximizes joint welfare. Thus, the efficient trade outcome obtains.70
The following discussion of the conditionally efficient tariffs highlights the impact of the cross-border
pollution externality in this analysis. Solving the maximization problem described above, when pollution
taxes are set first and trade taxes are chosen in the second stage, the net trade tax, rE(t, t∗), is obtained as a
function of pollution taxes.71 In the benchmark case of no cross-border pollution, that is when δ= 0, the
trade policy choice simplifies to:
rE(t, t∗,0) =
16α+(14+18α)t− (21+34α)t∗
42+26α
(3)
Alternatively, when δ= 1, that is when all of one country’s pollution affects the other country, trade policy
is given by:
rE(t, t∗,1) =
24α+(14−8α)t− (21+16α)t∗
42+4α
(4)
Assuming pollution taxes are set to zero in (3) and (4), notice that the net trade tax with perfect trans-
boundary pollution is greater than that with no cross-border pollution. In general, however, the relation-
ship between (3) and (4) will depend on the pollution taxes obtained from the first stage. In any case, for
values of δ between zero and one, the net trade tax conditional on pollution taxes, rE(t, t∗), will lie some-
where between (3) and (4). Furthermore, from the two benchmark cases, it is clear that the cooperative
trade tax, rE(t, t∗), is increasing in Home’s pollution tax and decreasing in Foreign’s pollution tax level
for 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The intuition is that when Home raises its pollution tax, production shifts
to Foreign, increasing pollution in both Home and Foreign. Thus, the level of trade protection rises to in-
directly lower Foreign’s pollution. Similarly, if Foreign decreases it’s pollution tax, then trade protection
rises to curb Foreign pollution.
With an environmental agreement in the first stage of the game, the choice of t and t∗ maximizes (1)
where the pollution externality is fully internalized and the pollution taxes chosen are equal to the marginal
cost of polluting in both Home and Foreign. The efficient pollution taxes are:
70The efficient policy outcomes are the same irrespective of the timing of negotiations.
71Due to ease of exposition, the net tariffs are described in full in the appendix. Note that it is the net trade taxes that are
unique not individual tariffs.
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tE = tˆ(δ,α) =
[4α(1+δ(4+δ)+2α(−1+δ2)2)]
[7+8α(2+δ(−1+2δ)+α(−1+δ2)2)] (5)
and
t∗E = tˆ∗(δ,α) =
[8α(1+δ+δ2+α(−1+δ2)2)]
[7+8α(2+δ(−1+2δ)+α(−1+δ2)2)] (6)
From the expression in (2), notice that the two last terms are equal to zero given the efficient choices
of t and t∗. Thus for efficiency, consumer prices must be the same in both Home and Foreign, suggesting
that trade policies must be efficient. In effect, plugging (5) and (6) into the net trade tax, rE(t, t∗), gives
the efficient trade policy outcome, that is, rE = τE + τ∗E = 0.
Noncooperative Policy Choices
In this section I consider the static policy game and characterize the Nash trade and environmental policies.
Noncooperative Policy Choices With Pollution Taxes Set in the First-Stage
Without any international agreement, in Stage 1 of the game, the two governments noncooperatively
and simultaneously choose levels of pollution taxes to maximize national welfare. Then in Stage 2 the
governments, having observed the levels of pollution tax, choose tariff levels τ and τ∗ respectively. I
solve for an equilibrium in pollution and trade taxes using backwards induction. Nash equilibrium tariff
choices in the second stage are defined as a set of policies (τN(t, t∗),τ∗N(t, t∗)), which satisfy the first-
order conditions for Home and Foreign’s maximization problem. To highlight the factors that influence
policy choices, as in (2), I totally differentiate Home and Foreign’s welfare functions:
dW =−Md pw+(p− pw)dM+(t−φ′)dS−δφ′dS∗ (7)
dW ∗ = M∗d pw− (p∗− pw)dM∗+(t∗−φ∗′)dS∗−δφ∗′dS (8)
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From (7) and (8), observe that there are four key effects of tariff choices: the impact of tariffs on world
prices (terms of trade effect), the impact of tariffs on local consumer prices (volume-of-trade effect) , the
impact of tariffs on local producer prices (domestic producer price effect), and the impact of tariffs on
foreign producer prices (foreign pollution externality effect). The domestic producer price effect can be
further disentangled into two component effects: a tax revenue effect and a domestic pollution externality
effect. The first two effects, the terms of trade and volume-of-trade effects, and the tax revenue effect, are
typical in the trade literature.72 This paper highlights two additional effects: the domestic pollution exter-
nality effect and the foreign pollution externality effect. A country can reallocate surplus from its trading
partner to itself through the terms-of-trade effect associated with world price movements. Furthermore,
changes in trade policies affect welfare through changes in local consumer prices that alter the volume
of trade, which is the volume-of-trade effect. Trade policies also influence local producer prices, which
affect domestic production, impacting domestic policy revenue and consequently welfare. The domestic
(foreign) pollution externality effect refers to the ability of trade policy to alter the local (foreign) producer
price and therefore the equilibrium domestic (foreign) supply levels and the amount of pollution damage
incurred holding the volume of trade fixed. Changes in pollution emissions in turn affect welfare.
If Home sets its production tax equal to the marginal cost of the domestic externality and consumer
prices are the same as world prices, the pollution externality effect originating from Home and the volume-
of-trade effect disappear as shown in (7). However, the Home government still has an incentive to restrict
trade because it can use trade policy to influence welfare through the terms-of-trade effect (Md pw) and the
foreign pollution externality effect (φ′dS∗) illustrated in (7). It is clear that the first term in (7) which rep-
resents the terms-of-trade effect is positive when Home’s tariff changes as gains in welfare occur through
a lower world price of the good that Home imports. With a lower world price comes less foreign supply
which reduces the pollution externality from Foreign, also improving Home’s welfare. The terms-of-trade
and foreign externality effects seem to reinforce each other in this case. Similar intuition holds for the
Foreign country as well. If Foreign fully internalizes its domestic pollution and the volume of trade is
constant, from (8) we see that Foreign’s terms-of-trade is higher when trade taxes increase, which has
a positive effect on welfare. The higher resulting world price makes Home producers want to supply
more, increasing the cross-border pollution effect which negatively impacts Foreign’s welfare. Hence, it
could be the case that in Foreign the negative cross-border externality effect exactly offsets the positive
72See Bagwell and Staiger (1999) who also consider a political-economy effect. I abstract from political economy effects
in this model in order to emphasize the effect of the pollution externality in the simplest model possible. Future research will
analyze the impact of political lobbies in a similar model.
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terms-of-trade effect in which case Foreign would have no need to restrict trade.
Within the context of the model, the four effects in (7) and (8) are:
dW = 3M(p,q)−6τ+2t+α(6δ−4){S(q)+δS∗(q∗)} (9)
dW ∗ = 4M∗(p∗,q∗)−6τ∗−3t∗−α(4δ−6){S∗(q∗)+δ∗S(q)} (10)
The first term in (9) corresponds to −Md pw in (7), which represents the terms-of-trade effect and
reflects the effect of a slight increase of Home’s tariff on imports and tariff revenue due to the lowering
of the world price. As stated above, this represents a redistribution of surplus from foreign exporters to
the domestic country and lowers the cost to the domestic government of offering further protection to its
import-competing producers. The second term, 6τ, captures the volume-of-trade effect and reflects the
efficiency cost to the domestic country when it raises its import tariff slightly. Import volume decreases as
a result of the implied higher local consumer prices. The last terms in (9) correspond to (t−φ′)dS−δφ′dS∗
in (7) and represent the combined domestic and foreign producer price effect of a small increase in the
domestic import tariff, τ. The term, 2t +α(6δ− 4)S(q), measures the net effect on producer surplus,
domestic tax revenue, and pollution damage of exchanging a fixed S(q) units of domestically produced
good x at a higher producer price. All else equal, Home’s domestic and foreign pollution externality
effects, α(6δ−4)S(q) and α(6δ−4)δS∗(q∗), increase domestic welfare with a higher import tariff when
δ > 2/3. The point here is that an increase in Home’s import tariff lowers Foreign supply and raises
domestic production due to higher prices. This diminishes the fraction of Foreign pollution that spills over
to Home (welfare improving) but also augments pollution from domestic production (welfare decreasing).
Thus,the net effect on welfare is positive, holding all other factors constant, if the proportion of Foreign
pollution that affects home is greater than 2/3. If Home pollutes significantly more than Foreign does
in Home and δ < 2/3, then both pollution externality effects will cause a higher import tariff to lower
Home’s welfare. A similar interpretation applies to (4) with a few exceptions. First, a small increase in
the export tax raises the world price of good x, reallocating surplus from Home to Foreign, thus improving
Foreign’s terms of trade. Second, higher export taxes lower producer prices in Foreign, resulting in a
lower equilibrium supply level that hurts Foreign welfare through lower tax revenue. Third, the pollution
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externality effect on Foreign welfare is positive as long as δ∗< 3/2. When Foreign increases its export tax,
domestic supply and consequently domestic pollution decreases. However, Home’s production increases
which results in a larger pollution spill-over to Foreign. In sum, Foreign benefits from an export tax when
its domestic pollution damage is greater than the spill-over from Home as the gain from lower internal
pollution is greater than the decrease in welfare from the pollution originating from abroad.
Let τBR(τ∗, t, t∗) and τ∗BR(τ, t, t∗) indicate Home’s import tariff and Foreign’s export tax best-response
functions. Considering the benchmark cases from the previous section, I find that in the event of no
cross-border pollution (δ= 0), the best-response functions for Home and Foreign are:
τBR(τ∗, t∗, t,0) =
(3−8α)− (18+8α)τ∗− (9+4α)t∗+(20+12α)t
(60+8α)
(11)
τ∗BR(τ, t, t∗,0) =
(4+24α)− (24+18α)τ− (33+30α)t∗+(8+6α)t
(66+18α)
(12)
In the second benchmark case of full pollution spill over effects, that is when δ = 1, Home and
Foreign’s best-response functions are given by:
τBR(τ∗, t∗, t,1) =
(3+12α)− (18+2α)τ∗− (9+8α)t∗+(20−4α)t
(60+2α)
(13)
τ∗BR(τ, t, t∗,1) =
(4+12α)− (24+2α)τ− (33+8α)t∗+(8−4α)t
(66+2α)
(14)
For all applicable values of α, note that both Home and Foreign’s reaction curves are downward sloping
with respect to the other country’s trade tax level. The intuition behind the downward sloping reaction
curves is that when Foreign’s export tax increases, Foreign production decreases, raising the world price
of good x. Consumer prices rise and Home experiences a fall in imports as a result. The decline of Home’s
imports weakens the terms-of-trade benefit associated with a higher import tariff. Although the production
externality gain increases when the import tariff is raised in terms of less pollution being emitted, Home’s
downward sloping best-response tariff function implies that this effect is secondary to the terms-of-trade
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effect.
Furthermore, under the assumption that pollution taxes are set to zero in both countries, note that when
Foreign sets an export tax, Home’s best-response function with δ= 1 is greater than its reaction function
with no transboundary pollution (δ = 0). This suggests that Home responds to a pollution spillover by
raising its import tariff level.73 In contrast, Foreign’s best-response function is lower with transboundary
pollution than without when Home sets a positive import tariff, suggesting that Foreign reacts to Home’s
pollution spillover by reducing its export tax. The trade policy best response functions will fall somewhere
between the two benchmark cases for values of δ ∈ [0,1]. In sum, the Nash trade taxes chosen by Home
and Foreign reflect the cross-border nature of the production externality through the δ parameter.
Figure 1: Noncooperative Best-Response Curves
τ∗BR0
τBR0
τ(0, 0)
τ∗(0, 0)
0
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N1
τBR1
τ∗BR1
Figure 1 highlights the Nash best-response curves for Home and Foreign in the two benchmark cases
where the pollution taxes in both countries are zero.74 The point N0 reflects the equilibrium with no cross-
border pollution while N1 is the equilibrium point when pollution is perfectly transboundary. Figure 1
suggests that Home imposes a negative Nash import tariff while Foreign sets a positive Nash export tax
when δ = 0. For an average valuation of the externality (α = 0.5), Home responds to an increase in
Foreign’s export taxes by lowering it’s import tariff where it essentially becomes an import subsidy.75
73Ludema and Wooton (1994) obtain this result as well in a model with trade policy but no domestic policy instrument available
and a cross-border pollution externality.
74In this example, α= 0.5.
75Again, production taxes are set to zero here. This is just for ease of exposition. In the appendix I describe the full Nash
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Intuitively, with no cross-border pollution, Home would like Foreign to produce more, hence the subsidy.
However, when pollution perfectly crosses borders, Foreign production now hurts Home where Home now
responds to Foreign’s trade policy by setting a positive import tariff. Given that Foreign is the exporter of
the polluting good, the government’s best-response is still to set a positive export tax to reduce domestic
production and pollution. This follows from the previous discussion comparing (11) to (13) and (12) to
(14). Moving from zero to perfect pollution spill over, Home’s best-response tariff increases from an
import subsidy to an import tariff when pollution taxes are set to zero as illustrated in Figure 1. However,
it is important to keep in mind that the level of pollution taxes will be positive in which case best-responses
and equilibrium policies will differ from what is highlighted in Figure 1.
From the best-response functions I obtain Home and Foreign’s Nash trade tariffs given pollution
taxes.76 Combining both trade taxes, I compare them to those in (3) and (4). With no cross-border
pollution in the non-cooperative game, I obtain:
rN(t, t∗,0) =
(7+16α)+(28+18α)t− (42+34α)t∗
84+26α
(15)
The other benchmark case of perfect transboundary pollution is given by:
rN(t, t∗,1) =
(7+24α)+(28−8α)t− (42+16α)t∗
84+4α
(16)
It is clear from (15) and (16) that given pollution taxes, Nash trade taxes are higher when pollution is
perfectly transboundary than in the event of no cross-border pollution. Furthermore, assuming pollution
taxes are set to zero, the Nash trade taxes in (15) and (16) may be greater or less than the cooperative
trade taxes in (3) and (4) depending on the values of α. In general, the relationship between Home and
Foreign’s Nash trade tax levels and the pollution taxes depend on the parameter values of the model, δ and
α.77 Home’s Nash tariff increases in its pollution tax for all possible parameter values, that is δ ∈ [0,1]
and α ∈ [0,1]. A rise in Home’s pollution tax lowers domestic supply of good x. This allows Foreign
producers to supply more of the good. Since Home is only concerned about domestic welfare, holding
equilibrium when environmental policy is chosen in the first stage and trade policy in the second stage.
76Full expressions for the trade tariffs are presented in the appendix.
77Under the condition that trade is not prohibitive, a positive trade volume occurs at the Nash tariff if for production taxes t
and t∗, rN < (1−3t∗+2t)/6, which then implies that −21+7α[5+4t +δ2(5+4t−9t∗)−9t∗+12δ(−t + t∗)]< 0. Hereafter,
given the domestic and foreign production tax level, we assume the conditions for non-prohibitive trade are satisfied.
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everything else constant, it raises unilateral tariffs for two reasons. First, the desire to protect its import-
competing industry causes Home’s government to increase its Nash import tariff in order to mitigate
Home producers’ loss due to higher pollution taxes at Home. Second, the foreign pollution externality
rises due to higher Foreign production. As a result, the Home government raises its import tariff level
to put downward pressure on Foreign production of the imported good, thereby reducing the negative
externality.78 In contrast, Foreign’s Nash trade tax is decreasing in its pollution tax level. The government
in Foreign lowers its Nash export taxes in response to a rise in Foreign pollution taxes to favor its exporting
sector and to restrict the pollution externality from the other country’s production.
Now consider the first stage of the game. Given the Nash tariffs described above, both Home and
Foreign unilaterally choose production taxes to maximize their respective welfare. Solving their respec-
tive first-order conditions, the Nash production taxes79 can be expressed as a function of the model’s
parameters, δ and α:
tN = tN(δ,α) and t∗N = t∗N(δ,α) (17)
when δ= 0, Nash pollution taxes simplify to:
tN =
α(−1674−2904α−852α2−72α3)
(−2646−6048α−4182α2−960α3−72α4)
t∗N =
α(−5589/2−3294α−888α2−72α3)
(−2646−6048α−4182α2−960α3−72α4)
When Home and Foreign set both policies simultaneously, Ederington (2002) and Limao (2002) show that
pollution taxes chosen unilaterally are efficient and reflect the marginal cost of domestic pollution in the
noncooperative policy game. To compare this result with the model in this paper, the Nash pollution taxes
when policy choices are made simultaneously are:
tN(δ= 0) =
α(26+38α)
42+83α+38α2
t∗N(δ= 0) =
α(45+38α)
42+83α+38α2
It is straightforward to verify that Home’s (Foreign’s) pollution tax in the absence of a cross-border
78Note that without a pollution tax, Home’s import tariff may be used to reduce domestic pollution.
79See appendix for exact expression of Home and Foreign production taxes.
89
pollution externality when both policies are chosen simultaneously is less (greater) than in the two-stage
policy game. This suggests that given no pollution spillover effect, Home (Foreign) is overtaxing (under-
taxing) domestic production relative to the efficient level in the two-stage game.
When δ= 1, the Nash pollution taxes are given by:
tN =
α(−4500−114α)
(−2646−4662α−108α2)
t∗N =
α(−4509−99α)
(−2646−4662α−108α2)
Holding α constant, Home’s production tax increases with δ. This is as a result of the fact that Home’s
welfare is negatively affected by pollution irrespective of the source. Home increases its production tax to
improve its environmental quality where Foreign essentially shifts some of its cost of polluting to Home.
Similarly, Foreign’s pollution tax increases with δ where the intuition from Home applies here as well.
This is confirmed when analyzing (17) in light of the two benchmark cases. I find that Home and Foreign’s
pollution taxes are less with no cross-border pollution than they are with perfectly transboundary pollution,
reflecting concern about pollution regardless of the source.
Furthermore, I find that given δ, Home and Foreign pollution taxes increase with α. Basically, the more
heavily Home (Foreign) weighs the pollution externality, the more Home’s (Foreign’s) government will
raise its pollution tax in an effort to limit the increasingly negative impact of the externality on domestic
welfare.
When a country places zero valuation on the pollution externality, that is when α= 0, pollution taxes
chosen unilaterally are efficient in the noncooperative policy game where Home and Foreign set both
policies simultaneously since there is no externality to correct. However, the desire to use trade policy to
manipulate the terms-of-trade is still present for both governments and countries enter into a trade agree-
ment to correct this terms-of-trade externality. The optimal cooperative trade policy in the simultaneous
move game where either α= 0 or δ= 0 is efficient.
When each country is able to choose trade and environmental policies strategically though, it is no
longer obvious that unilateral production taxes are efficient even with a trade agreement. The reason
being that both governments anticipate that they will be constrained by tariffs in the second stage. As
such, their choice of domestic policy in the first stage potentially reflects this.80
Plugging the pollution taxes from (17) back into the tariffs obtained conditional on environmental
80When we consider cooperative policies in the next section, we will explore the issue of domestic policy substituting for trade
policy and vice-versa.
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policy choices gives the optimal Home and Foreign Nash tariffs81, as a function of δ and α:
τN = τN(δ,α) and τ∗N = τ∗N(δ,α) (18)
To make these tariffs comparable to the tariffs in the efficiency section, I use the net tariff level,
rN = τN +τ∗N and again refer to the two benchmark cases. In the case of no spill over effect, the net trade
tax is given by:
rN(t, t∗,0) = τN(t, t∗)+ τ∗N(t, t∗)
=
(147+67α+12α2)
4(441+12α4+1008α+697α2+160α3)
(19)
The second benchmark case of δ= 1 is given by:
rN(t, t∗,1) = τN(t, t∗)+ τ∗N(t, t∗)
=
(147+253α+16α2)
12(147+259α+6α2)
(20)
The most important point to note here is that the optimal unilateral trade policy is not efficient. Further-
more, from (19) and (20), notice that the net level of trade protection is higher with perfect cross-border
pollution than when pollution is purely local. Essentially, the relationship between the Nash import tariff
chosen by Home and δ given α is positive for one key reason: as Foreign’s pollution increasingly crosses
over Home’s borders, Home’s welfare is affected negatively which prompts the Home government to raise
its import tariff in an effort to curb Foreign production and consequently Foreign pollution. In contrast,
Foreign’s export tax decreases with the spill over pollution from Home. The reason for this is that if
Home increasingly pollutes into Foreign, Foreign’s welfare is negatively impacted and Foreign lowers its
export tax to raise Foreign supply. This reduces Home’s production and as such Home’s pollution. The
fact that the net trade taxes in (19) and (20) are higher with cross-border pollution than without implies
that Home’s import tariff is larger in magnitude than Foreign’s export tax. Nevertheless, both Home and
Foreign unilaterally use trade policy to try and address the pollution externality.
81Again, see appendix for full expression of Nash trade taxes for Home and Foreign.
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While Figure 1 highlights the Nash tariffs with no pollution taxes where Home’s choice of an import
subsidy depends on the pollution spill over effect, it is of interest to determine whether the Home and
Foreign trade taxes in (18) have similar signs for the applicable range of parameters, that is δ ∈ [0,1] and
α ∈ [0,1]. I find Home’s Nash import tariff to be positive within the range of parameter values. Without
cross-border pollution effects (i.e. when δ = 0), Home’s government finds a slight positive import tariff
desirable, implying that the terms-of-trade benefit outweighs the volume-of-trade cost due to a reduction
in import volume. Considering the foreign pollution externality effect provides an added rational for
imposing a positive import tariff as this lowers Foreign production and reduces the amount of pollution
that spills over to Home. However, the domestic pollution externality reduces the appeal of a higher
import tariff as domestic supply goes up, raising the local pollution emissions level. Determining the sign
of Foreign’s Nash export tax is more ambiguous as for some range of parameter values, the export tax is
positive and for others it is negative which is in essence an export subsidy. Although when there are no
pollution externality effects, Foreign’s government finds a slight export tax desirable indicating that the
terms-of-trade benefit exceeds the cost of reduced trade volume. Including the local pollution externality
effect raises the attractiveness of an export tax because there is less local production, thus less pollution.
In contrast, a higher Foreign export tax raises Home’s supply of the good, which poses an extra pollution
externality cost to Foreign that lowers the appeal of an export tax. In any case, the Nash tariffs in (18) are
not efficient.
Lastly, Home and Foreign’s pollution taxes obtained in (17) are positive when δ ∈ [0,1] and α ∈ [0,1]
since pollution also arises due to domestic production. Relative to the first-best scenario outlined in the
previous section, I find that Home and Foreign Nash pollution taxes are also inefficient. The direction of
inefficiency, that is whether the Nash pollution taxes are higher or lower than their efficient counterparts
depends on the values of δ and α. Foreign’s non-cooperative pollution tax, t∗N however, is always less than
the first-best pollution tax, t∗E for any given parameter value, implying that Foreign is not internalizing
the damage it causes Home and over-supplies relative to the efficient output level.
Proposition 2. In the static non-cooperative tariff game:
(2.1). There exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
(2.2). Nash trade and pollution taxes are inefficient.
(2.3). The net Nash tariffs are above their efficient levels.
(2.4). Home and Foreign pollution taxes are positive.
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(2.5). Home’s Nash import tariff is positive for all parameter values while the sign of Foreign’s Nash
export tax depends on the specific values of α and δ.
(2.6). Foreign’s non-cooperative pollution tax is too low relative to the fully efficient tax level for the
applicable range of parameter values. Home’s Nash pollution tax relative to the efficient tax depends on
the specific parameter values within that range.
In the standard case of no cross-border pollution externality, the first-stage Nash domestic policies
are efficient while trade policies reflect terms-of-trade motives and are inefficient. With a cross-border
pollution externality, the first-stage Nash domestic policies are inefficient. The reason for this is that each
government only takes into account the effect of local pollution and ignores the additional cost imposed
on the other country when pollution spills over. By setting a pollution tax that is too low in the first stage,
Foreign can shift some of its costs of reducing pollution onto Home and possibly improve its terms-of-
trade in the second stage. Home’s choice of domestic policy in the first stage depends on the parameters
of the model. Intuitively, Home could subsidize domestic production by setting a pollution tax below the
efficient level if the pollution spillover to Foreign is large or if Home does not care about the environment.
However, if Home’s valuation of the externality is really high or the spillover effect is small, then Home
might find it unilaterally optimal to overtax its domestic production relative to the efficient level.
In the second stage, without cross-border pollution effects, there exists only a terms of trade motive
for trade protection. With transboundary pollution, there is an additional incentive to restrict trade as
governments seek to control pollution and reduce the pollution externality indirectly using trade taxes.
Given that Home imports the good and pollution crosses borders, the Home government has an incentive
to reduce Foreign production (and pollution) in addition to improving its terms-of-trade. Recall that even
if pollution is not transboundary in which case domestic policy would be efficient, Home still has the
terms-of-trade motive for unilaterally setting an import tariff. Thus, Home’s optimal Nash trade policy
is to set an import tariff. In contrast, Foreign may find an export subsidy optimal if Foreign concern
for the environment is low and pollution is transboundary, as the fact that some pollution spills over to
Home encourages the Foreign government to boost domestic production. Alternatively, if Foreign values
the environment, then an export tax may be optimal in the second stage, lowering domestic pollution in
addition to offering terms-of-trade gains.
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Noncooperative Policy Choices Under Reverse Sequence of Events
In this subsection, I consider the reverse timing where governments unilaterally set trade policy in the
first stage and environmental policy in the second stage. To obtain the subgame-perfect equilibrium, the
two-stage game is solved backwards, starting with the determination of pollution taxes.
Let tBR(τ∗,τ, t∗) and t∗BR(τ,τ∗, t) indicate Home and Foreign’s pollution tax best-response functions.
Considering the benchmark cases as before, I find that in the event of no cross-border pollution, the best-
response functions for Home and Foreign are:
tBR(τ∗,τ, t∗,0) =
(−1+12α)+(3+6α)t∗+(20+12α)τ+(6+12α)τ∗
(23+18α)
(21)
t∗BR(τ,τ∗, t,0) =
(2+40α)+(4+10α)t− (12+30α)τ− (33+30α)τ∗
(41+50α)
(22)
In the second benchmark case with perfect transboundary pollution, that is when δ = 1, Home and
Foreign’s best-response functions are given by:
tBR(τ∗,τ, t∗,1) =
(−1+24α)+(3−16α)t∗+(20−4α)τ+(6−4α)τ∗
(23+8α)
(23)
t∗BR(τ,τ∗, t,1) =
(2+48α)+(4−16α)t− (12+8α)τ− (33+8α)τ∗
(41+32α)
(24)
For α ∈ [0,1], note that both Home and Foreign’s reaction curves are upward sloping with respect to the
other country’s pollution tax level in the absence of a cross-border pollution externality. The intuition be-
hind the upward sloping reaction curves is that when Foreign’s pollution tax increases, Foreign production
decreases, enabling Home to increase domestic production. However, this also raises Home’s pollution,
prompting Home to increase its pollution tax. With perfect transboundary pollution, the slope of the reac-
tion curves shown above depend on the value α. In between the two benchmark cases, Home’s pollution
tax is downward sloping for values of 1/10(16−√166) < δ ≤ 1 and −3/(6−32δ+10δ2) < α ≤ 1 and
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is upward sloping otherwise. When the pollution spill over from Foreign to Home is large, an increase in
Foreign’s pollution tax that decreases Foreign’s pollution allows Home to lower its pollution tax in order
to spur domestic production. However, when Foreign’s pollution does not affect Home as much relative
to Home’s own domestic pollution, then even if Foreign increases its pollution tax, Home’s best-response
is to raise its pollution tax as well.82
From the best-response functions, I obtain Home and Foreign’s Nash pollution taxes given tariffs,
tN(τ,τ∗) and t∗N(τ,τ∗).83 Home’s Nash pollution tax rises with Home’s import tariff for the relevant
range of parameter values. An increase in Home’s import tariff lowers the volume of trade for good
x as Home prices are now higher, allowing Home producers to supply more to the domestic market.
However, the increase in domestic production results in more pollution which is not desirable to Home.
As a result, Home raises its pollution tax to curb the increased domestic pollution. Likewise, Home raises
its pollution tax with a rise in Foreign’s export tax since an export tax reduces Foreign supply, thereby
increasing domestic production and domestic pollution. Home chooses a higher pollution tax to minimize
the domestic pollution externality effect. For the Foreign country, the opposite is true where an increase in
Foreign’s export tax results in a decrease in Foreign’s pollution tax. The reason for this is that by raising
its export tax, the Foreign producer price declines which lowers Foreign supply and pollution. Foreign
can afford to slightly lower its pollution tax to improve the competitiveness of its domestic producers.
Similarly, Foreign’s pollution tax decreases as Home raises its import tariff to facilitate production for
Foreign suppliers.
Now consider the first stage of the game. Given the Nash pollution taxes described above, Home and
Foreign unilaterally choose trade policies that maximize their respective welfare. Solving their respective
first-order conditions, the Nash trade taxes can be expressed as a function of the model’s parameters, δ
and α:84
τN = τN(δ,α) and τ∗N = τ∗N(δ,α) (25)
Home sets a positive import tariff and Foreign sets an export tax given the range of parameter values.
Without pollution externality effects, Foreign finds a slight export tax desirable highlighting the incentive
82The interpretation of Foreign’s best-response curve is similar where the slope with respect to Home’s production tax is
negative for 1/3(8−√43)< δ≤ 1 and −2/(5−16δ+3δ2)< α≤ 1 and positive otherwise.
83The full expression for both taxes is provided in the appendix.
84See appendix for exact expression of Home and Foreign trade taxes.
95
to extract surplus from its trading partner. For the same reason Home chooses a positive import tariff even
when there are no pollution spill over effects. Recall that from Proposition 1 the efficient trade policy is
free trade. Thus, the Nash tariffs in (25) are not on the efficiency frontier.
Furthermore, Home’s import tariff increases with the cross-border pollution effect, δ, ceteris paribus.
A rise in δ prompts Home to increase its import tariff in order to reduce Foreign production and pollution.
This in turn lowers the cross-border pollution externality effect at Home and improves Home’s welfare
through better environmental quality. Home’s import tariff also increases with α since greater valuation of
the pollution damage negatively impacts Home’s welfare. By raising its import tariff, Home can reduce the
amount of Foreign pollution that spills over. Foreign’s trade protection level also rises with δ. One reason
for this is that Foreign wants to reduce pollution within its borders irrespective of the source. Foreign’s
export tax increase in response to higher pollution spill over from Home implies that the benefits from
lower pollution and increased export tax revenue outweigh the costs from loss in producer surplus and
lower volume of trade. With respect to α, Foreign’s trade tax increases the more it values environmental
quality, which holds true for Home as well.
Using the Nash tariffs from (25), we obtain the optimal Home and Foreign Nash pollution taxes, as a
function of δ and α:85
tN = tN(δ,α) and t∗N = t∗N(δ,α) (26)
Relative to the first-best policy outcome, Home and Foreign’s Nash production taxes, tN and t∗N , dif-
fer from the efficient pollution taxes obtained earlier where the differences are either positive on negative
depending on the precise values of α and δ. With no pollution spillover, that is when δ= 0, Home’s (For-
eign’s) Nash production tax in (26) is less (greater) than under the previous sequence of events in (17).
Thus, when countries are only concerned about domestic pollution, they can exploit the timing of trade
and environmental policy choices to maximize their welfare. In particular, Home (Foreign) taxes domes-
tic producers more (less) when it sets domestic policy first and trade policy second suggesting that in the
reverse case it uses trade policy to address pollution concerns. Furthermore, Home’s Nash pollution tax
in (26) is increasing in δ and α. This is exactly what we observe in the alternate sequence of events where
pollution taxes were chosen in the first stage. The rationale in both cases is to minimize Home’s welfare
loss from the pollution externality regardless of its source. Also, Foreign’s non-cooperative pollution tax is
85Again, see appendix for full expression of Nash pollution taxes for Home and Foreign.
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increasing in α and δ. In sum, we see that irrespective of the timing of negotiations, in the non-cooperative
equilibrium, trade policy is used in an attempt to rectify the negative impact of the cross-border pollution
externality. Given trade policy, domestic policy is used to correct for the increase in pollution within a
country’s borders that may have originated from either domestic or foreign production.
The following proposition summarizes the above findings:
Proposition 3. In the static non-cooperative tariff game:
(3.1). There exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
(3.2). Nash trade and pollution taxes are inefficient.
(3.3). The net Nash trade taxes are above their efficient levels.
(3.4). Home’s Nash import tariff and Foreign’s Nash export tax are both positive.
(3.5). Home and Foreign’s pollution tax relative to their efficient levels depend on the cross-border pollu-
tion effect and valuation of the externality.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is similar to that of Proposition 2, where choosing trade and envi-
ronmental policies non-cooperatively results in inefficient outcomes. The key difference here is that since
trade policy is chosen in the first stage, each country unilaterally finds it optimal to set a positive trade
tax. This is due primarily to terms-of-trade considerations but also in an attempt to control pollution.86
In the second stage, given their choice of trade policy in the previous stage, both countries then set their
pollution taxes relative to the pollution spillover effect and how much they value the pollution externality.
Cooperative Trade Policy and Unilateral Pollution Taxes
If countries are able to agree on both trade and environmental policies, the efficiency results in Section
3 obtain. While countries have had been able to agree on trade policies over the years under the auspice of
the GATT and WTO, talks to sign a new post-Kyoto international environmental agreement broke down
at the 2009 conference in Copenhagen. This raises the question of whether efficiency can be attained in
the absence of a global environmental agreement.
86Governments know that their choice of domestic policies in the second stage will reflect only domestic pollution concerns
and will not efficiently correct for the pollution externality, prompting them to use trade policy as an indirect means of addressing
the cross-border pollution externality.
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In this section, I examine whether trade policy coordination alone might result in trade and environ-
mental policies that lie on the efficiency frontier.87 Key studies in the trade literature have demonstrated
that by cooperating on trade policy, countries internalize the terms-of-trade externality, thereby escaping
the terms-of-trade driven Prisoners’ Dilemma.88 This paper reveals that governments may manipulate
their trade policies to correct for the pollution externality in addition to the terms of trade externality so
as to enjoy efficiency gains. In addition, efficiency may be obtained through the second-best policies
highlighted in this section. I take advantage of the specific structure of the model in order to acquire more
insight into the role of the cross-border pollution externality parameter in the determination of the mutual
trade policy.
Recall that in the absence of a trade agreement, both Home and Foreign will use their unilateral
tariff choices to manipulate the terms-of-trade in their favor. However, in this model, this is not the only
inefficiency present. Pollution emissions from production at home and abroad introduce an additional
externality where negotiations over environmental policy is required to obtain full efficiency (as in Section
3). When no environmental deal can been reached, a negative production externality will likely have
repercussions on trade volume and on trade policy in general.89
Trade Negotiations Occurring in the First Stage
Assuming no cooperation over domestic policy in the first-stage, in the previous section, I showed that
Nash trade taxes are inefficient.90 This section considers the case where countries unilaterally set pollution
taxes in the first stage and negotiate an agreement on trade using the generalized Nash bargaining solution
in the second stage, which leads to the efficient level of trade taxes.91 The game is solved by backward
induction beginning with the determination of tariffs given first-stage pollution taxes. Negotiated tariffs
will be chosen to maximize
87The main premise in this section is that trade and trade policy have environmental related effects and vice-versa leading to the
debate about linking trade and environmental policies. A number of studies cast doubt on the effectiveness of linkage under the
auspice of the WTO, for example Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2001), Ederington (2002), and Staiger and Sykes (2009). In general,
the argument has been that the only international externality relevant to trade agreements is the terms-of-trade externality and
that current WTO rules which focus on market access are well able to deal with any problems related to unilateral environmental
policy choices.
88Examples include Bagwell and Staiger (2001), Copeland (2000), and Limao (2005). An import tariff has the effect of
lowering the world price, hurting foreign exporters. Since the importing country does not bear the full cost of this policy, it
chooses tariff levels that excessively restrict trade, leading to inefficient trade volumes.
89It is quite likely that the Nash pollution taxes from the previous section differ from the optimal unilateral pollution taxes
obtained when countries can cooperate over trade policies. This will be established shortly.
90In a similar political economy model, Grossman and Helpman (1995) show that the bargaining game with intercountry
transfers in a trade agreement has essentially the same equilibrium as when the transfer is constrained to zero.
91I assume that the two negotiating parties divide the surplus equally between them and the equilibrium agreement is reached
immediately.
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(W (τ,τ∗, t, t∗)−W D(t, t∗))(W ∗(τ,τ∗, t, t∗)−W ∗D(t, t∗)) (27)
where W D(t, t∗) is the threat point of Home and W ∗D(t, t∗) is Foreign’s threat point. The threat point
could be the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in Section 4 or payoffs from previously negotiated trade
agreements.92 Assuming a zero threat point, the objective function is
(W (τ,τ∗, t, t∗))(W ∗(τ,τ∗, t, t∗)) (28)
The trade taxes from the Nash bargaining solution also maximize joint welfare in (1). Thus, the level
of trade protection conditional on pollution taxes obtained in (28) will be as described in Section 3. From
(3) and (4), I showed that the cooperative tariff, rE , is increasing in Home’s pollution tax and decreasing
in Foreign’s pollution tax for all parameter values. Though both governments no longer have the ability to
influence the terms-of-trade because of the trade agreement, they can potentially affect the other country’s
level of pollution emissions indirectly given their choice of pollution taxes in the first stage. If Home
raises its pollution tax to lower domestic pollution, production shifts to the Foreign country, increasing
its pollution level and the portion that spills over to the Home country. Thus, a higher combined trade
tax that reduces Foreign pollution is more desirable to both countries in terms of joint welfare. Likewise,
both countries prefer higher combined trade taxes when Foreign lowers its first-stage pollution tax because
of the desire to limit the additional pollution generated in Foreign, some of which flows into the Home
country.
Now consider the choice of domestic policy. Each country chooses its pollution tax to maximize
domestic welfare and knows that decisions made in the first stage will influence the outcome of trade policy
in the second stage. The choice of pollution taxes maximize W (pw, p,q,q∗) for Home and W ∗(pw, p,q,q∗)
for Foreign given rE(t, t∗). The resulting pollution taxes for Home and Foreign from the first stage are:
tA = tA(δ,α) =
[4α(1+δ(4+δ)+2α(−1+δ2)2)]
[7+8α(2+δ(−1+2δ)+α(−1+δ2)2)] (29)
92The analysis that follows assumes that the threat point is zero. Hence, if both countries are unable to reach an agreement, the
net gain from bargaining (over that of the non-cooperative equilibrium) is zero. In the case where the threat point is affected by
the pollution tax chosen, the policy outcome may differ from the one presented in this study. This feature of the threat point will
be included in the model and analyzed in future work. Also, note that the problem abstracts from bargaining power concerns.
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and
t∗A = t∗A(δ,α) =
[8α(1+δ+δ2+α(−1+δ2)2)]
[7+8α(2+δ(−1+2δ)+α(−1+δ2)2)] (30)
To determine whether the production taxes in (29) and (30) are efficient, we compare them to the
policies obtained from an environmental agreement in (5) and (6). Notice that tA and t∗A are exactly the
same as tE and t∗E , showing that the unilateral pollution taxes are indeed efficient. Plugging (29) and
(30) into the Nash trade taxes conditional on domestic policy gives the efficient trade policy outcome,
that is, rE = τE + τ∗E = 0. The efficient trade and domestic policy results obtained here are important
because they suggest that the Pareto frontier can be reached even without an environmental agreement.
In particular, when countries (that are similar and large) choose pollution taxes first and negotiate trade
policy second, the outcome of both policies are efficient.
Comparing the net cooperative tariff to the net Nash tariff, we have that rN > 0 = rE , again highlight-
ing the fact that Nash tariffs are inefficient. To be clear, the Nash pollution tax choices, tN and t∗N , in (17)
do not result in the efficient trade policy outcome in the negotiation stage. Thus, with the bargaining pro-
cedure outlined in the present paper, {tA, t∗A} is the unique set of pollution taxes chosen non-cooperatively
in the first stage that maximizes joint welfare and brings about efficient trade. If Home or Foreign selects
a pollution tax level different from that in (29) or (30), then inefficient trade protection ensues in an effort
to correct the pollution externality since the trade agreement nullifies any gains from manipulating the
terms-of-trade.
These results can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 4. In the two-stage policy game:
(4.1). There exists a unique non-cooperative domestic policy pair that maximizes joint welfare and leads
countries to agree on the free trade outcome.
(4.2). The unique non-cooperative domestic policy pair that leads countries to the efficient trade outcome
is efficient.
(4.3). Trade policy is used to correct for the pollution externality even when countries are bound by a
trade agreement.
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Reverse Timing of Trade Negotiations
This subsection describes the trade policy option that maximizes welfare in both countries where Home
and Foreign negotiate tariff levels in the first stage and unilaterally set their pollution taxes in the second
stage.93 Solving the game backwards, the determination of pollution taxes conditional on trade policy is
exactly as in subsection 4.2 where Home and Foreign’s Nash pollution taxes given tariffs are tN(τ,τ∗) and
t∗N(τ,τ∗) respectively.94
In the first stage of the game, the negotiated tariffs will be those that maximize equation (28) (and
equation (1)). Let τC and τ∗C be the optimal trade policy with a trade agreement, we find that τC =
−τ∗C.95 Thus, the combined cooperative trade taxes, that is, the sum of Home and Foreign’s trade taxes,
rC = τC + τ∗C = 0. The net cooperative tariff is exactly at the efficient net tariff level (zero joint tariffs).
Comparing rC = τC + τ∗C to rN = τN + τ∗N from (25), I find the Nash trade taxes to be inefficient as
rN > rC. Thus, entering into a trade agreement provides efficiency gains irrespective of the timing of
negotiations.
Given the efficient trade outcome from the first-stage, the pollution taxes obtained in the second stage
are defined as tC and tC∗, which are functions of δ and α. Comparing tC and t∗C with the first-best pollution
taxes, tE and t∗E , I get that tC < tE and t∗C < t∗E , highlighting the fact that both Home and Foreign are not
internalizing the cross-border externality and are taxing pollution below the efficient level.
Proposition 5.
(5.1). The trade policy outcome is efficient even when tariffs are negotiated first.
(5.2). Non-cooperative pollution taxes are inefficient and are too low relative to their efficient levels.
Proposition 5 establishes that domestic policy outcomes differ depending on the sequence of events.
The pollution taxes obtained when negotiations over trade policy occur in the second stage lie on the Pareto
frontier. In the absence of a multilateral environmental treaty, given that tariffs are negotiated before the
non-cooperative domestic policy choice, trade agreements induce substitution towards domestic policy
as a means of influencing the terms-of-trade relative to the reverse timing of trade negotiations. The
intuition underlying Proposition 5 is that since countries are not bound by an environmental agreement in
the second stage, they can shift the terms-of-trade in their favor using domestic policies that are chosen
93The same bargaining mechanism used in the previous subsection applies here as well.
94The full expression for both taxes is provided in the appendix.
95See appendix for exact expression of Home and Foreign trade taxes.
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unilaterally after trade policies have been negotiated.
Conclusion
This paper presents a trade model where governments engage in strategic behavior with respect to trade
and environmental policies. The model also features a cross-border pollution externality that links trade
and environmental policy in the absence of a multilateral environmental accord. This paper considers
both cases where trade agreements are negotiated in the first stage and non-cooperative pollution taxes
are chosen in the second stage, and vice-versa in order to evaluate the role that the timing of negotiations
plays on trade and environmental policy outcomes.
The model shows that governments are able to implement first-best environmental and trade policies
when pollution taxes are set unilaterally in the first stage and bargaining over trade policy occurs in the
second-stage. However, under the reverse timing, only the joint cooperative trade tax is efficient while
domestic policies are below first-best levels. The inefficiency of environmental policy is driven by two
key factors: the pollution spillover effect and the terms-of-trade externality. Without cross-border pollu-
tion, noncooperative domestic policies are efficient and reflect the marginal cost of domestic pollution.
When pollution is transboundary and countries are bound by a trade agreement, there is an incentive for
governments to use unconstrained domestic policy to improve their terms-of-trade and control pollution
given that trade negotiations occur in the first stage. Alternatively, when trade negotiations occur in the
second stage, countries set pollution taxes efficiently because they anticipate that with the cross-border
pollution externality, negotiated trade policies will incorporate pollution spillover concerns.
In sum, the model emphasizes that without an environmental agreement, global efficiency may still
be attained if countries that are similar and large enough to influence the terms-of-trade negotiate tariffs
after setting domestic policy. Furthermore, governments choice of trade policy, negotiated or not, reflects
concerns about the pollution externality. Where the use of environmental policy as a substitute for trade
policy depends on the timing of negotiations, trade policy may be used to substitute for environmental
policy regardless of when trade negotiations take place.
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Appendix
Efficiency Analytical Details
rE(t, t∗) = τE(t, t∗)+ τ∗E(t, t∗)
=
[e1]+ [e2]t+[e3]t∗
2[21+13α−24αδ+13αδ2]
where e1 = [16α−8αδ+16αδ2];e2 = [14+18α−44αδ+18αδ2];e3 = [−21−34α+52αδ−34αδ2]
Noncooperative Trade and Environmental Policy Analytical Details
τN(t∗, t) ==
[a]+ [b]t+[c]t∗
6[42+13α−24αδ+13αδ2]
where a = (−1/6)[−9+67α+12δα−120αδ2−52α2δ+52α2δ3+24α2−24α2δ4];b = (−1/6)[−84−
70α+96δα−14αδ2+26α2δ−26α2δ3−12α2+12α2δ4];c= (−1/6)[−27α−48δα+99αδ2+26α2δ−
26α2δ3−12α2+12α2δ4]
τ∗N(t, t∗) =
[a∗]+ [b∗]t− [c∗]t∗
6[42+13α−24αδ+13αδ2]
where a∗ = (1/6)[12+ 115α− 12δα− 72αδ2− 52α2δ+ 52α2δ3 + 24α2− 24α2δ4];b∗ = (1/6)[−16α−
36δα+40αδ2+26α2δ−26α2δ3−12α2+12α2δ4];c∗ = (1/6)[−126−129α+108δα−3αδ2+26α2δ−
26α2δ3−12α2+12α2δ4]
rN(t, t∗) = τN(t, t∗)+ τ∗N(t, t∗)
=
[n∗1]+ [n
∗
2]t+[n
∗
3]t
∗
−2[42+13α−24αδ+13αδ2]
where n∗1 = [−7−16α+8αδ−16αδ2];n∗2 = [−28−18α+44αδ−18αδ2];n∗3 = [42+34α−52αδ+34αδ2]
tN = tN(δ,α) =
[a1]α− [a2]α2− [a3]α3+[a4]α4]2δ
−5292− [b1]α+[b2]α2+[b3]α3+[b4]α4
where a1 = [36(−93+δ(−162+5δ))];a2 = [3(1936+δ(−423+δ(−2290+δ(771+82δ))))];a3 = [3(−1+
δ)(1+ δ)(−568+ 3δ(298+ δ(−56+ 5δ(−15+ 2δ))))];a4 = [(−3+ 2δ)(−2+ 3δ)(−12+ 13δ)(−1+
δ2)2];b1 = 2[126(48+δ(−24+13δ))];b2 = 2[6(−697+δ(678+δ(111+2δ(−81+26δ))))];b3 = 2[6(−1+
δ)(1+δ)(160+δ(−302+δ(166+δ(−32+15δ))))];b4 = 2[(−3+2δ)(−2+3δ)(−12+13δ)(−1+δ2)2]
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t∗N = t∗N(δ,α) =
[a∗1]α+[a∗2]α2+[a∗3]α3+[a∗4]α4
−5292− [b1]α+[b2]α2+[b3]α3+[b4]α4
where a∗1 = [−27(207+δ(116+11δ))];a∗2 = [9(−732+δ(396+δ(575−312δ+51δ2)))];a∗3 = [2(−1+
δ)(1+δ)(888+δ(−1533+δ(585+δ(61+30δ))))];a∗4 = [2(−3+2δ)(−2+3δ)(−12+13δ)(−1+δ2)2]
τN = τN(δ,α) =
−378− [c1]α+[c2]α2+[c3]α3+[c4]α4
−10584−2[b1]α+2[b2]α2+2[b3]α3+2[b4]α4
where c1 = [3(55+δ(1056+1679δ))];c2 = [−36+δ(−5424+δ(1427+5(1248−487δ)δ))];c3 = [2(−1+
δ)δ(1+δ)(797+3δ(−437+δ(139+50δ)))];c4 = [20(−1+δ)3δ(1+δ)2(6+δ(−13+6δ))]
τ∗N = τ∗N(δ,α) =
−504− [c∗1]α− [c∗2]α2− [c∗3]α3− [c∗4]α4
−10584−2[b1]α+2[b2]α2+2[b3]α3+2[b4]α4
where c∗1 = [237−3δ(1308+1055δ)];c∗2 = [36+δ(−4830+δ(2033+(4194−1565δ)δ))];c∗3 = [2(−1+
δ)δ(1+δ)(671+2δ(−529+δ(113+90δ)))];c∗4 = [20(−1+δ)3δ(1+δ)2(6+δ(−13+6δ))]
rN(δ,α) = τN(δ,α)+ τ∗N(δ,α)
=
−441− [n1]α+[n2]α2− [n3]α3
−5292− [b1]α+[b2]α2+[b3]α3+[b4]α4
where n1 = [201+18δ(−21+52δ)];n2 = [3(12+δ(99+δ(101+δ(−341+145δ))))];n3 = [(−1+δ)δ(1+
δ)(−126+δ(253+δ(−191+30δ)))]
Reverse Timing Nash Analytical Details
tN(τ,τ∗) =
[d1]+ [d2]τ+[d3]τ∗
[−133−262α+104αδ−10αδ2−120α2+64α2δ+112α2δ2−64α2δ3+6α2δ4]
where d1 = [5− 82α− 116αδ+ 46αδ2− 120α2 + 64α2δ+ 112α2δ2− 64α2δ3 + 8α2δ4];d2 = [−112−
190α+120αδ−22αδ2−60α2+32α2δ+56α2δ2−32α2δ3+4α2δ4];d3 = [−21−72α−16αδ+12αδ2−
60α2+32α2δ+56α2δ2−32α2δ3+4α2δ4]
t∗N(τ,τ∗) =
−([d∗1 ]− [d∗2 ]τ+[d∗3 ]τ∗)
[−133−262α+104αδ−10αδ2−120α2+64α2δ+112α2δ2−64α2δ3+6α2δ4]
where d∗1 = [−6−142α−52αδ+18αδ2−120α2+64α2δ+112α2δ2−64α2δ3+8α2δ4];d∗2 = [28+94α−
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2αδ−4αδ2+60α2−32α2δ−56α2δ2+32α2δ3−4α2δ4];d∗3 = [105+168α−102αδ+14αδ2+60α2−
32α2δ−56α2δ2+32α2δ3−4α2δ4]
τN = τN(δ,α) =
−1480927− [ f1]α+[ f2]α2+[ f3]α3− [ f4]α4+[ f5]α5+[ f6]α6
1397039x+2[g1]α+2[g2]α2+2[g3]α3−2[g4]α4+2[g5]α5
where f1 = 2[63(70344+759163δ)+2(44587753δ2)]; f2 = 4[(4886817+δ(139010595+δ(137321637+
δ(−121198214+ 13339023δ))))]; f3 = 4[2(2547674+ δ(165179974+ δ(38849533+ δ(−205217605+
δ(61863467+(6405363−2727166δ)δ)))))]; f4 = 4[8(−320085+δ(−51195761+δ(20030820+δ(70081816+
δ(−42552533+ δ(−8581893+ 2δ(5621973+ δ(−1388977+ 113902δ))))))))]; f5 = 4[16(−1+ δ)(1+
δ)(−31500+ δ(−17445983+ δ(15697947+ δ(7918649+ δ(−12650901+ δ(4761131+ δ(−607159+
δ(−14725+ 6077δ))))))))]; f6 = 4[64(−5+ δ)(−3+ δ)δ(−1+ δ2)2(103383+ δ(−81079+ δ(−8574+
δ(22878+δ(−7129+729δ)))))];g1 = x[49(65293+5δ(−5352+3253δ))];g2 = x[14(409441+δ(−318834+
δ(154485−42572δ+4372δ2)))];g3 = x[4(1259075+δ(−1413054+δ(472449+δ(112732+δ(−330059+
(140834−16185δ)δ)))))];g4 = x[16(−5+δ)(−3+δ)(−1+δ)(1+δ)(9087+δ(−8504+δ(6898+δ(−2344+
239δ))))];g5 = x[128(−5+δ)2(−3+δ)2(−1+δ)2(1+δ)2(13+δ(−10+13δ))];x= [−133+2α(−131+
(52−5δ)δ+4α(−5+δ)(−3+δ)(−1+δ)(1+δ))]
τ∗N = τ∗N(δ,α) =
−3089842− [ f ∗1 ]α− [ f ∗2 ]α2− [ f ∗3 ]α3− [ f ∗4 ]α4− [ f ∗5 ]α5− [ f ∗6 ]α6− [ f ∗7 ]α7
1397039x+2[g1]α+2[g2]α2+2[g3]α3−2[g4]α4+2[g5]α5
where f ∗1 = 2[7(1907782+ 649794δ+ 4443315δ2)]; f ∗2 = 2[2(11154358+ δ(36851622+ δ(70480786+
δ(−48636417+1498565δ))))]; f ∗3 = 2[4(4479254+δ(69458768+δ(39361191+δ(−104350125+δ(27799647+
(5832161−2054984δ)δ)))))]; f ∗4 =−2[16(−430335+δ(−29088333+δ(7250444+δ(42300776+δ(−24090901+
δ(−4232849+2δ(2886989+δ(−726693+63383δ))))))))]; f ∗5 = 2[32(−1+δ)(1+δ)(−31500+δ(−12445043+
δ(10652319+δ(4763637+δ(−7891041+δ(2929903+δ(−321195+δ(−29425+5881δ))))))))]; f ∗6 =
2[128(−5+δ)(−3+δ)δ(−1+δ2)2(88683+δ(−70299+δ(3578+δ(12294+δ(−4581+533δ)))))]; f ∗7 =
2[1024(−5+δ)5(−3+δ)2δ(−1+δ2)3]
tN = tN(δ,α) =
4762359+[h1]α+[h2]α2+[h3]α3+[h4]α4+[h5]α5+[h6]α6+[h7]α7
1397039x+2[g1]α+2[g2]α2+2[g3]α3−2[g4]α4+2[g5]α5
where h1 = 2[−7(6809063+4δ(4612534+1558911δ))];h2 = 2[2(−165487950+δ(−239046475+δ(47033436+
δ(14305470+6858917δ))))];h3 = 2[4(−210491541+δ(−131271339+δ(172366140+δ(1471859+3δ(7879516+
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5δ(−1578004+ 269951δ))))))];h4 = 2[8(−136992055+ δ(8049070+ δ(141737130+ δ(−29305416+
δ(5107910+δ(−21808298+δ(9653218+13δ(−104492+5305δ))))))))];h5 = 2[−32(−1+δ)(1+δ)(−24447630+
δ(16086653+δ(1760855+δ(−1295419+δ(3060611+δ(−4195521+δ(1934765+δ(−371457+25735δ))))))))];h6 =
2[−128(−5+δ)(−3+δ)(−1+δ2)2(152295+δ(−102431+δ(90082+δ(−65602+δ(21415+δ(−3359+
272δ))))))];h7 = 2[3072(−5+δ)3(−3+δ)2(−1+δ)3(1+δ)3(−13+δ(6+δ(−13+4δ)))]
t∗N = t∗N(δ,α) =
−1595881+[h∗1]α+[h∗2]α2+[h∗3]α3+[h∗4]α4+[h∗5]α5+[h∗6]α6+[h∗7]α7
1397039x+2[g1]α+2[g2]α2+2[g3]α3−2[g4]α4+2[g5]α5
where h∗1 = 14[−15370864+δ(−2163877+7318320δ))];h∗2 = 2[−554722186+2δ(109911028+δ(135471901+
19δ(−5987273+655691δ)))];h∗3 = 2[−4(303377898+δ(−283969835+δ(−98846825+δ(240075963+
δ(−96896015+2δ(5007030+351709δ))))))];h∗4 = 2[−8(176262175+δ(−258165886+δ(−6284834+
δ(225843164+δ(−151339562+δ(16066770+δ(13947022+δ(−4562608+415775δ))))))))];h∗5 = 2[−32(−1+
δ)(1+δ)(−28602480+δ(56745099+δ(−38733791+δ(−2456173+δ(17443481+δ(−9789575+δ(2438699+
δ(−281623+11787δ))))))))];h∗6 = 2[128(−5+δ)(−3+δ)(−1+δ2)2(−163995+δ(322217+δ(−280456+
δ(92990+δ(−2383+δ(−4327+626δ))))))];h∗7 = 2[1024(−5+δ)3(−3+δ)2(−1+δ)3(1+δ)3(−39+
δ(68+δ(−59+14δ)))]
Tariff Coordination and Unilateral Pollution Tax Analytical Details
τC(δ,α) =−τ∗C(δ,α) = 35329+[i1]α+[i2]α
2+[i3]α3+[i4]α4
1927317+[ j1]α+[ j2]α2+[ j3]α3− [ j4]α4+2[ j5]α5
where i1 =−2[659−δ(6359+8938δ)]; i2 =−2[−4(−75+δ(4534+δ(1906+δ(−3896+735δ))))]; i3 =
−2[32(−1+δ)δ(1+δ)(523+δ(−209+3δ(1+δ)))]; i4 =−2[64(−5+δ)2(−3+δ)(−1+δ)2δ(1+δ)2]; j1 =
4[98(23935−9922δ+7800δ2)]; j2 = 4[7(642895+δ(−512508+δ(333008+δ(−111296+12293δ))))]; j3 =
4[−4(−1066505+ δ(1233910+ δ(−604063+ δ(57396+ δ(269593+ δ(−131818+ 15695δ))))))]; j4 =
4[−768(−5+δ)(−3+δ)(−1+δ)(1+δ)(174+δ(−169+δ(158−57δ+6δ2)))]; j5 = 4[128(−5+δ)2(−3+
δ)2(−1+δ)2(1+δ)2(13+δ(−10+13δ))]
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Chapter III
Environmental Regulation and Trade Protection: A Case Study of the U.S.
Clean Air Act
Introduction
International trade theory contends that free trade is welfare improving. However, in practice, most
countries maintain trade barriers across a number of goods. One argument for this is that governments use
trade policy to protect domestic import-competing industries in exchange for political support.96 Another
rationale for trade barriers is that by acting strategically with respect to trade and domestic policy, countries
may capture returns that would otherwise go to trading partners and gain some type of market advantage.97
Ludema and Wooton (1994) and Soumonni (2011) further argue that some countries use trade policy to
address negative environmental externalites of international trade. These explanations are by no means
mutually exclusive as governments may restrict trade for political, strategic, and environmental reasons.
This paper examines whether domestic environmental regulatory policy has any bearing on tariff rates
in the U.S. given the various motives for trade protection. Conventional wisdom suggests that stricter
environmental regulation imposes significant additional costs and hinders the ability of U.S. firms to com-
pete in international markets (Jaffe et al. 1995). This loss of competitiveness affects pollution-intensive
industries disproportionately and may be reflected by declining exports, increasing imports, and possible
relocation of these industries to areas with less stringent regulations. Previous empirical studies that exam-
ine the effects of environmental regulation on trade flows (e.g., see Tobey, 1990; Grossman and Krueger,
1995; and Low and Yeats, 1992) find little evidence that more stringent environmental regulations result
in higher levels of import penetration.98 Where these studies assume environmental regulation is exoge-
nously determined, Ederington and Minier (2003) treat the level of environmental regulation and the level
of import penetration as endogenous variables. They find that environmental policy has a much stronger
impact on net import levels than previous studies reported. None of the papers referenced above has fo-
cused on the link between environmental regulation and trade policy using a U.S. environmental policy
96See for example Grossman and Helpman (1994), Goldberg and Maggi (1999), and Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (2007).
97See for example Copeland (1990), Ludema and Wooton (1994), Copeland (2000), and Horn (2006).
98Again, the argument put forth is that stricter environmental laws reduce domestic firms competitiveness resulting in more
imports relative to total output.
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experiment.99
In this paper I analyze the impact of the last major change in U.S. environmental law, the Clean Air
Act Amendments (CAAA) of 1990, on tariffs of 390 industries during the 1989-2002 period. There are
several candidate explanations for why tariffs may respond to tighter environmental regulation as alluded
to above. First, if less footloose, pollution-intensive industries have strong lobbies, the U.S. government
has an incentive to compensate them for stricter environmental regulation by raising tariffs in those sec-
tors, thereby reducing foreign competition in the domestic market.100 Alternatively, it could be that the
increasing demand for clean air in the U.S. prompts the government to first implement tighter environ-
mental laws and then raise tariffs in pollution-intensive sectors to reduce both domestic and foreign air
pollution. Lastly, the U.S. could potentially benefit from tightening domestic environmental policy and
raising unilateral tariffs prior to major revisions of trade agreements, in this case the formation of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.101
This paper shows that the 1990 CAAA decreases tariffs disproportionately less in pollution-intensive
industries between 1989 and 2002. This result holds in both a panel and an event-study analyses of U.S.
industries with varying pollution intensities, and after having controlled for the level of imports, number
of workers, and value added. Moreover, I obtain the same result when I restrict the sample to the 1989-
1994 period prior to the creation of the WTO in 1995 and when I exclude Canada and Mexico from the
sample due to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. Finally, I find the effect
of the 1990 CAAA and pollution-intensity on tariffs to be strongest for pollutants that principally affect
urban air and create acid rain, such as nitrogen dioxide (NO2), sulphur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide
(CO), and particulate matter (PM-10).102 This may reflect political economy concerns as industries which
emit relatively large amounts of these pollutants, such as the cement, petroleum and coal industries, may
also have strong incentives to influence trade policy.
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment is interesting to study in this context for two main reasons. First,
the CAAA policy experiment is clearly defined. The stated goal was to reduce air pollution emissions in
99Trefler (2004) uses the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement to examine the impact of FTA-mandated tariff cuts on employ-
ment, labor productivity, import prices, and output while Manova (2008) uses equity market liberalizations to explain export
behavior across 91 countries. Grossman and Krueger (1992) examine the likely environmental impacts of the North American
Free Trade Agreement.
100Ederington, Levinson, and Minier (2005) find that industries with the largest pollution abatement costs also happen to be the
least geographically mobile, or footloose.
101This could be as a result of the strategic nature of the policy game, as in Soumonni (2011) who finds that when noncooperative
pollution taxes are chosen before entering into a trade agreement, the resulting trade and environmental policies are efficient.
102According to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), acid rain occurs when sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions
are transformed in the atmosphere and return to the earth in rain, fog or snow. Urban air pollution sources include automobile
emissions, petroleum refineries, chemical plants, and combustion of fuel for transportation, utilities, and industries while acid
rain occurs mostly from the burning of fossil fuels by electric utilites. http://epa.gov/oar/caa/caaa-overview.html
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the United States. In addition, three major threats to the nation’s environment and to the health of citizens
were targeted: acid rain, urban air pollution, and toxic air emissions.103 The 1990 CAAA’s main focus
was on domestic-related issues and did not explicitly include trade reform as part of the package.104
Second, given that the health of American residents was a major concern, enforcement of the 1990
CAAA was strictest on mobile sources of urban air pollution and acid rain where prompt compliance was
mandated.105 My study is able to capture this by using measures of pollution emissions that affect urban
air pollution the most, create acid rain and also come primarily from industrial and agricultural sources:
NO2, SO2, CO, and PM-10.
Using the 1990 CAAA as a policy experiment, the main objective in this paper is to determine the re-
sponsiveness of tariffs when environmental laws become more stringent. This is in contrast to Ederington
and Minier (2003) who are concerned with the impact of environmental regulation on trade flows.106 In
the next section, I briefly describe the U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. I discuss the data and
provide some descriptive statistics in Section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical framework and results for
the panel estimation and event study analysis. In Section 5, I explore how the impact of the 1990 CAAA
and pollution-intensity on tariffs varies with simultaneous trade agreements. Endogeneity considerations
are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
US Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
On November 15, 1990, President Bush signed a bill into law that significantly revised the Clean Air
Act of 1970. Prior to the 1990 Amendments, the EPA regulated air toxics one chemical at a time.107
This approach proved unsatisfactory as the 1990 CAAA established new regulatory programs for the
control of acid rain, urban air pollution and the reduction of 187 toxic air pollutants. The new law also
introduced an operating permits program to ensure compliance and enhance enforcement of the Act. The
EPA was responsible for identifying categories of industrial sources of the listed air pollutants and set
regulations using a technology-based or performance based approach to achieve emission reductions.108
103http://epa.gov/oar/caa/caaa-overview.html
104The Act contained provisions to provide additional unemployment benefits to workers laid off as a consequence of compli-
ance with the Clean Air Act and pledged funds to continue the federal acid rain research program. http://epa.gov/oar/caa/caaa-
overview.html. Furthermore, the 1990 CAAA did not seem to have been implemented as a response to shocks in the business
cycle that could also influence trade policy. From the data I examine the log of GDP per capita in the U.S. over time and find that
in the years leading up to the 1990 CAAA, GDP per capita was increasing in the average industry.
105http://epa.gov/oar/caa/caaa-overview.html
106This paper also differs from Ederington and Minier (2003) in that: (1) I conduct an event study of a major change in U.S.
environmental regulation; (2) The panel estimation is done in light of the 1990 CAAA where the coefficient of interest reflects
the impact of pollution intensity before and after the new law. Ederington and Minier (2003) use pollution abatement costs as a
proxy for environmental policy.
107http://www.epa.gov/air/peg/toxics.html
108http://www.epa.gov/air/peg/toxics.html
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The CAAA are divided into titles where the first seven involve direct regulation.109 The remaining titles
are revisions that establish a compensation, retraining, and relocation program to assist workers laid off
due to compliance with the Act and provisions relating to research, development and air monitoring.110
A major component of the 1990 CAAA was the control of air toxins and acid deposition covered in
Titles III and IV. Aside from targeting 187 toxic air pollutants, the Act also required the EPA to publish a
list of source categories that emit certain levels of the listed pollutants within one year after the new law.
Furthermore, the EPA had to issue standards that must be met based on best demonstrated control tech-
nology within two years of passage of the new law. Also, the 1990 CAAA included specific requirements
for reducing emissions of nitrogen that had to be issued no later than mid-1992 for certain boilers. Title
VI, which focuses on Stratospheric Ozone and Global Climate Protection, requires complete phaseout of
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and Halons, and the 1990 CAAA banned certain chemicals listed as Class
1 chemicals within 2 years of enactment. In sum, compliance requirements and enforcement of the Act
began as early as one year after it was signed into law and some industrial boilers had only two years to
reduce nitrogen emissions by a precise amount. As such, I would expect to see an impact of the 1990
CAAA on tariffs roughly two to three years after the bill was signed.
Data
To analyze the impact of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment on tariffs, I combine U.S. manufacturing
trade data by industry and U.S. pollution-intensity by sector. In this section, I describe the data used and
present some empirical patterns.
U.S. Industry Tariff and Trade Data
I obtain data on duties charged and on the customs value of imports at the 4-digit SIC level from Schott’s
2010 NBER U.S. Manufacturing Database for 1972 to 2005. Schott (2010) gathers Feenstra’s (1996) U.S.
trade data for the period 1972 to 1988, which are country by year by 4-digit, 1972-revision SIC industry
and converts them to their 1987-version counterparts using concordance tables provided by Bartelsman,
Becker and Gray (2000). For the period 1989 to 2005, Schott (2010) purchases 10-digit HS by country
by year trade data from the U.S. Census Bureau and uses the concordances provided by Pierce and Schott
(2009) to obtain their SIC equivalents. To the trade data I add 1972 to 2005 4-digit 1987-SIC total value
added, value of shipments and employment data from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database
109A summary of the titles can be found in the appendix.
110http://epa.gov/oar/caa/caaa-overview.html
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constructed by Becker and Gray (2009). I then summed the customs value of imports and duties paid by
industry across trading partners and calculated the average tariff rate in each industry as the proportion of
duties paid in total imports.111
U.S. Industry Pollution Intensity Data
I obtain data on pollution intensity for the manufacturing sector from the World Bank’s Industrial Pol-
lution Projection System (IPPS). Constructed in 1987, the data covers 448 sectors and fourteen different
emission coefficients that include six air pollutants, two measures of water pollution, and toxic and metal
releases to air, water, and land (Hettige et al. 1995).The IPPS data was assembled by matching US Census
of Manufactures facility-level data to the Aerometric Information Retrieval System (AIRS) for air pol-
lutants, the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System for water pollution and the Toxics Release
Inventory (TRI) for toxic chemicals and metals (Levinson 2010).112 Because not every facility in the
Census reports to the environmental databases, the IPPS creates a lower bound coefficient of emission
intensity: total reported emissions divided by total economic activity for each industry that includes all fa-
cilities even those that do not appear in both datasets. I use this lower bound pollution intensity coefficient
(in metric tons) with respect to value added for each pollutant focusing on the major urban air and acid
rain pollutants: NO2, SO2, CO, and PM-10. I also sum across the six air pollutants to obtain a measure
of total air pollution intensity at the industry level.113
Summary Statistics
I examine the effect of pollution intensity and the 1990 CAAA on tariffs using industry-level data between
1989-2002. Table 1 presents the mean and standard deviation of tariffs, total pollution intensity and
pollution intensity by pollutant, and the log of imports, employment, and value added. The tariff rate in
the average industry is 3% with the dairy products and tobacco sector having the largest tariff rates (over
50%).114
The pollution-intensity variable varies slightly across pollutants with CO having the highest mean
111Ederington and Minier (2003) also calculate tariffs by dividing duties by import volume to give a measure of average ad
valorem tariffs for each industry. The tariff data in this paper is only available from 1989 onwards.
112The six air pollutants in the IPPS are: carbon monoxide (CO), sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), particulate
matter (PM-10), volatile organic compounds (VOC), and fine particulates (PT).
113Weber and Matthews (2007) in their study of pollution imports use NO, SO2, and CO2 as measures of pollution while Khan
(2003) calculates the pollution content of an industry by summing total carcinogenic toxic releases from the TRI database.
114The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) reports that tariffs on dairy products are well above the overall average agri-
cultural tariff level and are among the highest of all commodities. Also, Gibson et al. (2001) find dairy tariffs average about
85%, only surpassed by unmanufactured tobacco at 90%.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: 1989-2002
4-digit SIC U.S. Manufacturing Data
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Tariff 5552 3.313 4.240 0 100
Log of Imports 5552 2.061 1.492 -5.932 7.776
Log of Employment 6373 3.010 1.099 -0.693 6.321
Log of Value Added 6373 7.447 1.229 3.242 11.314
Total Pollution Intensity 6272 0.011 0.037 0 0.357
Carbon Monoxide 6272 0.0027 0.014 0 0.169
Sulphur Dioxide 6272 0.0026 0.011 0 0.140
Nitrogen Dioxide 6272 0.0016 0.006 0 0.052
Particulates 6272 0.0016 0.008 0 0.136
Volatile Organic Compounds 6272 0.0014 0.005 0 0.087
Fine Particulates 6272 0.0008 0.006 0 0.092
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Imports and Value Added are in millions of USD and employment is in 1000s.
and standard deviation. The two industries with the largest CO content are primary aluminium and steel
springs while those with the largest NO2 emissions intensity are nitrogenous fertilizers and cement. The
petroleum and coal products sector are the largest emitters of SO2.115 When considering total pollution-
intensity, I find the limestone industry to be the most pollution-intensive with 0.357 metric tons being
polluted per unit of value added.
Figure 1 shows that tariff rates are decreasing in the years following the Act. In fact, the visual
evidence suggests a declining trend in the level of U.S. tariffs overall and an even lower decline in tariffs
after the 1994-1995 period. This is not surprising given that with NAFTA and the WTO came further
rounds of trade liberalization.116 The tariff reductions in the first five years reflect in part the U.S. free
trade agreements with Israel (1985) and Canada (1989).117
Table 2 highlights tariff rates before and after the 1990 CAAA for two pollution-intensive indus-
tries (limestone and primary aluminium), non-polluting industries (diagnostic substances, and carpets and
rugs), and one industry at the mean pollution-intensity level (creamery butter). From Table 2 notice that
the tariff level in the most pollution-intensive industry, the limestone industry, rises on average in the years
following the 1990 CAAA as does the industry with one of the highest tariff rates, the creamery butter
industry.118
To get an idea of the relationship between tariffs and pollution intensity before and after the 1990
CAAA, I divide industries by total pollution intensity where sectors above the median pollution coefficient
115These industries also emit large amounts of NO2.
116NAFTA is the North American Free Trade Agreement signed between the U.S., Canada and Mexico in 1994.
117Bilateral liberalization of agricultural trade between the U.S. and Israel was still of concern in the 1990s as both countries
were reluctant to remove barriers for agricultural products. http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/israel-
fta
118Boilers are one of the major equipments used in the creamery butter industry and burn natural gas, coal, wood, oil, or other
fuel to produce steam. http://www.epa.gov/airquality/combustion/index.html
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Figure 1: Average US Tariff Rates over Time
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Industry: 1989-1990 and 1991-2002
Pre-Act Period Post-Act Period
Lime 0.010 (0.005) 0.146 (0.120)
Primary Aluminium 0.001 (0.0003) 0.009 (0.024)
Creamery Butter 3.650 (0.832) 13.910 (17.729)
Diagnostic Substances 5.650 (1.418) 2.140 (2.472)
Carpets and Rugs 6.436 (0.019) 4.589 (1.270)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics by Pollution Intensity Category
Pre-Act (1989-1990) Post-Act (1991-1995) Post-Act (1996-2002)
Pollution-Intensive 3.992 (6.049) 3.140 (3.371) 1.985 (3.390)
Non Pollution-Intensive 5.487 (5.265) 4.630 (4.491) 2.860 (3.943)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
take a value of 1 and are considered pollution-intensive while the other sectors take a value of 0 and are
non-polluting. Table 3 shows the tariff rates before and after the Act for pollution-intensive and non-
pollution intensive industries. It is clear that tariffs are declining over time across both groups. However,
in pollution-intensive industries, tariff rates decrease more slowly relative to non-polluting sectors. To be
specific, between the last two post-Act periods, tariff rates declined in non-polluting industries by about
1.77 while in pollution-intensive industries the decline was only about 1.16 percent. The same pattern
is observed for the pre-Act and post-Act periods.119 The description in Tables 2-3 suggest that import
tariffs in pollution-intensive industries are higher relative to non-polluting sectors after a tightening of
environmental policy. However, it could be that pollution-intensive industries already have low tariffs to
begin with. Thus, we might not observe as large a decline in tariffs in those industries as we would in
non-polluting industries. As such, any correlation between pollution-intensity and tariffs before and after
the 1990 CAAA may be completely spurious. The goal of the two empirical estimation approaches taken
in the following section is to establish a causal relationship between pollution-intensity and tariff rates in
the 1989-2002 period.
Empirical Framework
The main objective of this paper is to compare tariff levels by pollution intensity at the industry level.
This paper uses an estimation strategy that is in the spirit of Manova (2008) and Trefler (2004). I conduct
both panel and event-study analyses of tariffs in industries with varying pollution intensities before and
after the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment.
Panel Study Empirical Specification
Following Manova (2008), I use a difference-in-difference methodology to estimate the effect of more
stringent environmental regulations on trade policy across industries. The estimating equation follows
119It is important to point out that over the entire sample period the percentage decline in tariff rates was only about 2.68. In
the Appendix, I present Table 3 by pollutant.
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from the first-order conditions of the non-cooperative policy game in the theoretical model of Soumonni
(2011). The base model is:
τit = α0+α1EnvRegt +α2EnvRegt ×Pollutei+α3Importsit +ρi+ηt +ξit (1)
where τit is the tariff rate of industry i in year t, EnvRegt is a binary variable that takes the value of
1 in the years following the November 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment and 0 otherwise, Pollutei is the
pollution intensity in sector i given 1987 technology, and Importsit is the customs value of general imports
in industry i at time t. In equation (1), the coefficient of interest is α2 with an expected positive sign. This
implies that tariff levels decrease relatively less in sectors with higher pollution intensities with stricter
environmental laws .
I allow for industry and year fixed effects, and cluster errors by industry.120 The variable Pollutei
is not estimated separately because its effect is included in the industry fixed effects that also capture
other industry-specific omitted characteristics. The main effect of stricter environmental laws, α1, does
not vary by industry and accounts for changes in the regulatory environment before and after the 1990
CAAA, while the time fixed effects picks up any trend in tariff rates.121 Identification of α2 comes from
within-industry variation in pollution-intensity over time. This coefficient thus estimates how much more
pollution-intensive industries are affected by tighter environmental regulations in the years following the
Act relative to less pollution-intensive industries.
Panel Regression Results
The regression results from the basic model in (1) are presented in Table 4. I estimate this specification in
the full panel of tariffs for 390 industries in the 1989-2002 period. The first model (I) in Table 4 shows the
impact of environmental regulation on tariffs while ignoring the interaction term with industry pollution
intensity while the second model (II) considers this interaction term. I find a significant negative effect
of the 1990 CAAA, which suggests that in periods following more stringent environmental regulations,
tariff rates in the US tend to be lower in the average industry. This may be as a result of past GATT rounds
of trade negotiations that induced the U.S. to reduce tariffs on most manufactured goods imports over
120Results of the coefficient of interest are unchanged with or without year fixed effects and clustered standard errors.
121Although the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment was a national act, stringency of the law affected industries dif-
ferently depending on their production processes and enforcement occurred gradually over time for various industries.
http://epa.gov/oar/caa/caaa-overview.html
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Table 4: Effects of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment on Tariffs:Panel Study
I II III
EnvReg -0.512 (0.254) -2.135 (0.207) -2.174 (0.262)
EnvReg×Pollute 5.269 (1.212) 5.447 (1.249)
Log of Imports -0.460 (0.237) -0.395 (0.238) -0.424 (0.243)
Log of Employment 0.361 (0.384)
Log of Value Added 0.227 (0.339)
Obs. 5552 5397 5344
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average tariff level equal to
100∗ (duties/customsvalueo f imports) at the 4-digit sic industry level from 1989-2002.
time. However, the WTO notes that loopholes in the GATT system were heavily exploited particularly in
agriculture.122 Also, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) points out that prior to the Uruguay Round,
the U.S. maintained trade protection in the agriculture, high-technology goods, and mature industries.123
Given that some of these industries are also pollution-intensive, interacting the environmental regulation
dummy with pollution intensity might offer additional insight as to why protection increased in some
industries relative to others between 1989-2002. The coefficient of interest, α2, is positive and significant,
suggesting that tariff rates fell more slowly in pollution-intensive industries following tighter air pollution
control laws. More specifically, model (II) implies that for industries with pollution intensity in the 90th
percentile, stricter environmental laws decrease tariff rates by about 0.11 percentage points less than in
the 10th-percentile pollution-intensive industry. This effect is not trivial considering that the average tariff
rate did not change by much during the entire period. Between 1989-2002, the average annual decrease
in tariffs was about 0.19% per year. The results suggest that the interaction term between environmental
regulation and pollution intensity accounts for approximately 3% of the variation in tariff levels. Also, the
estimates presented in Table 4 hold after controlling for the customs value of imports, total employment,
and total value added at the industry level as shown in the third model (III).
I proceed to estimating specification (1) using the air pollutants that predominantly affect urban air and
create acid rain. Table 5 highlights the results for carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, sulphur dioxide,
and particulates.124 As in Table 4, α2, is positive and significant for all four pollutants. All else equal,
given two industries with comparable employee size, value added, and imports, the industry with larger
emissions of one of the four pollutants will have tariff rates decline more slowly on average. NO2 has
the biggest effect where tariff rates decrease by about 0.06 percentage points less for the average NO2
122For details see ”Understanding the WTO-The GATT years: from Havana to Marrakesh”. http://www.wto.org
123Mature industries according to the CBO include steel, textiles, apparel, and automobiles.
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/62xx/doc6202/doc09b-Entire.pdf
124The estimation results when all pollutants are included in (1) appear in the Appendix.
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Table 5: Effects of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment on Tariffs By Pollutant:Panel Study
CO SO2 NO2 PM-10
EnvReg -2.132 (0.258) -2.145 (0.259) -2.182 (0.271) -2.106 (0.257)
EnvReg×Pollute 9.623 (3.793) 14.261 (4.856) 41.418 (10.194) 16.187 (2.842)
Log of Imports -0.429 (0.243) -0.426 (0.243) -0.422 (0.244) -0.429 (0.243)
Log of Employment 0.370 (0.384) 0.365 (0.384) 0.370 (0.386) 0.386 (0.385)
Log of Value Added 0.224 (0.340) 0.221 (0.339) 0.219 (0.341) 0.194 (0.340)
Obs. 5344 5344 5344 5344
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average tariff level equal to
100∗ (duties/customsvalueo f imports) at the 4-digit sic industry level from 1989-2002.
pollution-intensive industry in the years after the CAAA.125 One potential reason for this is that the largest
emitters of NO2 (agricultural chemicals, cement, petroleum refining, lime, and pulp mills industries) are
those that are well-organized with potentially significant campaign contributions.126 The government
therefore has a strong incentive to raise tariff levels in those industries after setting stricter environmental
laws.
The specifications in Tables 4-5 in particular exploit the differences in tariff rates across roughly 400
industries that were affected differently by the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Ideally, obtaining infor-
mation on the exact enforcement dates by industry and determining the particular industries that received
exemptions or extensions would allow for potentially stronger identification of α2.127 The approach pre-
sented in this section exploits mostly the across-industry variation in pollution intensity while taking into
account the differential impact of enforcement before and after the Act.128
In sum, the results from this panel analysis support the hypothesis that trade policies respond to
changes in environmental regulations and to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment in particular. How-
ever, consistency of the results from (1) in Tables 4-5 and interpreting them as causal hinge on the critical
assumption that imports and environmental policy reform are determined exogenously and not influenced
by other factors that also have some bearing on trade policy. Given that the time-invariant data on pollution
intensity was constructed in 1987 and pre-dates the 1990 CAAA, I am able to circumvent endogeneity of
pollution emission concerns and treat the level of pollution-intensity as exogenously determined. I defer
125NO2 remains the most significant in the single regression with all pollutants included.
126Groups such as the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) and the American Petroleum Institute (API) have loudly
protested the EPAs decision to have greenhouse gas emissions regulated under the Clean Air Act. API members include Chevron,
ConocoPhillips,Exxon Mobil, GE, Halliburton and Shell. http://www.sourcewatch.org
127Future work includes finding and collecting this policy information, and re-estimating equation (1) where the environmental
regulation dummy would vary by industry and time.
128Note that I consider 1990 a pre-Act year given that the law was signed in November. As such, the implicit assumption here
is that enforcement of the Act occurred as of 1991 and affected all industries equally. The event study in subsection 4.3 examines
the change in tariffs for different time horizons but still under the premise that enforcement applied to all industries at the same
time. The process of gathering industry-specific information on enforcement and compliance dates which would allow me to
relax the latter assumption is currently underway.
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other issues of endogeneity bias to Section 6 below.
Event Study Empirical Specification
In this section, I consider an alternate approach to the fixed effects panel estimation in (1). More specifi-
cally, similar to Manova (2008) and Trefler (2004), I will account for the possibility of unobserved system-
atic difference across industries at the time of the CAAA using an event study approach.129 The estimates
from differencing the variables in (1) before and after the change in environmental policy may still be
recovered when I estimate the following specification:
∆τit = τi1− τi0 = α1∆EnvRegt +α2∆EnvRegt ×Pollutei+α3∆Importsit +∆ξit (2)
where t=1 (t=0 )in the years after (before) the 1990 CAAA. Notice that the constant term, α0, and the
industry fixed effects, ρi, have dropped out of the regression equation, providing clean estimates of a
causal impact of stricter environmental laws on tariffs. Since the environmental regulation measure used
is a dummy taking the value of 1 in periods after 1990 and 0 otherwise where ∆EnvRegt = EnvReg1−
EnvReg0 = 1−0 = 1, then (2) reduces to:
∆τit = α1+α2Pollutei+α3∆Importsit +∆ξit (3)
In specification (3), the environmental regulation dummy no longer enters the regression directly as shown
above, where α1 represents the new period intercept and captures the effect of tightening air pollution
policies on tariff levels. The coefficient on pollution intensity, α2, estimates the differential impact of the
1990 CAAA across sectors.
In this event analysis, the change in tariffs around the 1990 CAAA is the only observation for each
industry. Given that 1989 is the earliest year I observe tariff data for, I first measure ∆τit as the difference in
average tariff rates between 1989 and a range of time periods. In essence, I take the difference of average
tariffs for the pre-CAAA years 1989-1990 and post-CAAA years 1992-1993 which I compare with other
post-CAAA years up to ten years after the Act.130
129Manova (2008) and Trefler (2004) use first-differencing, which I employ in this section as well.
130Recall that since the 1990 CAAA was not signed until November of that year, I consider 1990 a pre-Act year in the estimation
and treat 1991 as the effective event year.
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Table 6: 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment Event Study Results
τ92,93− τ89,90 τ93,94− τ89,90 τ94,95− τ89,90 τ95,96− τ89,90
EnvReg×Pollute 2.419 (0.871) 3.366 (0.885) 3.828 (1.469) 5.177 (1.549)
EnvReg×PolluteCO 5.839 (2.417) 7.777 (2.368) 6.870 (4.536) 10.074 (4.822)
EnvReg×PolluteSO2 6.418 (3.622) 9.311 (3.791) 9.716 (5.332) 12.620 (5.720)
EnvReg×PolluteNO2 11.688 (6.466) 16.665 (5.603) 25.317 (7.061) 32.910 (8.487)
EnvReg×PollutePM10 6.902 (1.943) 9.356 (2.633) 11.986 (4.384) 15.999 (5.264)
Obs. 386 386 384 383
τ96,97− τ89,90 τ97,98− τ89,90 τ98,99− τ89,90 τ99,00− τ89,90
EnvReg×Pollute 6.370 (1.450) 7.278 (1.706) 7.515 (1.844) 7.087 (1.895)
EnvReg×PolluteCO 12.380 (4.607) 11.424 (5.373) 10.121 (5.609) 10.036 (5.814)
EnvReg×PolluteSO2 16.422 (5.769) 17.945 (6.633) 18.675 (7.135) 18.618 (7.258)
EnvReg×PolluteNO2 42.508 (9.823) 62.376 (18.921) 70.623 (23.895) 58.576 (13.213)
EnvReg×PollutePM10 18.736 (3.557) 23.358 (4.360) 26.395 (5.166) 25.831 (6.032)
Obs. 382 375 374 374
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average tariff level equal to
100∗ (duties/customsvalueo f imports) at the 4-digit sic industry level.
Event Study Results
The estimation results for all pollutants are presented in Table 6. The top panel shows the effect of
the interaction between pollution intensity and the 1990 CAAA on tariffs before and after the Act through
1996 while the bottom panel considers the post-CAAA years from 1996 to 2000. I find that as early as two
years after the Act, average tariff rates declined at a lower rate with total pollution intensity, suggesting a
relatively rapid response of trade policy to stricter environmental regulation. All the measures of pollution
intensity are positive and significant for most of the years except in 1992-1993 where NO2 and SO2 are
positive but not significant at conventional levels. This is mostly as a result of Title IV of the 1990 CAAA
that allows reductions of sulfur dioxide for some plants to occur in phases with slightly later deadlines
than other toxic air pollutants.131 Furthermore, as Table 6 illustrates, the coefficients seem to be growing
over time. One reason for this is that part of the 1990 CAAA was to make standards and enforcement
stricter over time. As such, if the more affected, pollution-intensive industries seek trade protection after
an increase in the stringency of environmental laws, we might expect to see the level of trade protection
rise as enforcement gets tougher or certain exceptions are phased out. As before, this effect is largest for
NO2 where significant emitters of NO2 are also some of the most politically connected. There seems
to be a faster decrease in tariffs in the last 3 years of Table 6 reflecting certain economic events such
as Congress approved tax cuts in 1998 that perhaps reduced the need for trade protection in pollution-
intensive industries as well.
131SO2 and NO2 pollution-intensities are highly correlated and industries with large emissions in one typically have large
emissions of the other as well.
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Table 7: Panel Estimation Results: 1989-1994
CO SO2 NO2 PM-10
EnvReg -0.534 (0.071) -0.535 (0.071) -0.543 (0.074) -0.521 (0.072)
EnvReg×Pollute 4.315 (1.861) 5.083 (2.500) 12.422 (4.557) 6.007 (2.056)
Log of Imports -0.579 (0.209) -0.577 (0.210) -0.578 (0.210) -0.580 (0.210)
Log of Employment -0.009 (0.506) -0.020 (0.509) -0.015 (0.514) 0.022 (0.511)
Log of Value Added 0.768 (0.409) 0.761 (0.411) 0.760 (0.421) 0.718 (0.416)
Obs. 2318 2318 2318 2318
Total Pollution Intensity
EnvReg -0.546 (0.072)
EnvReg×Pollute 2.005 (0.671)
Log of Imports -0.577 (0.209)
Log of Employment -0.028 (0.507)
Log of Value Added 0.776 (0.410)
Obs. 2318
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average tariff level equal to
100∗ (duties/customsvalueo f imports) at the 4-digit sic industry level from 1989-1994.
In sum, I obtain consistent evidence of a first-order effect of the 1990 CAAA and pollution intensity
on tariff levels using two different empirical strategies. The panel analysis pools all industry-year ob-
servations in the 1989-2002 period and identifies the effects of tougher environmental policies from the
cross-sectional and time-series variation without taking a stance on the time it takes for the change in
environmental laws to affect tariff rates. The fact that the results are qualitatively the same in both ap-
proaches provides complementary evidence on the impact of pollution intensity and tighter environmental
regulations on import tariffs.
Trade Agreements and Environmental Regulation Stringency
Changes in environmental laws could potentially be part of a number of domestic policy changes that
may include trade reforms. In this section, I maintain that my findings are not driven by simultaneous
changes in trade policy.
Anticipation of WTO formation scheduled to occur in 1995 may have had a bearing on the change
in environmental regulation, also impacting the level of tariffs. To explore this possibility, I restrict the
sample period to the years preceding creation of the WTO and re-estimate specification (1) for all four
pollutants.132 I continue to find a positive and significant effect of the interaction between pollution
intensity and the environmental regulation dummy on tariffs for all measures of pollution intensity. I also
find that the magnitude of α2 is considerably lower in Table 7 relative to Table 5. This may be due to
132This would also address other policies (monetary or fiscal) that could potentially influence both tariffs and environmental
regulation and occurred after 1994. In the specification with the restricted sample, I also control for imports, value added and
employment.
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Table 8: Panel Estimation Results without NAFTA Trade: 1989-2002
CO SO2 NO2 PM-10
EnvReg -0.105 (0.063) -0.118 (0.063) -0.150 (0.069) -0.105 (0.065)
EnvReg×Pollute 6.941 (2.719) 11.983 (4.864) 36.577 (11.836) 21.846 (7.476)
Log of Imports -0.258 (0.239) -0.259 (0.238) -0.260 (0.238) -0.264 (0.239)
Log of Employment 0.089 (0.372) 0.082 (0.372) 0.085 (0.376) 0.099 (0.373)
Log of Value Added 0.141 (0.384) 0.142 (0.382) 0.143 (0.387) 0.117 (0.383)
Obs. 5333 5333 5333 5333
Total Pollution Intensity
EnvReg -0.144 (0.063)
EnvReg×Pollute 5.055 (1.212)
Log of Imports -0.262 (0.238)
Log of Employment 0.076 (0.373)
Log of Value Added 0.152 (0.383)
Obs. 5333
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average tariff level equal to
100∗ (duties/customsvalueo f imports) at the 4-digit sic industry level from 1989-2002.
fewer data points used in estimation and/or to the fact that WTO formation presented additional motives
for trade protection, biasing the estimates of α2 in Table 5. The fact that the results still hold pre-1995
suggests that the interaction of pollution-intensity and the 1990 CAAA is not correlated with creation of
the WTO or other policy changes that occurred after 1994.
The North American Free Trade Agreement implemented in 1994 could also be a source of concern
for a number of reasons. First, with NAFTA came an executive order by President Clinton to conduct
quantitative evaluations of the environmental effects of the proposed trade agreement, suggesting that
NAFTA may have been determined endogenously with domestic environmental policy that also affected
tariff rates in the United States. Second, if Canada and Mexico are not exporting a significant share of
pollution-intensive goods to the U.S., then the larger decline in tariffs for non-polluting goods may just be
reflecting this and not truly capturing the causal effect of the 1990 CAAA.
Given that I observe tariff data by U.S. trade partner, I control for NAFTA by excluding Canada and
Mexico from the sample and I re-estimate equation (1) as before. The results in Table 8 show a positive
and significant effect of pollution intensity and environmental regulation on tariffs. Thus, restricting trade
to non-NAFTA partners does not seem to affect my findings.133
I also repeat the event-study analysis (specification (3)) excluding NAFTA trade. In particular, I
examine the change in average tariff rates between the pre-Act years and three years following NAFTA.134
As the results in Table 9 demonstrate, tariff rates decline less rapidly in the more pollution-intensive
133To be consistent with the WTO case, I restrict the sample period from 1989-1993 and re-estimate the model with NAFTA
members. The results are similar to those presented in Table 8.
134Increasing the number of years after NAFTA does not significantly affect the results.
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Table 9: Event Study Results without NAFTA
τ97,98− τ89,90
EnvReg×Pollute 7.384 (1.422)
EnvReg×PolluteCO 10.793 (3.702)
EnvReg×PolluteSO2 18.030 (6.635)
EnvReg×PolluteNO2 56.367 (19.622)
EnvReg×PollutePM10 30.500 (8.580)
Obs. 382
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
industries after environmental laws become stricter even in the absence of concurrent trade reforms.
Endogeneity
Endogeneity remains a serious concern in the trade and environment empirical literatures. The 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments may have been influenced by unobserved factors that could possibly determine
tariffs as well. Policy makers may believe that better environmental quality improves the health of workers
and consumers and leads to a stronger economy, which may also potentially impact trade policy. A few
pieces of evidence suggest that, while endogeneity of the environmental regulation change cannot be
unquestionably ruled out, it does not appear problematic for my results.
First, to the extent that the environmental regulation was enacted at the national level and the exact
timing of the CAAA was the product of complex political processes, it may be viewed as plausibly exoge-
nous from the perspective of individual producers. Nonetheless, if more stringent environmental laws are
anticipated, tariffs may fall less slowly in more pollution-intensive industries prior to the observed date
in expectation of increased costs of complying with the new regulation. Thus, the estimated impact of
stricter environmental regulation would be biased downwards.
Second, reports suggest that the record heat in the summer of 1988 and the Alaskan oil spill by Exxon
Valdaz in 1989 may have significantly influenced the passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
after a decade-long deadlock in clean air regulation (Bryner, 1992). These factors were by and large
independent of trade policy.
Lastly, the election of George Bush as president of the U.S. in November 1988 also played a key role
in tightening air pollution control laws in 1990. Bryner (1992) notes that Bush effectively used environ-
mental issues to distance himself from the Reagan administration and gain support from the Democratic
leadership who traditionally favored environmental protection. It is quite likely that the election of George
Bush also had a bearing on trade policy. President Bush maintained protection for the steel industry but
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Table 10: IV Panel Estimation Results: 1989-2002
CO SO2 NO2 PM-10
EnvReg -2.065 (0.295) -2.071 (0.296) -2.111 (0.306) -2.03 (0.295)
EnvReg×Pollute 9.267 (3.576) 13.575 (4.340) 40.234 (9.797) 15.525 (2.620)
Lagged Log of Imports -0.491 (0.284) -0.50 (0.285) -0.495 (0.282) -0.506 (0.283)
Log of Employment 0.291 (0.365) 0.359 (0.381) 0.364 (0.384) 0.380 (0.382)
Log of Value Added 0.250 (0.346) 0.250 (0.345) 0.249 (0.347) 0.225 (0.345)
Obs. 5294 5294 5294 5294
Total Pollution Intensity
EnvReg -2.097 (0.299)
EnvReg×Pollute 5.212 (1.113)
Lagged Log of Imports -0.503 (0.284)
Log of Employment 0.355 (0.381)
Log of Value Added 0.258 (0.345)
Obs. 5294
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average tariff level equal to
100∗ (duties/customsvalueo f imports) at the 4-digit sic industry level from 1989-2002.
also pushed for the North American Free Trade Agreement. The consistent results I establish without
NAFTA trade suggests that the latter case is not a major concern in my analysis. The former case of
political motivation for trade protection would in any case potentially underestimate the actual impact of
the interaction between pollution-intensity and the 1990 CAAA on trade policy.
There is also concern that increased imports may intensify lobbying for protection and lead to higher
levels of protection (see Trefler, 1993 and Ederington and Minier, 2003). As such, I follow an approach
suggested by Wooldridge (2002) and deal with the potential endogeneity of imports by using the lagged
value of imports as an instrument. The idea is that once current imports have been controlled for along
with unobserved, time constant factors like the ability of industries to organize, imports of other years
should have no effect on tariffs during the current year.135 However, previous imports may be correlated
with unobserved organizational ability and this can be solved by using lags (Wooldridge, 2002). I estimate
specification (1) by two-stage least squares (2SLS) where the in the first stage I regress imports on its lag,
the environmental regulation dummy, the pollution intensity interaction with the regulation as well as time
and industry fixed effects. Table 10 presents the 2SLS estimation results when the endogeneity of imports
is taken into account.136 For all pollutants in Table 10, I continue to find a positive and significant impact
of pollution-intensity and environmental regulation on tariffs. I conduct the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for
endogeneity of imports. In all cases I am able to reject the null hypothesis that imports are exogenous,
suggesting that the Instrumental Variable (IV) approach is more appropriate. I then test the significance of
my instrument and find an F statistic above 17 for all measures of pollution intensity where an F statistic
135This is the strict exogeneity assumption identified in Wooldridge (2002;pg 253).
136Results from the first stage regression are not presented here for ease of exposition but are available upon request.
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Table 11: The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments and Footloose Industries
Tariffs
EnvReg -2.184 (0.263)
EnvReg×Pollute 5.504 (1.510)
EnvReg×TransportCosts 0.0024 (0.024)
Log of Imports -0.422 (0.243)
Log of Employment 0.348 (0.387)
Log of Value Added 0.233 (0.340)
Obs. 5330
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
over 10 is required to suggest instruments are sufficiently strong.137
There may also be concern that more stringent environmental regulations might lead to the offshoring
of industries that can no longer remain competitive in the United States. However, if such industries
have high transport costs, they may be less sensitive to changing comparative advantage or changes in
production costs relative to footloose industries and will be less likely to relocate. My hypothesis is that
stricter air pollution laws will have a greater effect on tariffs in industries with high transport costs. The
intuition here is that a high transport-cost industry cannot freely relocate to another country in response to
tighter domestic environmental regulations and will be more likely to seek trade protection.138 Following
Ederington, Levinson, and Minier (2005), I estimate the product market transportation costs for each
industry using freight costs and controlling for the distance shipped.139 I interact the estimated transport
costs with the environmental regulation dummy and include the new variable in specification (1).
The results are presented in Table 11. If the above hypothesis is correct, the interaction term will
have a positive coefficient, indicating that more stringent environmental regulations will result in a slower
decline of tariff rates in less footloose industries. In Table 11, the interaction term is positive but not
statistically different from zero. The coefficient of the interaction between pollution-intensity and the
environmental regulation dummy is still positive and significant, suggesting that tariff rates fell by less in
pollution-intensive industries in the years following the 1990 CAAA even after accounting for the impact
of industry immobility.
137Results from the significance of instrument tests appear in the Appendix. Given that I have the same number of instruments
as endogenous variables, the Sargan test for the validity of the instruments cannot be applied here. As an alternate instrument,
I use the difference between the first and second period lag of imports and obtain results similar to those presented in Table
7. Furthermore, the gravity model of trade states that trade between a pair of countries may be determined by country size
(population) and geographical variables (physical distance, language, common border) that are plausibly exogenous from trade.
Thus, I use as an alternate instrument the predicted value of a gravity trade model between the U.S. and its trading partners
weighted by the industry share of total imports. The results are consistent in this case as well and presented in the Appendix.
138Note that if these less footloose industries are also pollution-intensive, then we might expect an even larger effect of the 1990
CAAA on tariffs.
139The Appendix in Ederington, Levinson, and Minier (2005) provides details. The key difference here is that I use the entire
sample of exporters to the U.S. between 1989-2002.
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Conclusion
This paper presents evidence that the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment was an important determinant
of tariff rates in pollution-intensive industries relative to less polluting industries in the U.S. between 1989-
2002. I use the variation in pollution-intensity across industries, and show that the 1990 CAAA decreased
tariffs disproportionately less in pollution-intensive sectors, particularly in those that are heavy emitters
of urban air and acid rain pollutants.
My results contribute to the literature on trade and the environment in two important ways. First, I
make a firm case for a causal link from pollution intensity and environmental regulation to trade barriers
by exploiting the 1990 CAAA and using industry variation in pollution-intensity. Second, I find larger
effects of tighter air pollution controls in industries that pollute NO2 intensively such as the cement,
petroleum refining, lime, and pulp mills industries. These industries are also well organized and have
groups that actively promote their interests in the political process, providing some evidence in support of
political economy theories of protection. Identifying the specific motives for tariff adjustments in response
to stricter air pollution laws presents scope for further research.
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Appendix
U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990
• Title I: Provisions for Attainment and Maintenance of National Ambient Air Quality Standards
– Requires the Federal government to reduce emissions from cars, trucks, buses, consumer prod-
ucts, and from ships and barges.
– Clarifies assignment of attainment and non-attainment areas.
– Gives certain states more time to meet the air quality standard.
– Requires states to make constant progress in reducing emissions
• Title II: Provisions Relating to Mobile Sources
– Tighter pollution standards for emissions from automobiles and trucks as of 1994 models.
– Reduce tailpipe emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxides.
– Establishes a clean fuel car pilot program in California.
– Requires standards to become stricter over time.
• Title III: Air Toxics
– Targets 189 toxic air pollutants of which emissions must be reduced.
– The EPA must publish a list of source categories that emit certain levels of these pollutants
within one year after the new law.
– The EPA must issue standards that must be met based on best demonstrated control technology
within two years of passage of the new law.
– Establishes a Chemical Safety Board to investigate accidental releases of chemicals.
• Title IV: Acid Deposition Control
– Requires a permanent 10 million ton reduction in SO2 emissions from 1980 levels.
– Allows emission reductions in phases up to January 1, 2000.
– Establishes tradeable emissions allowance system where each source must have sufficient al-
lowances to cover its annual emissions or face a fine.
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– Includes specific requirements for reducing emissions of nitrogen that must be issued no later
than mid-1992 for certain boilers.
• Title V: Permits
– Introduces an operating permits program.
– Each permit is valid for period of up to 5 years.
– Any citizen may petition EPA or the Federal court of appeals if a permit violates any aspect of
the Act.
• Title VI: Stratospheric Ozone and Global Climate Protection
– Requires complete phaseout of CFCs and halons.
– Requires the EPA to publish a list of safe and unsafe substitutes for Class I and II chemicals
and to ban the use of unsafe substitutes.
– Requires Class I chemicals be banned within 2 years of enactment.
– Implements ban for aerosols and non-insulating foams using Class II chemicals effective in
1994.
• Title VII: Provisions Relating to Enforcement
– EPA may issue administrative penalty orders up to 200,000 U.S.D.
– Criminal penalties for knowing violations are upgraded from misdemeanors to felonies.
– Sources must certify their compliance.
– EPA may issue administrative subpoenas for compliance data.
– Allows citizens to seek penalties against violators.
Summary Statistics and Estimation
The summary statistics tables replicate Table 4 in the main text by pollutant. For the four main pollutants
considered, I present the average tariff rate in the periods before and after the 1990 CAAA. As in Table
4, tariffs are declining over time but less so for pollution-intensive industries relative to the non-polluting
industries.
I estimate the specification in (1) with all the pollutants included in the regression to determine which
pollutant most strongly influences tariffs at the industry level. From Table A1, I find that NO2 is positive
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Summary Statistics: NO2
Pre-Act (1989-1990) Post-Act (1991-1995) Post-Act (1996-2002)
Pollution-Intensive 3.922 (5.961) 3.088 (3.188) 1.985 (3.304)
Non Pollution-Intensive 5.550 (5.349) 4.674 (4.602) 2.856 (4.015)
Summary Statistics: SO2
Pre-Act (1989-1990) Post-Act (1991-1995) Post-Act (1996-2002)
Pollution-Intensive 4.175 (6.039) 3.297 (3.445) 2.097 (3.399)
Non Pollution-Intensive 5.343 (5.289) 4.511 (4.509) 2.768 (3.974)
Summary Statistics: CO
Pre-Act (1989-1990) Post-Act (1991-1995) Post-Act (1996-2002)
Pollution-Intensive 4.035 (6.051) 3.199 (3.416) 1.940 (2.736)
Non Pollution-Intensive 5.458 (5.264) 4.578 (4.480) 2.910 (4.430)
Summary Statistics: PM10
Pre-Act (1989-1990) Post-Act (1991-1995) Post-Act (1996-2002)
Pollution-Intensive 3.983 (6.534) 3.114 (3.358) 1.863 (2.749)
Non Pollution-Intensive 5.236 (5.047) 4.386 (4.355) 2.782 (4.171)
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
A1: Effects of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment on Tariffs
EnvReg -2.433 (0.173)
EnvReg×PolluteNO2 43.412 (21.162)
EnvReg×PolluteSO2 -3.311 (6.853)
EnvReg×PolluteCO 4.678 (3.442)
EnvReg×PollutePM10 -7.839 (8.962)
EnvReg×PollutePT 5.415 (10.449)
EnvReg×PolluteVOC 5.610 (5.610)
Log of Imports -0.0039 (0.006)
Log of Employment 0.396 (0.395)
Log of Value Added 0.073 (0.374)
Obs. 5324
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average tariff level equal to
100∗ (duties/customsvalueo f imports) at the 4-digit sic industry level from 1989-2002.
Validity Tests for IV Panel Estimation Results:1989-2002
Endogeneity (F-Stat) Significance of IV (F-Stat)
EnvReg 0.172 102.761
EnvReg×PolluteNO2 0.157 102.282
EnvReg×PolluteSO2 0.155 102.622
EnvReg×PolluteCO 0.117 101.557
EnvReg×PollutePM10 0.170 103.684
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Table 12: Gravity Model IV Panel Estimation Results: 1989-2002
CO SO2 NO2 PM-10
EnvReg -2.204 (0.765) -2.209 (0.769) -2.236 (0.777) -2.175 (0.760)
EnvReg×Pollute 9.809 (4.107) 14.643 (6.198) 42.013 (14.002) 16.615 (4.760)
Log of Imports -0.319 (0.284) -0.330 (1.077) -0.340 (1.073) -0.325 (1.080)
Log of Employment 0.374 (0.371) 0.368 (0.372) 0.373 (0.372) 0.390 (0.371)
Log of Value Added 0.185 (0.416) 0.188 (0.413) 0.190 (0.413) 0.156 (0.418)
Obs. 5344 5344 5344 5344
Total Pollution Intensity
EnvReg -2.216 (0.768)
EnvReg×Pollute 5.521 (1.715)
Log of Imports -0.361 (1.069)
Log of Employment 0.363 (0.371)
Log of Value Added 0.205 (0.410)
Obs. 5344
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average tariff level equal to
100∗ (duties/customsvalueo f imports) at the 4-digit sic industry level from 1989-2002.
Table 13: Two Period Lagged Imports IV Panel Estimation Results
CO SO2 NO2 PM-10
EnvReg -2.081 (0.260) -2.112 (0.261) -2.141 (0.270) -2.073 (0.256)
EnvReg×Pollute 9.052 (3.896) 15.023 (5.383) 39.807 (10.012) 15.507 (2.921)
Log of Imports -0.465 (0.281) -0.438 (0.281) -0.445 (0.276) -0.442 (0.277)
Log of Employment 0.359 (0.383) 0.355 (0.383) 0.360 (0.385) 0.373 (0.384)
Log of Value Added 0.248 (0.361) 0.236 (0.360) 0.238 (0.361) 0.211 (0.361)
Obs. 5244 5244 5244 5244
Total Pollution Intensity
EnvReg -2.136 (0.263)
EnvReg×Pollute 5.279 (1.304)
Log of Imports -0.441 (0.280)
Log of Employment 0.351 (0.383)
Log of Value Added 0.244 (0.360)
Obs. 5244
Notes: Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the average tariff level equal to
100∗ (duties/customsvalueo f imports) at the 4-digit sic industry level from 1989-2002.
and significant with tariffs increasing by about 0.07% in the average NO2 pollution-intensive industry in
the years after the 1990 CAAA.
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